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Dear Readers,
As the end of another year approaches, we at the CISR hope 2009 has been 
productive and successful for you. We are very pleased with the growth in 
circulation and substantive changes we have made to The Journal this year, 
and are grateful for the contributions and feedback we receive from you, 
our readers. You may have noticed that our current issue has been modified 
a bit in its design. Please let us know what you think of the new layout and 
any other suggestions you have regarding The Journal—we are always look-
ing to improve!
This issue includes an editorial I have written about the Ottawa Convention 
and appropriate endstates for mine clearance. I’m putting forth one opin-
ion, but we would like to hear yours. It’s easy for you to tell us—there is an 
online survey to accompany the article. Please see the survey Web link in 
the article that begins on page 4 and then follow the instructions to com-
plete this quick and important opinion survey.
Also in this edition is a special report section on improvised explosive de-
vices. This topic has grown increasingly important as IEDs have a profound 
relationship to mine action and UXO functions, as well as affecting broader 
stability and development activities. We hope these articles are informative 
and useful. To stay up to date on breaking IED news, visit the IED News 
section of our Web site (http://maic.jmu.edu). Be sure to visit The Journal’s 
Web pages as well—there is a wonderful selection of online-only content to 
complement what is provided in the print version.
I hope you enjoy this edition!
Dennis
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In his article in Issue 13.1 of this publica-tion, Dr. Robert Keeley suggests an imag-inative and altogether logical course of 
action to enhance the Ottawa Convention—
amend it.1
For years, James Madison University’s Mine 
Action Information Center has called for an 
approach to mine action that would not sac-
rifice pragmatic plans and scarce resources 
on the altar of an unrealistic, “mine free” ap-
proach to landmine clearance. The reasons to 
us have always been evident: In a world suffer-
ing from so many humanitarian, medical, post-
conflict and development issues, insisting on 
the removal of every last landmine would di-
lute practical planning and management pro-
cedures, while requiring almost unimaginable 
amounts of resources.
Which Endstate?
The debate among supporters of “mine free,” 
“impact free” and “mine safe” endstates has 
generally been relegated to the realm of coffee 
breaks and free-form discussions at Standing 
E
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by Dennis Barlow [ Center for International Stabilization and Recovery ]
Amending the Ottawa      
             Convention: A Way Forward
With clearance deadlines for States Parties to the Ottawa Convention approaching or 
having passed, and available humanitarian aid being spread among an exploding num-
ber of worthy activities, should mine-action programs be held to the stringent letter 
of the Convention? The author posits that, with a simple solution, States Parties can 
fulfill the spirit of the agreement while eliminating costly, time-consuming and inef-
ficient clearance obligations. 
Committee Meetings of the Ottawa Conven-
tion. The “mine free” approach derives from 
Article 5, paragraph 1: “Each State Party under-
takes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all 
anti-personnel mines,” while the “impact free” 
proponents base their argument on the Pream-
ble, which sets as its goal “an end to suffering 
and casualties” [emphasis added].2 The goal of 
any strategic plan sets the path forward, and 
mine action is no different. Such terms estab-
lish the measures of effectiveness and progress 
to be achieved, and disagreements relating to 
the proper endstate invariably result in confu-
sion and dissention in policy as well as opera-
tional circles.
The obligation of the United Kingdom to help 
clear the Falkland-Malvinas Islands has forced 
the debate into the world of realpolitik. The 
United Kingdom has been one of the staunch-
est supporters of the Ottawa Convention, yet has 
both received and delivered harsh comments 
during heated exchanges relating to its Article 5 
obligations—and no wonder. Critics of the U.K. 
argue that the convention is clear, and that the 
U.K. government is required to “de-
stroy or ensure the destruction of all 
anti-personnel mines in mined areas 
under its jurisdiction or control.”2 At 
the 9th Meeting of the States Parties, 
British Ambassador John Duncan re-
sponded with some stern logic, ob-
serving that it would be unwise for his 
country to spend US$100 million 
to clear an area in the Falkland-
Malvinas Islands that has been 
without landmine accidents for the 
past 25 years. Clearly, he said, the 
money could be better spent. The 
U.K. observed that it was the spir-
it and not the letter of the Conven-
tion that it was upholding. This 
assertion came as a thunderbolt in 
that it confirmed what has been the 
position of the United States and 
others for a long time: Striving for 
a true impact-free environment is 
the most practical and logical way 
to approach mine action.
Extension Requests
At the conclusion of the first de-
cade of the Ottawa Convention, the 
great majority of countries with 
clearance deadlines (15 of the 17 in 
2009) have requested an extension to 
their Convention obligations. There-
fore, we must ask several questions 
regarding the failure to meet clear-
ance deadlines: 
1. Why have so many countries 
had to request extensions? 
2. As all 15 extension requests 
were granted by member states, 
will the international commu-
nity (donors, international or-
ganizations, nongovernmental 
organizations, etc.) accept the 
rationale and costs for exten-
sion requests and approvals? 
3. What does this situation mean 
for further support to affected 
countries?
4. How will it affect the donors 
providing financial support for 
clearance activities? 
5. How will it affect the need for 
resources relating to develop-
ment and humanitarian aid? 
The CISR/MAIC believes that the 
impetus for an amendment to pro-
vide the proper guidance for these ef-
forts is found in the first 14 words of 
the Convention: “Determined to put 
an end to the suffering and casual-
ties caused by anti-personnel land-
mines.”2 Clearly the imperative to 
relieve suffering trumps any particu-
lar operational methodology. We also 
note a disturbing trend in discus-
sions alluding to Article 5, paragraph 
2, which states that “Each State Party 
shall make every effort to identify all 
areas under its jurisdiction or con-
trol in which anti-personnel mines 
are known or suspected to be em-
placed”2 [emphasis added]—there 
being an implication that not know-
ing of landmines may be a way out 
of the political dilemma. To meet 
the question honestly and frankly 
seems to us the best recourse, rath-
er than skirting the issue by fenc-
ing with words or playing legalistic 
roulette as affected countries try to 
satisfy the requirements of various 
donors and stakeholders.
Time for an Amendment
We do not understand the contro-
versy about addressing the question 
of an amendment to the Conven-
tion. No one at the original meeting 
ruled out the need for amendments 
in the future, and Keeley points out 
that the U.S. Constitution has grown 
stronger—not weaker—through its 
amendment process.1 Certainly the 
framers of the Mine Ban Conven-
tion envisioned the potential to up-
date and enhance the document by 
inclusion of Article 13, which lays 
out a very clear set of procedures to 
amend it.
In light of countries being unable 
to complete Article 5 clearance ob-
ligations and the confusing discrep-
ancies between the terms found in 
the Preamble and Article 5, we won-
der why no State Party has suggested 
an amendment to clarify this key is-
sue and discuss it during an Amend-
ment Conference. 
See Endnotes, Page 77 
Dennis Barlow, Director of the James 
Madison University Center for International 
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Do you favor or oppose an amendment to the Mine 
Ban Convention to clarify the endstate required 
for clearance efforts? Tell us your opinion—take 
the Ottawa Convention Amendment Survey at: 
http://maic.jmu.edu
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In March 2005, over 100 donors and de-veloping countries convened in Paris to reform the international aid system and 
make it more effective in addressing global pov-
erty. The previous aid system, in place since at 
least the 1960s, had changed over time, mainly 
because of its problems and lack of effectiveness. 
The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness1 was 
issued in an attempt to rectify the flaws and em-
phasize the need to “increase the impact of aid 
… in reducing poverty and inequality, increas-
ing growth, building capacity, and accelerating 
the achievement of the Millennium Develop-
ment Goals.”1 
The Paris Declaration established five prin-
ciples to shape aid delivery:
1. Ownership: Developing countries set their 
own development policies and strategies, 
while donors support capacity develop-
ment and institution building. 
2. Alignment: Donor assistance should be 
consistent with the national priorities 
outlined in developing countries’ devel-
opment strategies.
3. Harmonization: Donors coordinate their 
aid activities. 
4. Managing for results: Developing coun-
tries and donors focus more on the impact 
Aid Effectiveness in Insecure Areas 
by Sharmala Naidoo [ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining ]
The issue of aid effectiveness in conflict-affected and insecure areas is receiving in-
creased attention within the development community. The Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness,1 Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Sit-
uations2 and the recent Accra Agenda for Action3 signal donor and recipient commit-
ment to improve the effectiveness of aid. Conflict-affected countries often present 
aid-effectiveness challenges that require special attention—but what does this mean 
for countries affected by mines and explosive remnants of war? This article examines 
recent developments, highlighting some implications for mine action.
of aid on people’s lives and create better 
ways to measure impact.
5. Mutual accountability: Developing coun-
tries and donors are more transparent in 
the use and impact of aid to their citizens 
and parliaments. 
The Paris Declaration recognized that aid-
effectiveness principles apply to conflict-affected and 
insecure areas but require adaptation, partic-
ularly where local ownership and capacity are 
weak. A recent report by the Afghanistan Re-
search and Evaluation Unit4 reinforces this 
message. It concludes that the Afghan context 
poses unique challenges to aid-effectiveness 
principles, including continued insecurity, 
limited capacity, competing agendas, corrup-
tion, lack of coordination, and lack of clarity 
among military, humanitarian and develop-
ment interventions.4
In 2007, the Organisation for European Eco-
nomic Co-operation Development Assistance 
Group released Principles for Good Internation-
al Engagement in Fragile States and Situations2 
(hereinafter, the Principles). The Principles 
calls on donors to ensure conflict-sensitive aid, 
whole-of-government approaches5 and policy 
coherence6 in the political, security and devel-
opment spheres. The Principles also encourages 
donors to link aid to the wider agen-
das of peace-building, conflict pre-
vention and state-building. 
More recently, developing coun-
tries and donors met in Accra in 
2008 to review progress on aid re-
form, and they issued the Accra 
Agenda for Action.7 The AAA em-
phasizes the following when engag-
ing in conflict-affected areas:
•	 Conduct joint donor assess-
ments (governance, capacity) 
and conflict analyses 
•	 Promote flexible, rapid and 
long-term funding modalities 
on a pooled basis 
•	 Link aid to broader peace- and 
state-building processes
•	 Strengthen the capacity of states 
to deliver core functions 
•	 Work with local communities 
and civil-society organizations, 
particularly where government 
capacity is weak or non-existent 
as a result of conflict
Post-conflict Implications 
In order to maximize contribu-
tions to relief, recovery and stabili-
zation efforts, donor coordination 
and harmonization are vital in 
mine/ERW-affected countries like 
Afghanistan, Somaliland, Sri Lanka 
and Sudan. Where possible, sup-
port for mine action should be 
aligned with national government 
plans and procedures. 
During and immediately after 
conflicts, mine action often plays an 
important role in facilitating peace-
keeping and humanitarian access, 
as well as enabling the delivery of es-
sential goods and services. It can also 
make important contributions to 
building peace, reducing armed vio-
lence and strengthening the capacity 
of state institutions. In such contexts, 
donors should ensure that support 
for mine action contributes to broad-
er peace-building, armed-violence 
reduction and institution-building 
processes, where appropriate. 
One example of how mine action 
played an important role in build-
ing confidence was between the gov-
ernment of Sudan and the Sudanese 
People’s Liberation Army in 2002 
when a locally-brokered ceasefire 
was negotiated, leading to a tri-partite 
Memorandum of Understanding 
among the government of Sudan, the 
SPLA and the United Nations. Fol-
lowing 30 years of conflict, this was 
the first time leaders from opposing 
sides in Sudan signed a nationwide 
agreement. The MoU allowed for 
emergency demining of key routes 
between North and South Sudan 
in the Nuba mountains. The United 
Nations Mine Action Service, in as-
sociation with DanChurchAid and 
two Sudanese nongovernmental or-
ganizations—Sudanese Association 
for Combating Landmines and Op-
eration Save Innocent Lives—joint-
ly trained 15 people from both sides 
as deminers. Community members 
from both sides were involved in 
assisting the deminers with clear-
ing vegetation in exchange for food 
through a World Food Programme 
food-for-work scheme. 
The value of humanitarian weap-
ons abatement was apparent in 2008 
when Mines Advisory Group started 
working with the Burundian police, 
Police Nationale Burundaise, in sup-
port of Burundi’s civilian disarma-
ment campaign. A mixed MAG-PNB 
mobile team collected and destroyed 
small arms/light weapons previ-
ously handed over by the popula-
tion or seized by the PNB. As part 
of Burundi’s implementation of 
the Nairobi Protocol for the Preven-
tion, Control and Reduction of Small 
Arms and Light Weapons in the 
Great Lakes Region and the Horn of 
Africa,8 MAG conducted a survey of 
the PNB SA/LW sites in June 2009. 
This survey led to a comprehen-
sive physical-security and stockpile 
management project in 2009 with 
MAG and the PNB which, parallel 
A minefield in Bosnia prevents land use long after the conflict has ended.
ALL PHOTOS COURTESY OF GICHD
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to the marking of weapons, focuses 
on collecting and destroying surplus 
and obsolete SA/LW, as well as im-
proving the physical security of po-
lice weapons stores. It also focuses 
on strengthening the capacity of the 
PNB in weapons and ammunition 
accountability and safe storage.9,10,11 
The project is ongoing with comple-
tion expected in April 2010.
A final example of the aid effec-
tiveness is seen with Danish De- 
mining Group’s active involvement 
in efforts to reduce armed violence. 
In Somaliland, DDG is working 
with local communities and peace-
building organizations to reduce the 
demand for SA/LW and enhance 
community safety. As previous at-
tempts to forcibly disarm commu-
nities have failed, DDG is focusing 
on training local communities in 
conflict-management and conflict-
resolution techniques, safe storage 
of SA/LW and ammunition, under-
taking mine/ERW clearance and de-
struction and building trust between 
communities and the police.12 In 
Somaliland, where state structures 
remain weak, strengthening the ca-
pacity of communities and civil-
society organizations is critical. 
Conclusion
Donors face increasing challenges 
in delivering aid effectively in coun-
tries affected by mines and ERW. Re-
cently, several strategies including the 
Paris Declaration, the Principles and 
the AAA have encouraged donors to 
take a wider look at the unique is-
sues encountered in delivering aid to 
conflict-affected and insecure areas. 
In order to maximize the benefits of 
relief, recovery and stabilization ef-
forts, donors are encouraged to con-
duct joint assessments, promote 
flexible funding modalities, work in 
harmonization with local govern-
ments and communities, and look at 
the wider agendas of conflict preven-
tion, state-building and peace-build-
ing in war-torn areas. In maximizing 
Currently serving as Project Manager for 
the Linking Mine Action and Development 
project at GICHD, Sharmala Naidoo has 
previously worked with Saferworld and 
Amnesty International. She spent several 
years in Zimbabwe, working with local 
human-rights and development NGOs. 
Prior to this, she worked for the Canadian 
Foreign Ministry. Naidoo holds a Mas-
ter of Arts in public administration from 
Carleton University in Ottawa, Canada.
Sharmala Naidoo
Project Manager
Linking Mine Action and 
Development Project
Geneva International Centre for
Humanitarian Demining
7 bis, Avenue de la Paix
PO Box 1300
1211 Geneva 1 / Switzerland
Tel: +41 22 906 83 22
Fax: +41 22 906 16 90
E-mail: s.naidoo@gichd.org
Web site: http://www.gichd.org/lmad
A MAG deminer working in Sudan.
aid effectiveness, donors can make 
valuable contributions toward peace-
building, strengthening local govern-
ment institutions, reducing violence, 
countering poverty and facilitating 
the coordination of humanitarian 
access in communities affected by 
mines/ERW.
Making aid effective in conflict-
affected countries is clearly chal-
lenging. However, enhanced donor 
coordination, harmonization and 
support for broader peace-building, 
armed-violence reduction, and insti-
tution-building initiatives are all 
vital, and they can go a long way 
to improving safety and reducing 
poverty in communities affected 
by mines/ERW. 
See Endnotes, Page 77 It is a well-known fact that the region of Southeast Europe is heavily contaminated with landmines and unexploded ordnance. 
Many mine-action centers in the region were 
established immediately after conflicts end-
ed in the SEE countries. Mine action in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina started in 1996, and 13 years 
later, demining authorities there have grown 
into highly respectable organizations with the 
knowledge and ability to assist mine-action cen-
ters outside the region of Southeast Europe. Still, 
demining is a continuous effort requiring con-
stant development and improvement. 
To improve demining methods, specifically 
the use of mine-detection dogs, the members 
of the South-Eastern Europe Mine Action Co-
ordination Council agreed that, due to the ex-
tensive and pioneering use of mine–detection 
dogs in Bosnia since early 1996, it would be ap-
propriate for Bosnia to host a mine–detection 
dog center for the Balkans region.1,2 SEEMACC 
is a technical body established as an integral 
facilitator of regional cooperation and inter-
regional projects through its expertise and 
knowledge of mine action within the region. 
The group promotes an integrated regional ap-
proach to planning demining activities, fund-
raising and establishing demining standards, 
as well as the installation of a forum in which 
to exchange ideas on the training of personnel. 
Besides being an important facilitator of re-
As the refinement of mine-detection methods becomes more important, the Mine 
Detection Dog Center for South East Europe is answering the call, training dogs and 
handlers for effective detection. Working with animals is not easy, but the MDDC has 
been very successful in its operations. The organization focuses on regional coopera-
tion, and has worked in areas such as Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Iraq, 
where it has proved to be an effective asset to mine detection and clearance. 
gional cooperation, the MDDC also initiated 
the creation of the region’s Humanitarian De-
mining Standard chapter covering the use of 
mine-detection dogs.3
Regional Training Projects
The Global Training Academy, located in San 
Antonio, Texas, United States, provided initial 
training to MDDC with the sponsorship of a 
grant by the Office of Humanitarian Demining 
Programs in the U.S. Department of State (now 
the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement) 
in 2003. The U.S. State Department also funded 
the operational costs of the MDDC and facili-
ties construction/improvements through the In-
ternational Trust Fund for Demining and Mine 
Victims Assistance in Slovenia until the MDDC 
became financially self-supporting in 2006. Co-
operation with the ITF and the Marshall Lega-
cy Institute in the United States has resulted in 
many successful projects. It is worth mention-
ing a few of the most important regional train-
ing projects, including those at the Azerbaijan 
National Agency for Mine Action and the Leb-
anon Mine Action Center. The MDDC has 
trained a total of 16 mine-detection dogs and 
teams from March 2006–June 2009 for ANAMA, 
along with 10 mine-detection-dog teams for 
the LMAC; the Marshall Legacy Institute pro-
vided the majority of the funds for purchasing 
and training the dogs. 
Regional Cooperation: 
             MDDC for SE Europe
by Marija Trlin [ Mine Detection Dog Center for South East Europe ]
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ANAMA training. MDDC train-
ers faced certain challenges in train-
ing and integrating mine-detection 
dog teams for Azerbaijan. In the 
first “six-pack” (a set of six mine-
detection-dog teams, where a team 
is comprised of one dog and its han-
dler), an MDDC trainer encountered 
differences in applicable standards 
and climate conditions between 
the training grounds in Bosnia and 
the on-site location in Azerbaijan. 
However, the training projects were 
evaluated as highly successful, and 
MDDC received positive feedback 
from ANAMA officials. 
As emphasized by an MDDC 
trainer, accommodation and care of 
the mine-detection dogs in Azer-
baijan was excellent and similar to 
that of the proven system in Bosnia. 
However, the adjustment period and 
integration into teams proved more 
challenging. Even after undergo-
ing intense training at MDDC, the 
dogs needed some time to acclimate 
to Azerbaijan’s climate and soil con-
ditions. While it was not a consider-
able amount of time, trainers should 
remember that MDDs are not ma-
chines, but animals that need to adapt 
to new surroundings. To ensure prop-
er integration and long-term results, 
MDDC trainers suggested a longer 
period of supervision from the ANAMA 
trainers and handlers during their 
integration period, as both dogs and 
trainers needed to become acclimated 
to Azeri conditions.
Soil and vegetation in Bosnia and 
Azerbaijan differ in composition, 
which affects the explosive evapora-
tion intensity, making it more diffi-
cult for dogs to sniff out landmines. 
Furthermore, while Bosnian stan-
dards for use of MDDs assume dogs 
detect explosives buried at 10 centi-
meters (3.9 inches) deep, Azeri stan-
dards assume 20 centimeters (7.9 
inches) deep, therefore requiring ad-
ditional training. 
From the MDDC experience, 
language barriers were not an is-
sue, as training was conducted in 
Russian and English. In terms of 
logistics, however, there was some 
concern, as transportation issues 
often arise. Sometimes transport-
ing dogs safely to their destinations 
is challenging, considering the nu-
merous requirements and limita-
tions imposed by airline companies. 
MDDs are often treated as “special 
luggage” and require a human es-
cort. Despite such transportation 
obstacles, the team training and in-
tegration projects were successful, 
especially considering the excellent 
reviews of the demining tasks upon 
completion, which is ultimately the 
most important factor. 
Lebanon training. Another MDDC 
success is its training projects for 
the Lebanon Mine Action Center, 
funded by MLI. So far, MDDC has 
trained a total of 10 MDD teams 
from 2008 to 2009. Besides the back-
ground knowledge and experience 
of the Global Training Academy, 
another advantage of this training 
project was that standards applied in 
Lebanon were the same as those in 
Bosnia, making it easier to integrate 
the dogs and handlers into teams. 
Regional Projects
One of the first regional de- 
mining projects in which MDDC 
participated provided support to 
DanChurchAid’s demining teams 
in northern Albania, from April to 
November 2005. MDDC conduct-
ed a similar project in Southeast 
Albania in July 2005, and another 
to support demining of the border 
area between the Republic of Cro-
atia and Serbia in November 2005. 
Since Bosnia, Albania and Croatia 
are countries within the same re-
gion, the affected areas have very 
similar climates, soil and vegeta-
tion, and the same accreditation4 
procedures and applicable stan-
dards for humanitarian demining. 
Cooperation with DCA contin-
ued into 2006 in several regions 
of Albania, and was followed by 
support for demining teams of 
the Explosive Ordnance Demining 
Management Section Kosovo from 
2007 until the present. MDDC 
teams are currently being deployed 
in Kosovo. 
Besides the interregional exchange 
and cooperation with DCA, MDDC 
also participated in demining tasks 
in Iraq from July 2008 to May 2009, 
and their contract was extended to 
December 2009. Accommodated 
in a self-contained Mines Adviso-
ry Group base of operations at Bani 
Maqam, Chamchamal, MDDC han-
dlers received more extensive logisti-
cal support than is usually provided 
for regional tasks. Among many oth-
er requirements, handlers under-
went physical check-ups, including 
tests for HIV and hepatitis, and at-
tended security interviews with the 
relevant security services. Handlers 
also required armed escort teams to 
transport them to the work sites and 
required translators with operational 
language abilities in English, Arabic 
and Sorani Kurdish. Logistical sup-
port to accommodate handlers and 
dogs in Iraq was also more demand-
ing than in Southeast Europe.
Demining tasks have been per-
formed in adherence to the local 
mine-action standards of Northern 
Iraq (i.e., Kurdish), and the success 
of the MDD teams led to a contract 
extension in June 2009. Considering 
the numerous cultural, political and 
climate differences found in the vari-
ous regions, the joint cooperation of 
the demining task, which involved 
the Marshall Legacy Institute, MAG, 
MDDC and the Global Training 
Academy, and with funding from 
the U.S. Department of State, has 
proven to be highly efficient.
Conclusion
From MDDC’s point of view, it 
must be emphasized that the chal-
lenges of regional and interregion-
al cooperation are more manageable 
if addressed in the initial planning 
phase. During this phase, it is essen-
tial to estimate timelines accurately 
and adjust performance and logistics 
to be in line with local standards and 
conditions. Each project MDDC has 
taken on provides a foundation of ex-
perience that can be applied to future 
projects. Cooperation between mine-
action centers and MDDC continues 
to be a successful enterprise as mine-
action experts strive to reduce the 
mine threat in the most efficient and 
cost-effective manner. Despite cul-
tural differences and conditions, all 
mine-action organizations share the 
same desire to free countries from 
mines and unexploded ordnance, 
and MDDC strives to build on this 
common ground. 
See Endnotes, Page 77
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A MDDC team working in Albania.
PHOTO COURTESY OF DAnCHURCHAID
Iraqi handler nedžad Skenderovic and MDD Allen take a break.
PHOTO COURTESY OF ELISE BECkER, MARSHALL LEGACY InSTITUTE
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Formed in 2007, USAFRICOM sought to secure the sustainability and growth in 53 African countries by build-
ing schools, delivering medical supplies and 
providing education on HIV/AIDS. In addi-
tion, USAFRICOM works to create awareness 
about unexploded-ordnance and explosive-
remnants-of-war clearance, and performs 
ERW-clearance operations and explosive-
ordnance disposal. 
Despite Africa’s growing involvement in in-
ternational affairs, many nations on the con-
tinent still struggle with the looming threat of 
political instability. HIV/AIDS, extreme pover-
ty, widespread hunger and repeated violent con-
flicts have left many countries with longstanding 
problems and a reliance on assistance from in-
ternational organizations. Of course, subsist-
ing primarily on foreign aid creates even more 
complications. Without enough money to be-
gin investment, these countries have little to no 
chance of economic development; thus, the re-
covery process becomes cyclical and ineffective. 
Certainly, the threat of landmines and oth-
er ERW does not help these situations. Accord-
ing to the United Nations’ 2009 Portfolio of 
Mine Action Projects, there are 973 suspected 
mined areas and 1,010 UXO-contaminated ar-
eas in the Democratic Republic of Congo alone. 
Similarly, the Portfolio reports that landmines 
and UXO affect more than 1.9 million people 
USAFRICOM’s Approach to 
                   International Stability
by Eric Wuestewald [ Center for International Stabilization and Recovery ]
The United States Africa Command, created in 2007, is responsible for military 
relations in 53 African countries. Having assumed responsibilities formerly housed in 
three other combatant commands, USAFRICOM is now tasked with a broad range 
of humanitarian, military and policy objectives on the continent, including conducting 
mine action and remediating the dangers posed by explosive remnants of war. This 
article explores the massive tasks facing USAFRICOM as it stands up, and the ways 
in which the command is already making a much-needed difference.
in 1,492 communities in Ethiopia. It also notes a 
presence of at least 1,561 landmines and piec-
es of UXO in Burundi and approximately 12.16 
square kilometers (4.7 square miles) of mined 
areas in Mozambique.1 As has been the case in 
addressing economic hardship across the Afri-
can continent, complete reliance on foreign as-
sistance is not likely to stimulate the national 
investment needed to ef fect ively provide 
self-suf f iciency and stability. With seeming-
ly countless numbers of affected areas, includ-
ing those just mentioned, the challenges Africa 
and the international community face are clear.
Background
After 10 years of discussions about how 
best to reverse the unfortunate dichotomy 
between international inf luence and regional 
instability,  and how to achieve and promote 
the long-term sustainability and security of 
African nations, the U.S. Department of De-
fense announced the creation of an African 
Geographic Combatant Command on 6 Feb-
ruary 2007. Officially established in October 
2007,2 USAFRICOM is the youngest of the 
U.S. Department of Defense’s six geograph-
ic commands. USAFRICOM consolidates the 
responsibilities previously allocated to U.S. 
Pacific Command, U.S. Central Command 
and U.S. European Command into a single 
African security-related organization.3 
Humanitarian Approach
Whereas traditional commands 
have focused their attention on di-
rect warfare, USAFRICOM instead 
works toward diplomacy and sus-
tainability through military opera-
tions to promote “a stable and secure 
African environment in support of 
U.S. foreign policy.”2 The command 
employs more than 1,000 individuals 
from both military and nonmilitary 
organizations, working closely with 
the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. 
Agency for International Develop-
ment, the African Union, and other 
regional, international and nongov-
ernmental organizations to ensure 
coordination of political stability, 
economic growth and international 
humanitarian efforts in Africa.3,4 
In October 2008, USAFRICOM 
officially transitioned to independent 
Unified Command status, and since 
then it has actively worked toward 
merging and managing the U.S. mili-
tary activities for Africa organized by 
U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. Central 
Command and U.S. European Com-
mand.4 Despite the Command’s rela-
tively short existence, USAFRICOM 
has already taken significant steps 
to ensure the long-term security of 
African countries by constructing 
schools and clinics, delivering medi-
cal supplies and services, and provid-
ing HIV/AIDS-awareness programs. 
Mine Action
Mine-action activities are just a 
small part of USAFRICOM’s mis-
sion. To help combat the human-
itarian threat of mines and ERW, 
USAFRICOM conducts its own se-
ries of programs to supplement 
pre-existing services conducted by 
international and nongovernmen-
tal organizations and trained host-
nation personnel. 
USAFRICOM carries out ERW 
train-the-trainer programs in mul-
tiple countries, utilizing U.S. Army, 
Navy, Marine and Air Force Com-
ponent Commands to assist in its 
UXO- and ERW-clearance train-
ing.3 By conducting these train-
the-trainer missions, in addition 
to working with each individual 
country and its specific needs on a 
case-by-case basis, the Department 
of Defense plans to incorporate ca-
pacity building and sustainability 
into the program.
With a US $310 million budget,4 
USAFRICOM is conducting six active 
mine-action engagements in Burun-
di, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, 
Namibia and Zambia. In each of 
these countries, USAFRICOM per-
forms ERW operations, EOD Level 
I (location, exposure and destruc-
tion of single landmines and oth-
er ERW) and Level II (moving, 
transportation and proper dispos-
al of mines and other ERW) train-
ing, mine-detector maintenance/
repair, medical first-responder, and 
MRE courses. 
In fiscal year 2010, these pro-
grams will also be conducted in 
Chad, the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, the Republic of the Con-
go and Sudan.3 
Conclusion
USAFRICOM has been operational 
for only two years. Despite its nascent 
state, this Combatant Command has 
already assumed many responsibili-
ties from three other geographic com-
mands. In addition, USAFRICOM has 
also established a program that initi-
ated mine-action work in six African 
countries. Though there are no clear re-
sults yet on how these particular pro-
grams will affect the host nations, with 
an increased budget, more focus on 
training and diplomacy, greater mili-
tary personnel and expanded military 
operations, USAFRICOM expects a 
long-term beneficial impact.
See Endnotes, Page 77
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Without enough money to begin 
investment, these countries have 
little to no chance of economic 
development.
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Are there common denominators or pre-conditions that enable countries to co-operate on interstate and subregional 
levels? Each region is unique in terms of its size, 
political systems, national cultures, ethnicities, 
historical experiences and language roots, so it 
can be generally argued that what facilitates and 
enables work in one region will not necessari-
ly be applicable in another.2 However, based on 
over 10 years of experience in applying a region-
al approach, ITF strongly believes that common 
prerequisites should be met to successfully fos-
ter cooperation on a regional basis.
The following preconditions provide useful in-
sight into what might enable countries to assist one 
another to solve common landmine problems.3
•	 An awareness of common or connected 
origins of landmine/explosive remnants 
of war issues 
•	 Recognition that mine action must con-
sider wider contextual issues, like stabil-
ity and humanitarian, reconstruction and 
development efforts
•	 A willingness to work toward eliminating 
the threat from landmines/ERW
•	 Commitment and support from the in-
ternational community to communicate 
between regional mine-action centers and 
national authorities 
•	 A neutral regional intermediary to fa-
cilitate meetings, mine-action work 
and negotiations 
ITF’s Experience 
            with Regional Cooperation
by Luka Buhin [ International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance ]
A key element to the success of the International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine 
Victims Assistance, particularly in Southeast Europe, has been its facilitation of a regional 
approach to mine action and subsequent contributions to regional structures and sys-
tems. Encouraging regional cooperation is an important confidence-building measure, 
not only in countries emerging from conflict but also in countries undergoing transition. 
A regional approach has become one of the guiding principles of ITF’s work.1 
•	 Recognition that the sensitivity of post-
conf lict and transition periods requires 
cooperation and confidence-building 
regional stakeholders
Regional Cooperation Rationale 
There are direct and indirect benefits of re-
gional cooperation between affected countries 
on mine-action issues. These benefits can be 
clustered into the following aspects:3
1. Resources: Cooperation prevents the du-
plication of resources and efforts—finan-
cial, physical, material and human. 
2. Coordination and information: Interac-
tion facilitates the exchange of effective 
and efficient solutions to unique or simi-
lar landmine problems. 
3. Social: Social networking and confidence 
building between counterparts in the re-
gion encourages current—as well as fu-
ture—cooperation efforts.
4. Capacity-building: Cooperation aug-
ments institutional capacities, and if es-
tablished institutions can help those with 
less experience and stability.
5. Cross-cutting: Mine-action activities can 
aid other regional issues, such as border 
security, development and commerce.
Even though mine action tends to develop 
on a national basis, there have been sufficient 
incentives and benefits to its application on a 
regional basis.2 ITF has promoted and applied 
the regional approach in Southeast 
Europe, the South Caucasus and 
Central Asia. 
The ITF’s Regional Efforts 
A regional approach is a vital di-
mension of ITF’s activities; impor-
tant issues can be addressed more 
efficiently and cost-effectively if the 
countries in the region help each 
other become mine-free.4
ITF helps to mobilize funding, raise 
awareness, build capacity and catalyze 
activities across a region. It perceives 
these roles as mutually supportive, al-
lowing it to serve as an effective agent 
in providing assistance and promoting 
mine-action activities.
SEEMACC. The need to exchange 
views, expertise and experience in 
mine action in the region of South-
east Europe was recognized at the 
first meeting of directors of South-
east Europe mine-action centers and 
ITF in April 2000, leading to the for-
mation of the South-Eastern Europe 
Mine Action Coordination Council.5
The directors of the centers of Al-
bania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 
Croatia signed the agreement to es-
tablish SEEMACC, together with ITF, 
in November 2000. In addition to the 
original founders, other organizations 
achieved membership/observer status.
The mission of SEEMACC is 
to develop a sustainable regional 
mine-action program to enable de-
velopment and economic recovery 
of affected areas and provide assis-
tance to mine victims. The guiding 
principles of SEEMACC’s work are 
based on a holistic approach, includ-
ing neutrality, humanity, partnership 
and activities executed in accordance 
with national concepts.
Manual-demining operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Regional Cross-border Demining Programme, 2006.
PHOTO COURTESY OF ARnE HODALIČ
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The ITF workshop “Confidence Building and Regional Cooperation through Mine Action” was held 25–27 March 2007, in 
Almaty, kazakhstan.
PHOTO COURTESY OF ITF
SEEMACC’s work has resulted in 
acceptance of a common regional strat-
egy, regional standard-operating pro-
cedures, and an accreditation system 
for demining organizations, as well 
as support in the development of re-
gional institutional capacities since 
the Council’s inception, the U.S. De-
partment of State through ITF has 
financially supported the ongoing 
work of SEEMACC.
Central Asian cooperation.6 
In 2008, the OSCE Office in Tajiki-
stan and ITF joined forces for the 
project “Facilitation of Central 
Asian Regional Co-operation in 
Mine Action.” The wider project 
purpose, which will be achieved 
through several phases, is to es-
tablish effective and sustainable 
regional cooperation in the field 
of mine action and other cross-
cutting issues among six states in 
Central Asia: Afghanistan, Ka-
zakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. 
In the initial phase, implemented in 
2009, the project partners are working 
to create the framework for a region-
al mine-action cooperation body. Ini-
tial working visits by project staff have 
already shown a willingness to cre-
ate a joint initiative. The initial phase 
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E-mail: buhin@itf-fund.si
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will conclude with an ITF-organized 
multilateral conference on region-
al cooperation in Central Asia and 
Afghanistan in late 2009. 
Cross-border Demining in South-
east Europe.7 From April 2003 to 
December 2006, ITF managed a 
2.85-million-euro (US $4,151,0008) 
grant from the European Union to fa-
cilitate cross-border demining projects 
in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Croatia, and Serbia. In total, 1.74 
square kilometers (0.67 square mile) 
of land were cleared, with more than 
2,700 mines and 536 pieces of UXO 
found and destroyed during the imple-
mentation of demining projects. 
Conclusion 
Regional cooperation in mine 
action facilitates the utilization of 
resources, coordination of mine-
action efforts, networking, capaci-
ty and confidence-building efforts, 
among other things. Within South-
east Europe, where the common 
goal of a mine-free region has been 
set, regional cooperation in mine 
action has reached a mature level at 
which joint efforts span from well-
established coordination forums to 
cooperation on strategic, operational 
and technical levels.2 
It is ITF’s opinion that regional 
cooperation in mine action has the 
potential to develop and succeed 
outside of Southeast Europe, as well. 
Furthermore, there are realistic pos-
sibilities for regional cooperation in 
mine action to include other cross-
cutting issues such as development, 
small arms and light weapons, and 
border management. 
See Endnotes, Page 77
Felisberto Novele, a member of Mine Action Center Cyprus, was killed by an anti-tank explosion on 28 
October 2009. Novele, 48, was working in Yeri, only 10 
kilometers (6.2 miles) southeast of Nicosia, the capital 
of Cyprus. A native of Mozambique, Novele is the first 
death MACC has suffered during its five years of work-
ing on the island, although nine people, including civil-
ians and deminers, were injured in 2008.1
Cyprus has been affected by landmines since the 1974 
crisis between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Landmines 
were laid by both sides, including inside of the buffer zone 
created after the conflict. The buffer zone, now controlled by 
United Nations forces, consists of three percent of the island 
by Cory kuklick [ Center for International Stabilization and Recovery ]
and holds agricultural land valuable to farmers.2 Mine clear-
ance in the buffer zone is managed by the MACC, which 
plans, coordinates and monitors the clearance of mines and 
unexploded ordnance. Working alongside U.N. Peacekeep-
ing Forces in Cyprus, MACC has cleared 57 minefields, 
covering 65 square kilometers (25 miles) of land.1
In a 2008 interview with Blue Beret magazine, Novele 
said he was proud of the work he was doing. “Our efforts are 
to guarantee the new generations of the future a safer world,” 
he said. “The land cleared can give way for [hospitals and 
schools] and that is why I am proud.”3 Novele was support-
ing a wife and eight children, as well as a widowed mother.
See Endnotes, Page 77
 
In Remembrance
Felisberto Novele
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For the sixth consecutive year, UNMAS, in coordination with the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB)—formerly 
known as the Swedish Rescue Services Agency— 
conducted a mine-action rapid-response train-
ing program exercise. In 2009, the exercise took 
place at the MSB College for Risk- and Safety-
Management in Sandö, Sweden, from 8–17 June. 
The exercise was conducted within the 
Framework for Mine Action Planning and Rap-
id Response, whereby UNMAS deploys a mine-
action coordination team with MSB support 
to establish a mine-action coordination cen-
ter. The program was conducted in the fic-
tional country of Sandland where a conf lict 
had recently ended after a U.N./NATO in-
tervention. The exercise involved assembling 
the Sandland Mine Action Coordination Cen-
ter. The principal task of the S-MACC was to 
produce a landmine/ERW threat assessment 
and propose methodology for reduction of 
that threat. In addition, the S-MACC direct-
ed the conduct of real explosive-ordnance-
disposal teams simulating the management 
of the emergency response. The exercise was 
conducted under field conditions with the 
participants living in a tent camp set up by 
the MSB support staff.
The Framework for Mine Action Planning 
and Rapid Response was successfully imple-
mented in Lebanon after the conf lict with 
Israel in 2006. An operational mine-action 
UNMAS Rapid-response Exercise
by Liban Holm [ United Nations Mine Action Service ] and 
Cory Kuklick and Chad McCoull [ Center for International Stabilization and Recovery ] 
In a post-conflict country littered with mines and explosive remnants of war, the 
capability to deploy highly qualified mine-action staff rapidly is key to saving lives. 
United Nations Mine Action Service recently spearheaded a new 10-day emergency 
training program based on lessons learned from previous rapid-response efforts in 
Kosovo, Lebanon and the Occupied Palestinian Territories. This exercise emphasized 
the importance of interagency coordination and was designed to simulate a scenario 
in which these relationships would be called upon heavily in order to achieve success.
center was already in place but not equipped 
to handle the enormous increase in workload. 
The Framework allows additional staff to be 
deployed rapidly in support of an existing 
mine-action center. The need for help in Leb-
anon was grave—approximately an hour af-
ter the cease-fire was called and Israeli troops 
pulled back, people began to return to their 
homes, and the first calls came in about vic-
tims of unexploded ordnance, including clus-
ter munitions. 
The aim of the exercise was to provide the 
U.N. with an opportunity to train selected 
staff in key positions and also for MSB to 
train their staff to work in support of mine-
action rapid-response operations. The exer-
cise also served to validate and improve the 
Rapid Response Plan Operational Manual, 
including standard working procedures. The 
2009 session consolidated the improvements 
made to the exercise in recent years and wid-
ened the body of participating U.N. agencies 
and nongovernmental organizations. The 
intention of this broader inclusion ref lects 
the complex interagency environment that 
will likely be present during an activation of 
the framework. 
Participants and the Exercise Control Staff
The 2009 control staff came from numerous 
organizations, including UNMAS, UNICEF, 
the U.S. Department of Defense’s Humani-
tarian Demining Training Center, 
DanChurchAid, Danish Demining 
Group and Mines Advisory Group. 
UNICEF, the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees and non-
governmental organizations nomi-
nated UNMAS and MSB staff from 
Afghanistan, the Democratic Repub-
lic of the Congo, Lebanon, Nepal, 
Sudan and Western Sahara to par-
ticipate in the drill. Additionally, the 
Swedish Rangers supported the ef-
fort by taking on the roles of NATO 
troops and militia. They provided 
mock small arms fire at night close to 
the camp area to simulate an immedi-
ate post-conflict setting with sporad-
ic fighting. A directing organization 
was set up to ensure the S-MACC 
component was conducted and sup-
ported in accordance with the 
UNMAS/MSB Rapid Response Plan. 
Setting the Stage 
The scenario for the exercise devel-
oped over several years and is inspired 
by similar real events and emergen-
cies that occurred in Kosovo and Leb-
anon. The detailed practice scenario 
included additional fictitious docu-
ments describing Sandland, such as 
the CIA World Fact Book, Sandland 
Concept of Operations, an outline of 
Sandland political profiles and Secu-
rity Council resolutions. The exercise 
was based on a U.N. peacekeeping 
and humanitarian mission, acting 
under chapter VII of the Charter of 
the United Nations, following the 
conflict in Sandland. 
Notional Sandland was locat-
ed in Northern Europe and borders 
Nordland to the north and South-
land to the south and west. In the 
scenario, Sandland was invaded by 
Nordland, but as a result of a NATO 
bombing campaign and subse-
quent ground war, Nordland troops 
were pushed back. The conflict gave 
rise to large numbers of internal-
ly displaced people. In neighboring 
Southland, large numbers of refu-
gees had gathered in UNHCR cam-
pus. The air campaign involved the 
use of unitary bombs and cluster- 
munitions systems. The use of clus-
ter bombs caused international in-
terest because many of the NATO 
nations had recently signed and 
pledged to support the Convention 
on Cluster Munitions. 
During the exercise, the simulat-
ed UNHCR-run IDP camps in Sand-
land were quickly overwhelmed, and 
after a couple of “practice days,”1 
IDPs started to return home, re-
sulting in large numbers of casu-
alties primarily from unexploded 
cluster munitions and other unex-
ploded ordnance. UNICEF provid-
ed information that schools were 
used as temporary shelters for mili-
tia groups and were targeted, caus-
ing explosive remnants of war to be 
left behind. The U.N. World Food 
Programme also reported accidents 
involving contracted drivers hitting 
UXO/mines while delivering food. 
To ensure greater coordination and 
exchange of information, interagen-
cy coordination meetings were es-
tablished by UNHCR as the lead 
in the Protection Cluster,2 in which 
mine action was located.
Implementation and Results
This year, the participants, af-
ter having been through NATO and 
militia checkpoints, arrived from 
the airport and moved into a tent 
camp set up by MSB support staff. 
The participants had received brief-
ings at the beginning of the exercise 
and background documents out-
lining the scenario. To initiate the 
expercise, the S-MACC received 
tasks that provided additional in-
formation and/or provided the par-
ticipants with challenges such as 
overlapping EOD tasks that would 
have to be prioritized or high-level 
visitors. The tasks were divided into 
The U.n. medical team hit two fictional landmines during an operation and had to 
be rescued and treated for injuries.
ALL PHOTOS COURTESY OF LIBAn HOLM
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subgroups targeting specific elements of the S-MACC, 
including operations, mine-risk education, media and 
nongovernmental organizations. In order to monitor 
the performance of the S-MACC’s response to the tasks 
without undermining the operation, the control staff 
wore yellow vests, marking them as neutral observers. 
The phrase “what you see is what you get” was key to 
understanding the scenario; it supported the illusion of 
reality in the drill and also set the boundaries. For ex-
ample, if there was a shop down the road listed in the 
scenario, there was actually a shop down the road. If the 
scenario called for participants to drive along the road 
and not find evidence of UXO/mine contamination, 
they actually did not see signs of contamination. It took 
a couple of days to master this level of role-playing. All 
participants assumed the role they played, giving the ex-
ercise real value. The S-MACC could call a central U.N. 
switchboard and reach almost anyone they requested by 
the name of their character.
One goal for this year’s exercise was to get the 
S-MACC staff out on the roads to conduct surveys and 
complete tasks. These tasks ranged from explosive-ord-
nance-disposal tasks on roads blocking WFP convoys to 
a meeting with a local militia commander with informa-
tion on mine contamination. The participants were told, 
“There is no right or wrong,” to emphasize that they were 
in a live role-play situation. If a specific task was solved 
only after a very long response time or not solved at all, 
it was repeated in a slightly different fashion. For in-
stance, as part of the scenario, the S-MACC was visited 
several times by local militias that threatened them un-
til NATO was requested to provide support and security 
for the camp area. Once the S-MACC solved the securi-
ty issue, militias stopped trying to enter the camp. 
The S-MACC staff hit the ground running, trying 
to gather as much information as possible. However, at 
such an early stage of a complex post-conflict setting, 
not much information was available, and other U.N. 
agencies were only starting to establish a presence. The 
S-MACC staff worked 15–16 hours a day and soon start-
ed to show signs of fatigue. Normally the information 
and final presentation would have been completed in 
a month, but during the exercise, these tasks had to be 
compressed into eight days.
The participants “did fare very well adapting and 
overcoming the many challenges that came across their 
desks,” said Angel Belen, Deputy Director at the U.S. 
Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation 
The nATO troops, played by Swedish Rangers, secured the airport and set up a checkpoint where the team was examined 
for identification.
Agency.2 Using their past experienc-
es from different venues, the partici-
pants helped each other throughout 
the exercise.
A new element included in the 
2009 drill was the addition of Unit-
ed Nations Television and Video, 
which was invited to the practice to 
document the training of the emer-
gency response in Sandland. Docu-
menting the exercise is important 
to underline the significance of be-
ing able to deliver a rapid response 
and to highlight the importance 
of interagency coordination. Ad-
ditionally, donors from the Gov-
ernment of the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands and the Swedish Inter-
national Development Cooperation 
Agency, who are funding not only 
the exercise directly but also pro-
vide generous funding to UNMAS 
mine-action programs, will get an 
opportunity to have a closer look 
into some of the opportunities their 
funding provides. 
Conclusion
The feedback from participants 
and exercise-control staff was very 
positive for the 2009 drill. The par-
ticipants in the S-MACC fulfilled 
the overall goal of presenting a plan 
for immediate-, medium- and long-
term intervention. 
The exercise is a valuable tool in 
terms of lessons learned in a con-
trolled training environment.3 The 
practice also provided two-way learn-
ing, as it gave a unique opportunity 
for NGO personnel to see firsthand 
the complexity of problems and polit-
ical issues that a UN–MACC invari-
ably must deal with in an immediate 
post-conflict situation, and vice versa. 
The same is true for the U.N. agencies 
represented, and all parties agree that 
this sharing of knowledge and under-
standing, as well as the contacts made, 
serves to significantly improve an in-
tegrated mine-action response imme-
diately after conflict—the very time 
when lives are most endangered and 
the humanitarian relief effort is at its 
most vulnerable. 
“This exercise is the way forward for 
the mine-action community; develop-
ing best practices, standards and mea-
sures of effectiveness,” said Belen.4
See Endnotes, Page 77 
Simulated militia groups opposed to the presence of the United nations and 
nATO confront the mine-action team.
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Mine action mostly occurs in post-conflict and unstable environ-ments. Always a turbulent period 
for a country, the post-conflict phase is char-
acterized by abrupt changes and weak govern-
ment institutions. In addition, a country may 
face a sluggish economy, fragile infrastructure, 
poverty, high unemployment and political in-
stability, thereby creating a very complex situa-
tion for mine-action operations. 
A realistic question might be why an organi-
zation would consider developing a mine-action 
program in such an unstable environment. Sev-
eral reasons are fairly obvious: to prevent mine 
accidents or at least reduce their number; to 
provide immediate assistance to victims of ex-
plosive remnants of war; to begin building the 
foundation for economic and social recovery; 
and to provide assistance to and resettlement 
for refugees and internally displaced persons. 
While one might assume that the governments 
of mine-affected countries, having the strongest 
interest in mine action, would provide whatev-
er is necessary to execute mine-action activities, 
the reality, unfortunately, is often otherwise. 
Political Instability
Conditions such as armed clashes2 and in-
surgencies3 can result in the termination of 
activities and mine-action programs. A signif-
icant number of disillusioned ex-soldiers and 
armed insurgents will often resort to criminal 
activities and general banditry.4 Though uni-
lateral support from the host country for hu-
manitarian organizations would provide the 
best foundation for mine-action activities, 
post-conflict governments are often torn apart 
Change is the Only Constant1 
by Zlatko Gegic [ Fondation Suisse de Déminage ]
Because of the nature of mine-action organizations and programs, they are often placed 
in post-conflict areas where humanitarian work faces several obstacles. It is important to 
consider possible setbacks before embarking on demining in a post-conflict country. 
by rampant political corruption and are unable 
to address their country’s issues or provide the 
necessary support to those organizations oper-
ating in their country. As a result, mine-action 
organizations are often left to develop the pro-
grams and provide assistance with little or no 
cooperation from the local governments. 
Logistical Concerns
The challenges mine-action programs face 
in complex situations are enormous, including 
providing protection for personnel and assets, 
complex logistics, restricted movement, con-
tinual changes in deployment plans, and ob-
stacles preventing removal of ERW in the field. 
These problems are persistent for those working 
in countries such as Afghanistan, Burundi, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sri Lanka 
and Sudan, to name a few.
Economic Difficulties
Despite post-conflict government declara-
tives and a genuine enthusiasm to assist with 
mine-action activities, many governments do 
not have the financial or organizational abili-
ty to assist with mine-action operations. This 
limitation often puts a strain on the finances of 
mine-action organizations operating in post-
conflict countries. Organizations may find they 
are unable to access task sites, and that their 
field staff need additional protection, usually in 
a form of an armed escort. However, the orga-
nizations usually have to endure all costs relat-
ed to this protection, such as fuel, food, daily 
wages and transport. In the case of Fondation 
Suisse de Déminage program in Burundi, assis-
tance the authorities offered was in the form of 
a few indifferent, poorly equipped 
and unpaid police officers provided 
as armed escorts. Furthermore, the 
police officers were suddenly with-
drawn when the local government 
felt their assistance was required 
elsewhere. Nevertheless, tasks need 
to be completed and deadlines met. 
While mine-action organizations 
may be able to afford these addition-
al short-term burdens on their bud-
gets and staff, these programs can 
rarely afford to provide such sub-
stantial assistance for extended pe-
riods of time. 
Additional Considerations
Mine-action organizations must 
juggle the program’s goals and the 
donor’s requirements with the real-
ity of the situation on the ground. 
Program strategies, especially pro-
posals for mine-action activities, 
are written assuming the work will 
be carried out in a relatively sta-
ble situation and are often based 
on the assumption of minimum 
costs, sometimes with unrealistic 
goals, deadlines and financial re-
quirements, in order to win a bid or 
secure funding. In addition to bureau-
cratic issues, mine-action organiza-
tions must take a country’s specific 
security issues and insurgency con-
straints, as well as the ethnic and re-
ligious background of national staff, 
into consideration. 
In teams of mixed nationalities, 
organizations will face challenges 
regarding supervisory issues. For 
example, organizations must con-
sider the implications of sending 
mine-action teams composed primar-
ily of Muslims to work in a Serbian 
(Christian)-dominated area in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, or Shiites and Sunnis to 
work in religious conflict zones in 
Iraq. Additional limiting factors in-
clude the restrictions placed by do-
nors on the use of funds, the type of 
intervention used (mine-risk educa-
tion versus ERW clearance), and the 
prioritization of mine-action tasks. 
This prioritization is especially lim-
iting when United Nations Mine 
Action Centers cater to the host 
country’s wishes, often overlooking 
humanitarian mine-action inter-
ests, and when the corruption and 
ethical structure of national mine-
action authorities manipulate task 
prioritization on the basis of ethnic 
bias, further exacerbating an already 
difficult situation. 
Conclusion
Post-conflict areas are gener-
ally unstable and require mine ac-
tion to help return to normalcy. One 
can be certain that sudden, unpre-
dictable changes are the only con-
stants in this industry. The only way 
to help an organization cope with 
these complex situations is to care-
fully perform a pre-program analy-
sis that sets realistic goals, deadlines 
and methods of evaluation. Further-
more, in choosing individuals with 
experience managing mine-action 
activities in post-conflict environ-
ments, organizations can increase 
the success of a mine-action pro-
gram. Ultimately, organizations must 
learn to consider the lack of host-gov-
ernment support coupled with sud-
den and unpredictable change and 
work to avert these pitfalls, thereby 
helping to ensure the effective tran-
sition from a post-conflict situation 
to one of stability and safety. 
See Endnotes, Page 77 
Adrien Buhire, an FSD deminer, points to a hole in his truck caused by the bullet that 
wounded him during an attack on the FSD convoy in Burundi (March 2008).
PHOTO COURTESY OF zLATkO GEGIC
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The cease-fire agreement and peace talks between the government of Sri Lanka and LTTE seemed to offer the possi-
bility of an end to a decades-long, catastrophic 
conflict. Some 683,000 
persons were internal-
ly displaced, of whom 
more than 174,000 lived 
in welfare centers and re-
settlement villages when 
the cease-fire was signed. 
The agreement recog-
nized “the importance of 
improving living condi-
tions for all inhabitants 
affected by the conflict,”1 
and in this respect, the 
return of IDPs and reha-
bilitation of war-affected 
areas were clear and im-
mediate priorities. In-
ternational organizations and donors agreed, 
believing that such rehabilitation offered oppor-
tunities for the displaced and allowed the po-
tential to build confidence between the national 
government and LTTE.2
A major mine-action program has been underway in Sri Lanka since 2002, when a 
cease-fire agreement between the government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers 
of Tamil Eelam was signed. However, after a seemingly inexorable escalation in vio-
lent guerrilla tactics used by the LTTE, open warfare resumed, and in May 2009, the 
government announced that it had achieved military victory over the LTTE. This arti-
cle traces the various ways that the increase in conflict affected mine-action activi-
ties in Sri Lanka. 
by Chris Rush [ Geneva Call ]
Sri Lanka: Mine Action in 
          a Deteriorating Environment
The presence of anti-personnel landmines 
in areas where the displaced would resettle was 
a major hindrance to rehabilitation efforts,3 as 
these devices were utilized extensively by both 
sides in previous phases 
of the conflict. The exact 
number of landmines 
that had been laid was 
unknown, but it was es-
timated to be between 
1.5 and 2 million.4 
The issue grew increas-
ingly urgent as people 
began spontaneously re-
turning to their homes.3 
While neither the gov-
ernment of Sri Lanka nor 
the LTTE had renounced 
the use of anti-personnel 
mines3—allowing the pos-
sibility of the future use of 
these weapons in the event of renewed hostilities—
donor governments and institutions felt that this 
stance should not be an impediment to support-
ing mine action and provided a significant level of 
funding for mine-action activities.5 
A variety of agencies, both na-
tional and international, began 
work on mine-action projects under 
the coordination of Sri Lanka’s Na-
tional Steering Committee for Mine 
Action. Clearance of mine-affected 
areas was one of the main priorities, 
and a number of international agen-
cies began clearing areas jointly 
held by the government and LTTE. 
There was optimism about the 
possibility of swift mine-clearance 
progress. Indeed, in the first few 
years after the cease-fire was signed, 
the optimism seemed well-placed; 
for instance, it was noted that clear-
ly defined mined areas—mostly 
fenced and marked—led to a Lev-
el Two Survey6 being conducted in 
just six months, a task described as 
“impossible in any other country.”5 
In 2004, the Sri Lankan government 
set a target of achieving a mine-free 
country by the end of 2006.4 How-
ever, after the LTTE pulled out of 
peace talks in 2003, there was a 
gradual worsening of relations be-
tween the parties to the conflict. 
Initially, this animosity resulted in 
isolated and sporadic outbreaks of 
violence, but there was a more rapid 
escalation in conflict beginning in 
2006, with more or less open war-
fare ensuing the following year. This 
fighting culminated in the abroga-
tion of the cease-fire by the govern-
ment of Sri Lanka in January 2008. 
The use of AP mines is illustra-
tive of the changing tactics of the 
LTTE. While the early years of the 
cease-fire were characterized by a 
general absence of credible allega-
tions of the use of AP mines, the 
reality changed as the situation de-
teriorated. In a meeting with Geneva 
Call in 2005, the LTTE stated that it 
fully recognized the importance of 
removing mines, and promised that 
new mines would not be emplaced.7 
However, allegations of mine use 
were levelled against the LTTE in 
2006,8 and such claims were more 
numerous and specific the following 
year.9 The LTTE denied all charges,9 
and the organization asserted that 
if mines were still being laid, it was, 
in fact, government forces that were 
laying them.10 
From the information availa-
ble, it was difficult to truly evaluate 
mine use in the country, so in 2006, 
Geneva Call wrote to both the gov-
ernment of Sri Lanka and the LTTE 
to request approval of a mission to 
investigate and verify the allega-
tions. It should be emphasized that 
because neither party had banned 
the use of landmines, they had no 
obligation to approve such a course 
of action. Still, it was disappoint-
ing when neither party agreed to the 
proposed verification mission.9 Al-
though the allegations of the post-
cease-fire agreement mine use were 
mainly against the LTTE, the Land-
mine Monitor asserted in 2008 that 
“knowledgeable sources … have al-
leged that Sri Lankan security forces 
used AP mines in 2007 and 2008.”11 
Nevertheless, the government of Sri 
Lanka consistently asserted that it 
did not resume mine use.12
While the use of AP mines 
is always a cause for concern, it 
would be particularly disturb-
ing if mines were laid in areas that 
had previously been cleared and 
deemed mine-safe. It is not appar-
ent whether any of the alleged mine 
use was in areas that had already 
been cleared of mines, although at 
least one of the apparently credible 
allegations of AP mine use made 
against the LTTE was in the center 
of a village that had been resettled 
after a previous round of fighting, 
and it was subsequently evacuated 
again.13 Because the LTTE still had 
not renounced AP mine use, Gene-
va Call urged the LTTE, at the very 
least, to refrain from laying mines in 
areas that had already been cleared 
of AP mines.11
Reduced Operational Effectiveness 
Mine action became increasingly 
hampered by the escalation of con-
flict, and the deterioration of the sit-
uation affected ongoing mine-action 
activities in a variety of intercon-
nected ways. By 2006, those agencies 
that were working in LTTE-control-
led areas were citing the security 
situation as a reason for slower-than-
expected implementation of mine-
clearance activities.14 In these areas, 
the work of mine-action agencies was 
reportedly disrupted by the recruit-
ment, both voluntary and forced, of 
staff by “local security forces.”11 
A marked minefield in northern Sri Lanka.
PHOTO COURTESY OF LAnDMInE BAn ADVOCACY FORUM
Clearly defined mined areas—mostly fenced and 
marked—led to a Level Two Survey being conducted 
in just six months, a task described as “impossible in 
any other country.”
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Demining in Sri Lanka.
PHOTO COURTESY OF TAMIL REHABILITATIOn ORGAnISATIOn
In government-controlled areas, 
the volatile security situation also 
affected mine-clearance activities, with 
operations reportedly being affected by 
the surge in violence.11 The Landmine 
Monitor noted that the operating en-
vironment was becoming increasingly 
ineffective because of tighter controls 
on the movement of people, equip-
ment and supplies.11 The imposition of 
work permits for expatriate workers re-
portedly affected the operations of hu-
manitarian agencies.15 The movement 
of mine-clearance equipment into 
LTTE-controlled areas was reportedly 
problematic even before the escalation 
in conflict.16 However, it became even 
more difficult as the situation deterio-
rated, and beginning in August 2006, 
restrictions on the movement of vari-
ous items, such as fuel, affected the ef-
fectiveness of mine-clearance agencies 
operating in these areas. Of particu-
lar concern was the prohibition of the 
movement of the personal protective 
equipment utilized by deminers.17
While a number of agencies, in-
cluding Norwegian People’s Aid, Swiss 
Foundation for Mine Action, Danish 
Demining Group and Mines Advi-
sory Group, were initially operating 
in LTTE-controlled areas in the north, 
by 2007 only NPA still had the neces-
sary permission from the government 
to work there. However, in January 
2008, NPA suspended operations, as-
serting that it had no choice in the mat-
ter because its Technical Advisors were 
not granted permission to re-enter the 
LTTE-controlled areas after a routine 
stand-down in their operations.17 By 
the end of 2008, NPA ceased its opera-
tions in Sri Lanka altogether.18
Loss of Mine-action Workers
Perhaps the starkest and most 
unwelcome illustration of how the 
deteriorating security environment 
affected mine action is the violent 
disappearance and death of mine-
action staff. By any standards, Sri 
Lanka has been a dangerous place 
for humanitarian actors. Forty-
three humanitarian workers have 
reportedly been murdered in Sri 
Lanka since the beginning of 2006, 
while 20 more individuals were re-
ported missing.19 Five of those mur-
dered, and nine of those that have 
disappeared, reportedly worked for 
international mine-action agencies. 
Most of the incidents occurred when 
the staff members were off duty or 
on the way to or from work. These 
incidents, besides being abhorrent, 
served to undermine the opera-
tional effectiveness of the agencies 
in question. For instance, after the 
murder of a DDG staff member in 
Jaffna in August 2007, the organi-
zation suspended its operations for 
nearly two weeks.11
With only a few exceptions,20 af-
fected agencies did not make public 
comments about the deaths or dis-
appearances of their staff. This reti-
cence has been in stark contrast to 
incidents that involved the killing 
or abduction of other humanitarian 
staff; these humanitarian agencies 
issued statements condemning at-
tacks, and where relevant, called for 
the release of staff. 
There may be a number of fac-
tors behind this different approach. 
The author was told by a mine-action 
program manager that an incident in-
volving the abduction of a staff mem-
ber of his agency did not necessitate 
a response, as it was considered un-
likely that the staff member had been 
targeted because of his work for the 
agency, but for other reasons unrelat-
ed to his professional life.21 In other 
instances, mine-action agencies may 
have viewed that issuing public state-
ments was not worthwhile, because 
such measures had proved ineffective 
in either stopping the killings or lead-
ing to the release of those abducted. 
Furthermore, agencies may have also 
been concerned that in an increasing-
ly polarized situation, any comment 
might be construed as critical of one 
party or another, and would compro-
mise their neutrality. 
Shifting Priorities
The increase in conf lict led to 
the emergence of new needs for 
mine-clearance expertise, par-
ticularly in respect to battle-area 
clearance. In 2008, the Landmine 
Monitor noted that mine action in 
Sri Lanka had shifted from being a 
development- and reconstruction-
related activity to being focused 
largely on responding to imme-
diate unexploded-ordnance and 
mine-contamination threats.11 
Some agencies expressed con-
cerns about the prioritization of 
tasks in this new environment. It 
was felt that the National Steering 
Committee for Mine Action had 
been sidelined, and that decisions 
about priorities were primarily made 
by the military. It was reported that 
there was pressure put on agencies to 
concentrate their efforts on support-
ing the clearance of areas to allow for 
the return of the recently displaced. 
While positive in itself, one agency 
felt that the prioritization was driv-
en by political—rather than human-
itarian—concerns, as the numbers of 
displaced people received increased 
international attention. Further-
more, some expressed skepticism 
about the quality of clearance that 
could be carried out within the new-
ly imposed time frame.22
Withdrawal of Donor Support
Increasing concern about a drift 
toward renewed conflict led to a 
review of funding priorities by a 
number of donors. Some govern-
ments decided that it was not ap-
propriate to fund mine clearance at 
a time when there was a real risk of 
a resumption of mine use by either, 
or both, of the involved parties. 
Geneva Call was informed that the 
Netherlands had withdrawn funding 
for this reason,23 and later, Switzerland 
followed suit.24 In a speech made to 
commemorate the International Day 
for Mine Awareness 2006, the U.K. 
Ambassador to Sri Lanka announced 
that because Sri Lanka was still not a 
signatory to the AP Mine Ban Conven-
tion, no more funds for mine clear-
ance would be made available that 
year. Furthermore, he stated that 
unless there was progress toward a 
ban, funding in the following year 
would go toward survey activities 
only. He stated, “This may appear a 
tough line, but what is the point of 
financing the lifting of landmines 
only to see them being put back into 
the ground when conflict recurs or 
security demands [use of mines]?”25 
Forty-three humanitarian workers 
have reportedly been murdered 
in Sri Lanka since the beginning 
of 2006, while 20 more individuals 
were reported missing.
14
Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Vol. 13, Iss. 3 [2009], Art. 1
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol13/iss3/1
28         feature | the journal of ERW and mine action | fall 2009 | 13.3 13.3 | fall 2009 | the journal of ERW and mine action | feature         29
A boy looks at an nCBL brochure during a mine-risk education class conducted by nCBL in Bardiya district, nepal.
ALL PHOTOS COURTESY OF nCBL © 2009
The approach of linking fund-
ing to progress toward an AP mine 
ban was not unanimously accepted. 
The Tamil Rehabilitation Organisa-
tion, which operated humanitarian- 
demining teams in LTTE-controlled 
areas, expressed that the pressure 
placed on parties involved in the 
conflict to make mine-ban commit-
ments amounted to “politicization” 
of mine-action funding, and that it 
led to very short-term funding and 
was problematic for agencies carry-
ing out the work.26
During the early years of the 
cease-fire, there were a number of 
national and international actors in-
volved in attempts to convince the 
parties to move toward a ban on the 
use of AP mines. However, progress 
was limited; the government linked 
accession to the AP Mine Ban Con-
vention to reaching an agreement 
with the LTTE over the “non-use” 
of landmines, while the LTTE made 
it clear that they would only consid-
er banning the weapon if significant 
progress toward peace was made.5
As the conflict escalated, the op-
portunities and prospects for ad-
vocacy were reduced. There was 
increasing hostility to any initiative 
that seemingly limited the means 
and methods of warfare. Geneva 
Call, which had been engaging the 
LTTE in a ban on landmines with 
the endorsement of the Sri Lankan 
government,27 was soon no longer 
granted permission by the government 
to visit LTTE-controlled areas to pro-
ceed with this engagement.28 Later, the 
organization was informed by the 
government that it would not even 
be granted the necessary permission 
to enter the country. The Sri Lanka 
Campaign to Ban Landmines was 
basically inactive by 2006. Similarly, 
the Landmine Ban Advocacy Forum 
ceased to function toward the end 
of 2007. It is noteworthy that advo-
cacy seems to have diminished at 
the same time that allegations of re-
newed mine use were surfacing. 
A general increase in hostility to-
ward NGOs also affected agencies 
involved in mine action. In 2006, 
mine-clearance agencies operat-
ing in LTTE-controlled areas were 
criticized for cooperating with the 
Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation 
at a time when the LTTE was car-
rying out attacks with command-
detonated “claymore” devices.29 It 
is notable that despite the presence 
of mine-action agencies in LTTE- 
controlled areas—including at that 
time the Tamil Rehabilitation Or-
ganisation, which was working un-
der the coordination of the National 
Steering Committee for Mine Action—
there was no public clarification by 
government officials of the impor-
tant humanitarian role played by the 
mine-clearance agencies. 
Conclusion
The escalation of conflict in Sri 
Lanka profoundly affected mine ac-
tion. Some of the challenges were 
predictable, though others could not 
have been foreseen. To ensure that 
they remain effective, mine-action 
agencies and donors working in the 
context of ongoing conflict must be 
able to carefully monitor and assess 
developments, and respond quickly 
and appropriately to new challenges 
as, and when, they emerge. Similar-
ly, affected states must ensure that, 
even in the midst of conflict, they 
strive to cultivate an environment 
conducive to mine action. Howev-
er, since the collapse of the LTTE in 
May 2009, recent efforts have been 
made to improve mine action. Orga-
nizations including UNICEF, U.N. 
Development Programme, Mines 
Advisory Group and Handicap In-
ternational are conducting mine ac-
tion in Sri Lanka, with numerous 
other projects taking place.30
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The Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) and the govern-ment of Nepal signed a compre-
hensive peace agreement on 21 November 
2006. The tireless efforts of NCBL enabled 
both parties to agree to incorporate impor-
tant points on landmines and improvised 
explosive devices into the CPA. The provi-
Despite the signing of a 2006 peace agreement by the Nepalese government and the 
Maoists, Nepal’s mine clearance remains a work in progress due to the after-effects 
of its decade-long Maoist conflict and the emergence of small, armed groups. Ban 
Landmines Campaign Nepal (NCBL) is at the forefront of the country’s mine-risk- 
education efforts. This article examines NCBL’s MRE program objectives, expecta-
tions, methods, and achievements, as well as the many challenges it faces.
by Purna Shova Chitrakar [ Ban Landmines Campaign Nepal ]
Mine-risk Education in Nepal, 2009
sion directs the parties to map landmines 
and other explosive devices within 30 days 
of the signing of the agreement and destroy 
such mines and devices within 60 days. De-
spite this commitment, only 17 out of 53 
minefields, and 99 out of more than 285 
improvised-explosive-device fields were 
cleared by mid-2009. 
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No progress has been made on collecting the data 
and destroying the mines and IEDs planted by the 
Maoists. The mines and IEDs from the conflict continue 
to injure, maim and kill the civilian population. Further-
more, the Maoist breakaway factions and the emerging 
armed groups in the Terai (the stretch of foothills at the 
base of the Himalayas) exacerbated the situation with 
their use of explosives, resulting in 182 incidents within 
28 districts in 2008. That year, media reports and infor-
mation available to NCBL indicated 330 civilians were 
injured in Nepal, which included 240 men, 46 women 
and 44 children. Eighteen people died from their inju-
ries. From January to June 2009, there were 96 civilian 
victims: 46 men, 25 women and 25 children. Among 
them, 11 died.1
When the CPA was signed, elections for the Nep-
alese Constituent Assembly were held. A functioning 
interim government formed, and the top leader of the 
Communist Party of Nepal became the prime minister. 
However, the government has yet to encourage devel-
opment and provide stability within the country. The 
decade-long armed conflict encouraged various groups, 
divided by caste, race and language, to continue fight-
ing. Small, armed groups have emerged in the Terai and 
hills of Nepal, fueling violence and further destabiliz-
ing the region.
NCBL MRE Program
Despite the challenging political situation, from Jan-
uary to March 2009, NCBL conducted mine-risk ed-
ucation in 10 districts in the hills and Terai with the 
objective of protecting people’s lives and property from 
mines and other explosives. NCBL also ran emergency 
MRE in two additional districts, including Bardiya and 
Rautahat, which suffered losses from explosions of mines 
and other explosive remnants of war. The districts were 
selected based on the number of explosions and casual-
ties within each district. Ten facilitators were selected to 
run the MRE program, and the International Committee 
of the Red Cross, NCBL, Nepal Army and UNICEF im-
plemented the introductory training. In addition, NCBL 
published a brochure and distributed 100,000 copies of 
MRE literature during the introductory program. NCBL 
started providing MRE in 2003 and has conducted edu-
cation programs in 39 districts.
Objectives of the MRE program included the following: 
•	 Conduct	 and	 encourage	 community	 MRE	 while	
raising awareness about the risks of mines
•	 Conduct	MRE	in	schools	and	motivate	pupils	to	share	
their knowledge with their families and communities 
•	 Encourage	 security	 forces,	 local	 government	 and	
relevant authorities to conduct MRE around secu-
rity posts and high-risk areas to protect civilians
•	 Publish	and	distribute	MRE	materials	
NCBL expected the following from the MRE pro-
gram in 2009:
•	 Civilians	from	10	districts	would	participate	in	MRE
•	 Fifty	thousand	civilians	(including	schoolchildren	
and teachers) from 12 districts would receive MRE
•	 NCBL’s	published	materials	would	reach	50,000	lo-
cal people
•	 The	government	and	security	forces	would	be	en-
couraged to conduct MRE
NCBL had planned to run MRE in 10 districts, but 
it added the Rautahat and Bardiya districts, as they had 
substantial mine-contamination threats for the residents. 
Altogether, 32,831 people, including teachers, students, 
farmers, security personnel, journalists and intellectuals, 
participated in and benefited from the program.
NCBL applied various learning techniques to civil-
ians within these districts. Methods of mine-risk edu-
cation included:
•	 Lectures
•	 Group	discussions
•	 Door-to-door	visits
•	 Media	mobilization:	 local,	 regional,	 and	 national	
print and broadcast media 
•	 Discussions	about	MRE	pictures
•	 Question-and-answer	sessions
•	 MRE	charts
•	 Speeches	by	teachers	
Program Achievements 
NCBL’s MRE program accomplished several objectives, 
grouped into six categories of achievement, explained below.
Success in numbers. An overwhelming 32,911 students 
and teachers in 160 schools and 40 communities in 12 dis-
tricts benefited from the MRE program, namely Banke, 
Bardia, Dang, Doti, Jajarkot, Panchthar, Parsa, Ramechhap, 
Rautahat, Saptari, Siraha and Sunsari. The program taught 
MRE participants to recognize and not tamper with suspi-
cious objects, avoid suspected hazardous areas and inform 
the authorities about possible minefields.
Cooperation. The MRE program was a joint effort 
between the Nepal Army, International Committee of 
the Red Cross, and UNICEF, social workers, journalists, 
human-rights activists, students, teachers, members of 
school-management committees and rural women from 
different districts.
Political pressure. The MRE program put pressure 
on the government to remove mines and to sign the 
Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention.
Keeping at-risk youths safe. The Maoists en-
gaged children and youths in war and in the mak-
ing of explosives. Even after the guns fell silent, 
the children and youths maintained an interest in 
bombs. The MRE program sensitized the youths to 
the risks associated with mines and other explo-
sive devices.
Expanded influence. The MRE program strength-
ened the anti-mine campaign and expanded the net-
work of NCBL.
Community involvement. The program received 
suggestions from the local community, teachers and 
students on conducting and improving MRE. Addi-
tional achievements included: 
•	 Conducted MRE in two additional districts.
•	 Distributed more than 100,000 copies of previ-
ously printed publications. 
•	 Expanded NCBL’s impact and outreach in addi-
tional districts.
•	 Established the ability to organize an efficient re-
sponse to landmine/ERW incidents affecting the 
Madhesi people. In this case, NCBL organized a 
rally of 150 women, eliciting a positive reaction 
from the local community.
Monitoring and Evaluation Meeting
A monitoring and evaluation meeting was organized 
to assess the work carried out by the facilitators in the 
different districts. They discussed the following agenda 
items during the meeting: 
• Objectives, methodologies and achievements 
• Experiences from the different districts
• Further difficulties in carrying out MRE
  Suggestions. Various suggestions were received dur-
ing the evaluation. NCBL believes these suggestions will 
be helpful in planning and implementing future MRE: 
•	 Organize district-level seminars. Such seminars 
would support the mobilization of the district-
level government agencies, political parties and 
the media.
Students participate in an nCBL MRE class in Bardiya district, nepal.
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•	 Include	MRE	within	the	school	
curriculum. Notices posted on 
school premises and in public 
places could make people more 
aware of the program’s avail-
ability. Interactive programs, 
such as street dramas, quiz con-
tests and essay competitions, 
would bring greater attention 
to MRE programs.
•	 Accelerate	the	campaign	for	de-
claring schools “zones of peace.” 
•	 Ensure	 MRE	 is	 incorporated	
into military and police training.
•	 Distribute	MRE	materials	to	a	
wider population. Addition-
ally, these materials should 
be published in the various 
languages represented by the 
districts and should more ac-
curately depict and represent 
the local population.
•	 Increase	 government	 funding	
to MRE programs.
•	 Incorporate	 information	 about	
common consumer goods used 
to make explosive devices into 
the MRE programs. 
•	 Promote	 MRE	 in	 children’s	
magazines. Additional infor-
mation could be effective in 
reaching small children. 
•	 Promote	 MRE	 on	 radio	 and	
TV stations.
•	 Arrange	 for	 the	 facilitators	 to	
meet with the cadres of the 
emerging armed groups such 
as the Janatantrik Terai Mukti 
Morcha (Terai People’s Libera-
tion Front)–Goit and Jwala Singh 
factions, Madhesi Mukti Tigers, 
Madhesi Virus Killer, Terai Jana 
Kranti Parishad and others.
•	 Create	 and	 hang	 wall	 calen-
dars. Calendars, with their 
many pages, dates, events and 
holidays, would be effective as 
they can be hung on the walls 
of school buildings where stu-
dents can see the educational 
message year round. 
Difficulties
Ban Landmines Campaign Nepal 
faces numerous challenges in carry-
ing out its MRE programs. For in-
stance, an incident occurred while 
NCBL was on its way to Pakari in the 
Saptari district to conduct MRE. The 
Tigers questioned NCBL, suspecting 
them of propagating fear among the 
population. NCBL was able to carry 
through with MRE, but an armed 
sentry watched over the sessions at 
all times. Conflict erupted in the Te-
rai districts, further exacerbating the 
situation as armed groups continual-
ly kept an eye on MRE program fa-
cilitators, inspecting the resource 
materials for possible propaganda 
against the armed groups. 
Strikes, highway blockades and 
arson continue to create obstacles 
for NCBL facilitators. Furthermore, 
limited resources remain a problem. 
Conclusion
NCBL constantly faces obsta-
cles to its MRE programs in Nepal. 
Mines continue to injure, maim, 
and kill men, women and children 
in the rural areas. The emergence 
of various armed groups in the Te-
rai has further necessitated con-
ducting MRE, and it has become 
essential for the government to 
sign the AP Mine Ban Convention 
and to ensure assistance is provid-
ed to mine victims. Furthermore, 
engagement in MRE and various 
peace-building processes has be-
come imperative in order to restore 
lasting peace in Nepal.
See Endnotes, Page 78 
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Between 27 December 2008, and 18 Jan-uary 2009, the Israel Defence Forces con-ducted Operation Cast Lead, a military 
campaign with the objective of preventing Pales-
tinian militants from firing homemade rockets 
into Israeli territory. The campaign caused se-
vere damage to infrastructure, including roads, 
government offices, nongovernmental organiza-
tions, U.N. facilities, schools, hospitals and agri-
cultural land. Following the Israeli withdrawal, 
the United Nations Mine Action Service—at the 
request of the U.N. Resident and Humanitarian 
Coordinator for the Occupied Palestinian Terri-
tories, and in coordination with the U.N. Mine 
Action Team—agreed to initiate a Technical 
Assessment Mission under the United Nations 
Framework for Mine Action Planning and Rapid 
Response. This team arrived in Gaza on 23 Janu-
ary 2009, with these objectives: 
•	  Establish the level of unexploded-
ordnance contamination
•	  Determine what assistance UNMAT and 
the international mine-action commu-
nity could provide to the affected civil-
ian population, the United Nations Relief 
and Works Agency for Palestine Refu-
gees in the Near East, the U.N. Country 
Team and other humanitarian actors
The Rapid Response to 
                   Operation Cast Lead
by Elena Rice [ United Nations Mine Action Service ] 
When the United Nations Mine Action Service was asked to assess the need for a 
mine-action presence in the Gaza Strip following Operation Cast Lead, a 23-day con-
flict involving the Israeli Defence Forces and Palestinian militias in 2008, it was thrust 
into one of the world’s most complicated humanitarian operating environments. This 
article provides a background for the mine-action program in Gaza, summarizing the 
key challenges and lessons learned during the first four months of operations in this 
complex environment.
•	  Facilitate the opening of humanitarian 
corridors and the delivery of humani-
tarian aid in line with United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 18601
It became clear to the Technical Assess-
ment Mission team that in the days immedi-
Damage to a classroom in a Balgis al Yemen 
school, one of the many buildings investigated by 
the Technical Assessment team.
ALL PHOTOS COURTESY OF MInE ACTIOn TEAM–GAzA
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ately following the conflict, 
Palestinian forces in Gaza had 
conducted surface clearance 
of unexploded ordnance, 
moving items to central 
storage locations where they 
could be kept prior to their de-
struction. They conclud-
ed, however, that a number 
of international explosive-
ordnance-disposal teams 
would be required to sup-
port the safe return of the 
humanitarian community to 
Gaza. These teams would 
be needed to dispose of the 
remaining UXO that still 
littered schools, U.N. and 
NGO offices, hospitals and 
homes, as well as UXO that 
was expected to be found 
buried among the rubble of 
destroyed buildings. Under 
the coordination of UNMAS, 
the UNMAT–Gaza Office 
was established to initiate a 
rapid response to neutralize 
the UXO threat.
The Threat
While anti-tank mines 
were used as a source of ex-
plosives to support the me-
chanical razing of homes, 
UNMAT found little evi-
dence to suggest that land-
mines were used otherwise. 
The key threat was from 
UXO, with urban centers be-
ing the most heavily affect-
ed. As of early June 2009, 28 
percent of items discovered 
contained white phosphorus and 72 
percent contained high explosives. 
As of 30 June 2009, unconfirmed re-
ports indicated there had been nine 
post-war accidents resulting in eight 
fatalities and 27 injuries.
Operations
In the 10 days immediately fol-
lowing the cessation of hostilities, 
UNMAT and implementing part-
ners conducted UXO-investigation 
tasks that facilitated the opening of 
37 schools, Gaza’s six main ar-
terial routes, and key U.N. of-
fices and warehouses. Within 
six weeks, all U.N. facilities, 
contaminated schools and 
hospitals in Gaza—and a ma-
jority of clinics—had been 
surveyed and the UXO was 
removed. The core remaining 
UXO threat now lies with-
in the ruins of collapsed and 
damaged buildings. There is 
a high probability that UXO 
remains in the rubble of the 
15,550 housing units that 
were destroyed or damaged 
in the conflict. 
The United Nations Relief 
and Works Agency for Pal-
estine Refugees in the Near 
East and the United Nations 
Development Programme, 
as well as several nongovern-
mental organizations, have 
initiated projects to remove 
more than 150,000 tonnes 
(165,000 U.S. tons) of rub-
ble from these buildings, a 
necessary precursor to re-
construction of homes and 
other structures. UNMAT 
advised UNRWA and UNDP 
that if current trends contin-
ue, there is a medium to high 
risk of UXO contamination 
in 49 percent of collapsed/
damaged buildings. All or-
ganizations involved with 
rubble removal have there-
fore placed a strong empha-
sis on explosive-ordnance 
disposal in their operational 
planning, the result of a major in-
formation push on the part of mine-
action staff and the insistence of 
several of the donors supporting the 
rubble removal that mine action be 
written into project documents.
The key focus of mine-action operations will be sup-
porting the process of rubble removal and reconstruc-
tion by ensuring that the estimated 9,000 Palestinians 
involved in this complicated task are able to carry it out 
with the minimum possible threat of injury or death 
from UXO. This task will be achieved through UNMAT 
input into the assessment and planning for such proj-
ects, extensive UXO identification and awareness train-
ing for those involved, UXO-specific task planning and 
site-management training for site supervisors, and the 
provision of an “on call” EOD service when items of 
UXO are located among the ruins of buildings. 
The Challenges
A wide array of political-, security-, access- and 
information-related challenges combine to make 
Gaza a highly complex operating environment.
Politics. Gaza is, de facto, controlled by Hamas, 
with other clan, paramilitary and private-sector ac-
tors enjoying significant inf luence. Still, a majority 
of the international community views the Palestinian 
Authority (predominantly Fatah) as the legitimate 
governing body for all of the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories, including Gaza. Power struggles between 
Hamas and Fatah have led to violent clashes in both 
Gaza and the West Bank. Ambiguity surrounding the 
question of who runs Gaza has caused complications 
for UNMAT and implementing partners, in particular 
when trying to distinguish with which local-authority 
actors to coordinate. Getting the job done in accordance 
with ethical considerations, mindful of the humanitar-
ian principle of “do no harm,” and without aggravating 
any of the actors whose support is necessary for sus-
tained operations, has involved a delicate balancing act. 
Access. While the intra-Palestinian power struggles 
create a challenging environment in which to operate, the 
Gaza context is further affected by the influence of Israel, 
which controls access for the vast majority of people and 
goods into and out of Gaza. Representatives of interna-
tional aid organizations and the foreign media can enter 
subject to coordination with and security clearance from 
the Israeli authorities; however, entry and exit must be co-
ordinated in advance, and passage through the high-
security Erez terminal between Israel and Gaza is often 
a lengthy process. In the initial weeks of the mine-action 
program, the process of gaining permission for individual 
NGO staff to enter Gaza often took several weeks—a long 
period of time in the context of a rapid-response scenario. 
Robert Serry, the U.N. Special Coordinator for the 
Middle East Peace Process, has identified access as the 
key challenge to humanitarian work in Gaza. Given 
the obvious Israeli security concerns associated with 
permitting mine-action equipment and explosives to 
be brought into Gaza, gaining approval to import this 
equipment in time to be effective has been one of the big-
gest challenges. All equipment brought into Gaza must be 
approved in advance by the Coordinator of Government Af-
fairs in the Territories. Access for specialist EOD and protec-
tive equipment has now been approved (three months after 
the first request was made), and approval for importation of 
explosives and other associated equipment needed for UXO 
destruction was granted in principle in late May 2009. 
Security. The Israel Defense Forces continue to operate 
in and around Gaza, often in response to militant groups 
directing homemade rockets toward Israel. Movement of 
U.N. staff is severely restricted under U.N. security reg-
ulations, and while some parameters may be warranted, 
the risk-averse nature of these decisions can severely im-
pact operational-planning implementation and quali-
ty assurance. Ongoing Israeli military operations in the 
buffer zone inside Gaza adjoining Israel mean that mine-
action work in these areas must be coordinated with the 
IDF, often implying delays. The Gaza Strip is a small area, 
increasing the possibility that teams will find themselves 
in the wrong place at the wrong time; thus, ground in-
cursions, targeted airstrikes and ongoing militant opera-
tions constitute the key threats to staff safety.
A woman walks past ruins of a building UnMAT–GO 
will investigate for evidence of UXO.
UXO will likely be found in these Gazan buildings.
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Information and coordination. Gathering infor-
mation on the extent and nature of the UXO threat has not 
been a straightforward task. On occasion, local authorities 
have denied access to sensitive areas for teams conduct-
ing risk assessments. Initial post-conflict assessments by 
the United Nations and other international bodies did 
not look at the possible impact of UXO. An internation-
al mine-action sector has not played a role in Gazan hu-
manitarian and recovery efforts previously; thus, those 
responsible for planning did not factor in the poten-
tial that UXO contamination would impact the people 
or humanitarian operations. Furthermore, as a major-
ity of mine-action work will be conducted in support of 
the work of other agencies, coordination of mine-action 
activities is strongly linked to other agencies’ funding 
and planning. As most UXO remains within the rubble 
of damaged buildings, UNMAT is now affected opera-
tionally by other agencies’ planning—or lack thereof—
as well as their ability to implement projects in a 
timely manner. 
Other challenges have included:
•	  Establishing relationships as a new actor on the 
humanitarian scene and gaining an understand-
ing of who does what, where, and why in a highly 
politically-charged and sensitive operating envi-
ronment (although building relationships with 
longer-established U.N. and NGO entities that 
could provide advice has proven valuable).
•	  Suitable mapping of Gaza’s general area has not 
been available, with implications for coordina-
tion with IDF, accurate record-keeping and op-
erational tasking.
•	  The media has not always been a positive force, as 
information relevant to or concerning the mine-
action program has, on occasion, 
been used out of context or twisted 
to negative effect. 
Overall, UNMAT has learned 
to work around, or despite, these 
challenges, and to develop solu-
tions or alternatives. 
Lessons Learned
A key lesson—reinforced at many 
junctures—has been the necessi-
ty of keeping staff and equipment 
to the minimum quantities neces-
sary. The UNMAT consists of a Pro-
gramme Manager, Security Officer, 
Support Services Officer and Pro-
gramme Officer, with four nation-
al staff. The NGO implementing 
partners have operated with be-
tween five and seven one-man EOD 
teams, a Community-liaison Man-
ager, and a small international and 
national support component. Dur-
ing the first months, prior to the 
approval and importation of EOD 
equipment, teams had no option but to work with rudi-
mentary non-specialist tools, and to carefully prioritize 
only the items truly essential for operations. Planning 
of program requirements was based on the realization 
that a light footprint was most likely to be successful in 
an environment in which access is not straightforward.
The Coordinator of Government Affairs in the Ter-
ritories stated in January that only mine-action organi-
zations falling under the coordination of the U.N. Mine 
Action Team would be permitted to operate in Gaza. 
UNMAT has subsequently limited the number of im-
plementers to one (with the exception of a three-month 
period between March and May 
2009 when two organizations were 
working). In the context of Gaza, 
where movement, information and 
operations must be tightly con-
trolled for security and political rea-
sons, the advantages of operating 
with only a few organizations are 
numerous. 
The Israeli insistence on a close 
relationship between the U.N. and 
implementing partners meant that 
a relatively unconventional struc-
ture was established. Instead of a 
traditional mine-action coordi-
nation center in which the United 
Nations oversees the work of im-
plementing actors, a “Mine Action 
Team” structure was employed: A 
U.N. Programme Manager runs 
the overall project, while utiliz-
ing the senior technical member 
of staff from the implementing 
NGO as Operations Manager. 
Both components share offices in 
Gaza and Jerusalem, and this in-
tegrated structure has so far led to 
streamlined operations and mini-
mized information gaps, with the 
added advantage of reducing over-
all staffing requirements. 
In two related examples of good 
practice, the program’s structure, 
modus operandi and, to an extent, 
its existence, have been continu-
ally evaluated during its first four 
months. The huge logistical, po-
litical and security constraints to 
operations have meant that sev-
eral “crunch dates” were set, on 
which the management in Gaza 
and UNMAS New York have dis-
cussed whether the program should 
be closed, downsized or expand-
ed to align with the reality on the 
ground. Similarly, the UXO prob-
lem in Gaza has (very deliberately) 
not been over-sold to donors, the 
media or the aid community. From 
the beginning, the United Nations 
and donors were assured that this 
situation was “not another Koso-
vo 1999 or Lebanon 2006,” with no 
evidence of cluster munitions, no 
conventional use of landmines and 
UXO contamination not as exten-
sive as initially expected. With a dis-
tinct mission statement, the project 
could realistically be predicted to 
have a finite scope, with a maximum 
duration of two years from begin-
ning to end. While perhaps some-
what counterintuitive, these factors 
have been beneficial for maintain-
ing donor confidence; in particular, 
the willingness to take a step back 
and honestly examine what the U.N. 
Mine Action Team and its partners 
can achieve (and whether it is use-
ful) has been well-received by those 
funding the program.
Conclusion
Establishing a mine-action pro-
gram in the context of one of the 
world’s longest running conflicts—
where suspicion runs deep in the 
psyches of all actors—has been a 
highly complicated task, even de-
moralizing on occasions when it ap-
peared the political impediments 
were too great to overcome. Yet pa-
tience and persistence, as well as the 
occasional “outside the box” solu-
tion, have contributed to UNMAT’s 
success during its first four months 
in Gaza. Mine action is one of the 
very few humanitarian sectors with 
the ability to operate in Gaza and to 
produce success stories in this high-
ly restrictive environment. The U.N. 
Mine Action Team and partners will 
continue their work in the Gaza Strip 
until January 2011, by which time it 
is hoped that the area’s deadly legacy 
of conflict will have been eliminat-
ed, facilitating a return to a safer and 
more stable life for the people who 
live and work in the Gaza strip. 
See Endnotes, Page 78 
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A 2,000-pound bomb discovered in the second story of a damaged building dem-
onstrates the challenge EOD teams face.
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The Kingdom of Jordan has a long record of participating in international human-itarian crisis-prevention and peace-
keeping efforts. On a per-capita basis, Jordan is 
one of the largest contributors to U.N. peace-
keeping missions—with an emphasis on pro-
viding field hospitals and support for mine 
action. Jordan regularly dispatches relief sup-
plies and heavy equipment when natural disas-
ters strike around the world. 
In the mine-action sector, Jordan’s National 
Committee for Demining and Rehabilitation 
has hosted a number of mine-affected coun-
tries (including Iraq, Libya, Mauritania and 
Sudan) over the past few years to exchange 
ideas and share tactics on a range of subjects. 
NCDR staff have also traveled to programs in 
Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chile, 
Croatia, Lebanon and South Korea to learn 
how each country has addressed its unique 
challenges. In May 2009, the NCDR moved to 
the next phase in connecting with other mine-
affected countries; it sent two of its operations 
staff to the Libyan program, where they pro-
vided short-term capacity-building support to 
the Libyan teams working in the eastern bor-
der area. 
Expanding the Scope of Work
As the work of the international mine-
action community moves into its second de-
cade, it is clear that the number of accidents, 
stockpiles and the proliferation of landmines 
have begun to decrease. However, a great deal 
of work remains to be done around the world 
A Broader Canvas: 
       Jordan’s ERW Training Course
by Mohammad Breikat [ National Committee for Demining and Rehabilitation ] 
and Olaf Juergensen [ United Nations Development Programme Jordan ]
Jordan is embracing the role of international humanitarian ambassador, particularly in 
the field of mine action. Jordan’s National Committee for Demining and Rehabilitation 
has hosted several events for mine-affected countries and has recently completed its 
first explosive-remnants-of-war training course.
at the national level. With recent conflicts and 
the ever-changing nature of war, it has become 
clear to the international community that in ad-
dition to further work on clearance, old threats 
remain and new threats have been identified 
that require a systematic and often civilian-led 
approach similar to what the mine-action com-
munity has successfully adopted.
The threats come in the form of what are gen-
erally classified as explosive remnants of war. A 
broader topic than landmines, ERW are explo-
sives often left strewn across a war-torn land-
scape and are not necessarily intended to be 
activated through human contact. ERW, there-
fore, include a wide variety of threats ranging 
from abandoned or unexploded artillery shells, 
cluster submunitions and unspent rockets to 
the more ubiquitous scourge of landmines. In-
deed, cluster munitions are seen as 
so problematic that an international 
convention was created at the end of 
2008 to deal with the hazard. As re-
cent events in the Middle East have 
demonstrated, the threat of ERW is 
pervasive. It not only breeds terror 
and fear, but it also affects the health, 
stability, commerce, education, agri-
culture and public safety of a com-
munity. ERW remediation is not an 
area that lends itself to easy man-
agement because it is a multi-faceted 
issue and deals with many diverse 
functions during volatile periods 
in a country’s history. Despite the 
pressing need to develop national ca-
pacities to cope with ERW, an inter-
nationally coordinated approach has 
thus far been absent. 
Building on the considerable ca-
pacity that exists in the mine-action 
sector (skills, knowledge systems, 
standards, procedures and insti-
tutional organization), the NCDR 
began to approach donors and po-
tential partners to establish a one- 
month intensive training course in 
Jordan that would build on previous 
United Nations Development Pro-
gramme Senior Mine Action Man-
agers’ Courses. The Jordan ERW 
training course would address both 
the latent needs of the mine-action 
community and the increasing 
capacity-development needs related 
to the more broadly defined ERW 
sector. Based on several high-level 
meetings, UNDP-commissioned re-
ports and presentations, and a joint 
NCDR-UNDP questionnaire, it was 
determined that there was a demand 
for further management training to 
strengthen national capacity to deal 
with ERW that are curtailing recon-
struction and recovery in war-torn 
societies. As it is still affected by 
ERW, Jordan provides an excellent 
opportunity to view ongoing opera-
tions and blend the classroom theory 
with field application. 
October Launch
Through a grant from the Bureau 
of Political-Military Affairs’ Office of 
Weapons Removal and Abatement 
in the U.S. Department of State, the 
first training course was held from 11 
October through 5 November 2009, 
and a second course is scheduled for 
November 2010. Applying a unique 
blend of theoretical, methodological 
and case-study materials, the Jordan 
Explosive Remnants of War Training 
Course provided first-class instruc-
tion on the design and management 
of national responses to the presence 
of landmines and ERW. Based on the 
campus of the former United Na-
tions University in Amman, Jordan, 
the NCDR course was coordinat-
ed through close cooperation with 
James Madison University’s Mine 
Action Information Center and uti-
lized experts from JMU, the Geneva 
International Centre for Humani-
tarian Demining Implementation 
Support Unit, International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross, Mines Ad-
visory Group, Norwegian People’s 
Aid and the United Nations Mine 
Action Team. The course was global 
in scope and was open to 30 partici-
pants at a time. It was taught in Eng-
lish and operated for a period of six 
weeks —two weeks via long-distance 
education prior to arrival in Am-
man followed by four weeks of in- 
residence lectures, group work and 
field exercises in Jordan. Invitations 
to apply for the course were sent out 
in July 2009 and the costs for ac-
cepted applicants were fully covered 
as part of the grant.
His Royal Highness Prince Mired of Jordan, Chair-
man of nCDR (left), poses with the Deputy Foreign 
Minister of Mozambique, His Eminence Henrique 
Benz, following discussion of bilateral mine-action 
exchanges and nCDR’s new International ERW 
Training Course, at the 9th Meeting of States Par-
ties in Geneva, Switzerland. november 2008.
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The widespread problems of landmines and other ERW in Colombia have been addressed in various ways. Depending 
on the region’s security situation, mine action 
has been undertaken by Colombian military 
forces, government agencies or not at all. As 
the security situation has improved national-
ly, government authorities and military forces 
have been jointly planning and implementing 
mine-action activities. This easing in tension 
has also allowed for the planning of expanded 
demining and information-gathering capaci-
ties. In early June 2009, representatives from 
Colombia’s presidential mine-action author-
ity, the Programa Presidencial para la Acción 
Integral contra Minas Antipersonal (the Pres-
idential Program for Comprehensive Action 
Against Anti-personnel Landmines or PAICMA), 
and the Colombian military met to plan for 
these activities. 
The Workshop
Sponsored by the Bureau of Political Mil-
itary Affair’s Office of Weapons Remov-
al and Abatement in the U.S. Department of 
State and facilitated by the Mine Action In-
formation Center at James Madison Univer-
sity, the Taller de Planificación del Desminado 
Humanitario en Colombia (Colombia Hu-
manitarian Demining Planning Workshop) 
The Colombian HD Workshop: 
            Developing a Plan of Action
by Geary Cox II [ Center for International Stabilization and Recovery ]
Four decades of near-continuous conflict between non-state actors and government 
forces have left Colombia with an extensive, deadly legacy. Landmines, improvised 
explosive devices and other explosive ordnance litter the countryside, and casual-
ty rates remain among the highest in the world. As conflict has subsided, Colombia 
has begun the challenging task of addressing and gathering information on problems 
caused by explosive remnants of war.
convened in Bogotá 9–12 June 2009. More 
than 40 representatives from the U.S. and 
Colombian governments, international or-
ganizations, national mine-action authori-
ties, and key stakeholders in Colombia’s work 
against landmines and other ERW attended.
The workshop opened with speeches from 
Colombian Vice President Francisco Santos 
Calderón and the Director of PAICMA, Andrés 
Dávila. Both stressed the importance of foster-
ing cooperation among military forces, nation-
al authorities and international partners, and 
of developing a plan of action that would in-
tegrate and expand demining capabilities. The 
speeches emphasized not only the urgency of 
the situation facing Colombia, but also the in-
creasing opportunities for mine-action practi-
tioners to work innovatively and collectively. 
Officials from PAICMA and the Humanitar-
ian Demining Department of the Colombian 
Armed Forces then presented on the coun-
try’s mine-clearance program and its planned 
expansion. Currently, Colombia has three de-
mining teams operating around military bas-
es and three operating in the Antioquia, Meta 
and Nariño departments. Each team consists 
of 45 personnel and during 2009, PAICMA 
plans to train an additional three teams. These 
new teams will begin operating in 2010 in the 
Bolívar, Tolima and Valle del Cauca departments. 
Also during 2010, five teams will be 
trained and will begin operations in 
the Arauca, Caldas, Caquetá, Norte 
de Santander and Putumayo depart-
ments. By 2011, demining and infor-
mation gathering will be undertaken 
by the full cohort of teams (includ-
ing the three teams reallocated from 
demining military bases) in the 14 
“high risk” departments. 
Issue Development
After detailing the history of 
Colombian mine action and out-
lining plans for the future, work-
shop participants’ briefings turned 
to lessons learned and best prac- 
tices for mine-action situations like 
Colombia’s. U.S. State Department 
consultant Murf McCloy presented 
on mine-clearance prioritization, 
survey and land release—specifical-
ly how planning and execution can 
be affected by an insecure environ-
ment. (Complicating elements for 
clearance and survey in Colombia 
are ongoing conflict and recently de-
fused tensions.) Steve Priestley, Di-
rector for International Projects at 
Mines Advisory Group, briefed on 
the lessons MAG has learned in its 
community-liaison program. 
The first day closed with a PM/
WRA-hosted reception, and the pro-
ceedings reconvened on the second 
day with a briefing by Mohammad 
Breikat, Director of Jordan’s Nation-
al Committee for Demining and Re-
habilitation. NCDR is a success story 
for mine-action cooperation among 
civilian agencies, military personnel 
and nongovernmental organizations, 
having integrated resources and ca-
pabilities into a productive national 
effort. Finally, Joe Donahue, Chief Ex-
ecutive Officer of Information Man-
agement and Mine Action Programs 
(iMMAP), talked about techniques 
and practices for data collection and 
information management.
The presenters on best practices 
and lessons learned were available to 
provide advice, perspective and en-
couragement as participants began 
the most difficult part of the work-
shop: issue development and refine-
ment of a plan of action. 
Working Groups and Discussion
Two working groups were 
formed—one that focused on the in-
formation requirements for setting 
priorities and planning operations, 
and another that discussed the com-
mand-and-control requirements for 
demining operations and the secu-
rity requirements for activities. Both 
groups addressed force develop-
ment, training needs and resources 
required to conduct operations. 
Working groups were not con-
strained to any rigid boundaries im-
plied by the groups’ focus areas; 
instead, both groups were prompt-
ed to cast a wide net in proposing 
ideas. Facilitators had developed two 
lists of preliminary questions intend-
ed to spark discussion, and the work-
ing groups began by considering these. 
Both groups soon departed from the 
prepared discussion points as mem-
bers of each considered the problems 
facing each area, the resources needed 
to address them, a way to begin doing 
so, and the primary agency or agencies 
that could take the lead. As each issue 
was debated, the working groups were 
encouraged to establish several goals 
and, if appropriate, set a preliminary 
timetable for accomplishing each goal. 
Groups also considered what resources 
and training would be required to im-
plement proposed actions.
Plaza de Bolívar in downtown Bogotá, Colombia, during a placid afternoon.
PHOTO COURTESY OF THE AUTHOR
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Time to prepare presentations for the combined group 
was extended because both groups were having such 
fruitful discussions. The working groups took the extra 
time to develop consensus points—those issues on which 
the group did not reach consensus (because of a lack of 
time or the need for more thorough consideration) were 
labeled as areas of concern meriting further discussion. 
The Plan of Action
When the working groups reconvened in the plenary 
session, there was an encouraging level of agreement be-
tween the two groups about the pertinent issues facing 
Colombian mine action and how to address them. The 
workshop facilitators encouraged the plenary group to 
preserve redundancies because they offered a more com-
plete understanding of the complicated mine-action pic-
ture in Colombia. Participants recognized the following 
items of concern in the Plan of Action:
Growth consideration for demining platoons. Over 
the next three years, there will be an estimated growth 
from six to 14 demining platoons. Plans will be required 
for addressing equipment needs, as well as costs associated 
with sustaining and maintaining this expanded capacity.
Mechanical enhancements. As the demining capac-
ity increases, there will be a need to integrate mechani-
cal capabilities where possible. 
Prioritization of work areas. Stakeholders in Co-
lombia need to prioritize work areas and coordinate 
with relevant organizations, develop updated area im-
pact studies, establish milestones based on increases in 
demining platoons’ capabilities, and ensure the appro-
priate employment of units. Impact Survey teams will 
need training so they can confirm information. An in-
tegrated approach to processing and disseminating this 
information will also need to be established.
Resource mobilization. The working group members 
emphasized the need to develop an overview of the re-
source requirements by sector for the next three years. 
The overview will be useful in securing donor assistance. 
The base financial needs of PAICMA will be included, 
as well as additional costs from impact studies, new me-
chanical tools, mine-detecting dogs, and other human 
resources and capabilities.
Mine-detecting dogs. MDDs are an important 
component of expanded demining capabilities. The 
Colombian military already employs MDDs in military 
operations, but there is a need to adapt and improve the 
capacity for humanitarian demining.
Command and control: National, integrated mech-
anisms for command and control must be strength-
ened to allow PAICMA and the military command to 
adapt more quickly to the changing needs of the de-
mining platoons, and to better accommodate expan-
sions of the program.
Information gathering. Barriers in the information-
gathering process need to be broken down, including 
problems posed by security, geography and a lack of 
resources. Data currently available cannot be corrob-
orated, collated or integrated. A channel between the 
military and other information centers should be cre-
ated to facilitate information sharing, and information 
should be analyzed for accuracy and relevancy.
Incorporating IMSMA. The Information Man-
agement System for Mine Action was recognized as 
vital to effective demining activities. Information 
being added to IMSMA is overseen by PAICMA, 
but will soon be available to other stakeholders. 
PAICMA is leading efforts to verify this infor-
mation and has made it available on its Web site, 
http://www.accioncontraminas.gov.co.
Effective use of information. 
Primary information is not always 
available in the field, so a clear un-
derstanding of the sites that should 
be demined is not always available. 
Protocols for verifying information 
should be standardized.
Information requirements for 
planning operations and priority 
setting. While the main prioritiza-
tion tool for operations is the infor-
mation in IMSMA, the secondary 
resource will certainly be communi-
ties returning to their lands. Criteria 
are needed for prioritization (secu-
rity, geography, land use), and ade-
quate information will be needed to 
implement these criteria when plan-
ning operations commence.
Planning for additional survey 
teams. As more platoons are created, 
there must be a simultaneous increase 
in the number of survey teams. These 
new teams should employ a mix-
ture of General and Technical Survey 
methodologies, with NGOs possibly 
providing supplementary support to 
military teams (activities should be 
coordinated through PAICMA). 
Integrating community liaisons.
Community liaisons were seen as a vi-
tal component for humanitarian de-
mining. Although a structure for such 
a system is not yet ready, participants 
were interested in a hybridized civilian/
military approach in the interim.
Coordinating victim assistance, 
clearance, mine-risk education and 
platoon activities. There are numer-
ous information mechanisms for co-
ordinating the listed activities, but 
none of them are comprehensive. 
Department committees, national 
information tables, the Intersecto-
rial Commission for Action against 
AP Mines, and other venues provide 
important but limited opportunities 
for coordination. PAICMA will look 
to establish a regular venue for interac-
tion and coordination.
The framework Plan of Action 
shows the complexities and interre-
lated nature of mine-action efforts 
in Colombia. Participants were com-
mitted to suggesting ways forward 
for as many topics as possible, and 
emphasis was placed on recognizing 
stakeholder organizations for lead-
ership and future collaboration. The 
plenary session discussed and ap-
proved the next steps and follow-up 
opportunities to sustain and moni-
tor the implementation of the Plan 
of Action. The full text of the Plan 
of Action is available in Spanish 
and English on the MAIC Web site: 
http://tinyurl.com/ygumko.  
Presenting the Plan
The 13-point Plan of Action the 
working groups developed was for-
mally presented the following day at 
a closing session attended by about 
100 dignitaries and representatives 
from mine-action organizations, 
diplomatic missions to Colombia, 
landmine survivor assistance and 
advocacy organizations and land-
mine survivors. Displays of demin-
ing equipment, prostheses, and other 
humanitarian-assistance tools filled 
the lobby, and attendees could view 
these items and learn more about the 
multifaceted assistance programs at 
work in Colombia. 
After discussing the framework 
Plan of Action regarding the deploy-
ment of expanded mine-clearance 
capacities, Pablo Parra Gallego, Di-
rector of the Humanitarian Demin-
ing section for PAICMA, discussed 
next steps, addressed the challenges 
involved in post-clearance communi-
ty development, and spoke about the 
role of government agencies, inter-
national organizations and NGOs in 
mobilizing resources and developing 
plans for Colombia. 
PAICMA Director Andrés Dávila 
spoke about his organization’s con-
tinuing work to improve mine-action 
integration in Colombia and to solic-
it international interest in Colombia’s 
progress. Dennis Barlow, Director of 
Deminers in protective gear.
PHOTO COURTESY OF U.S. EMBASSY, BOGOTÁ
MAIC Director Dennis Barlow addresses dignitaries and workshop participants.
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the Center for International Stabili-
zation and Recovery, emphasized the 
workshop’s important steps toward a 
formalized roadmap with achievable 
goals and clearly delineated steps.
The closing session was addressed 
by William Brownfield, U.S. Ambas-
sador to Colombia, and Sergio Jara-
millo, Colombian Vice Minister of 
Defense. Both speakers stressed the 
importance of further developing 
an integrated approach to demining 
that incorporates resources and skills 
from governmental, military and in-
dependent organizations. Speaking 
in Spanish, Ambassador Brownfield 
underscored the importance of hu-
manitarian mine action as Colom-
bia recovers from its war-torn past. 
The ambassador also highlighted the 
workshop’s relevance in light of the 
upcoming Cartagena Summit on a 
Mine-free World (24 November–4 
December 2009).
Moving Forward
With such a positive response to the 
Plan of Action and the energy suffus-
ing the conference, there was a near-
universal call for follow-on activities 
to commence as quickly as possible. 
The workshop helped build 
momentum for Colombia’s mine-
action programs, attracting atten-
tion to achievements while helping 
jump start future work. Participants 
agreed to share more information, 
meet more frequently, and collabo-
rate more closely on projects. The 
workshop’s Plan of Action will hope-
fully serve as a call for greater syn-
ergy and cooperation as Colombia’s 
demining capacity expands.
See Endnotes, Page 78 
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U.S. Ambassador to Colombia William Brownfield speaks to closing-day attendees.
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Research in Colombia on    
          Explosives Detection by Rats
by Luisa Fernanda Méndez Pardo [ Escuela de Estudios Superiores de Policía ] 
and Andrés M. Pérez-Acosta [ Universidad del Rosario ]
The interdisciplinary research group INVESTUD is investigating the effectiveness of 
mine-detecting lab rats. In Africa, the APOPO program is well-known for using African 
giant pouched rats for mine detection, but INVESTUD hopes to build on and even 
surpass APOPO’s progress to advance Colombia’s mine-clearance efforts.
Colombia has been the focus of at-tention in several articles in The Journal of ERW and Mine Action 
over the years mainly because Colombia con-
tinues to have landmine victims numbering 
among the highest in the world.1,2 According 
to the most recent Landmine Monitor Report,2 
however, the number of fatalities began to de-
crease in 2007 for the first time since 2002.
Since 1999, the Landmine Monitor has pro-
vided background on the Colombian armed 
conflict, the state of the current landmine 
problem, casualty figures and explanations of 
victim-assistance programs. Few reports have 
mentioned the local scientific research and 
technological development of devices for de-
tection and deactivation of explosives. 
The 2000 Landmine Monitor Report brief-
ly mentioned a potential research project aimed 
at developing a mine-detection robot. The proj-
ect was to be carried out by the Department of 
Mechanical Engineering at the University of Los 
Andes in Bogotá.3 The 2001 Landmine Monitor 
Report, however, stated that this plan failed to take 
off when no groups showed interest in the initia-
tive.4 Landmine Monitor entries from 2002–2008 
make no mention of mine-detection research.
INVESTUD Introduces the Wistar Rat
Since 2004, the interdisciplinary research 
group INVESTUD of the Colombian National 
Police has been exploring if white Wistar rats 
of the Rattus norvegicus species (commonly 
used as lab rats) are capable of detecting ex-
plosives in an open field. An antecedent of 
this project is the APOPO program, which 
originated in Belgium and set up its first op-
erations in Mozambique. APOPO relies on 
the olfactory abilities of the African giant 
pouched rat, Cricetomys gambianus, for land-
mine and unexploded-ordnance detection.5
Although the Colombian research project 
led by INVESTUD has not yet tested its rats’ 
detecting abilities in a real minefield, the team 
of researchers continues to believe there are 
several advantages of Wistar rats detecting ex-
plosives over the current APOPO program. The 
two most relevant advantages are: 
1. The white rat weighs less than the African 
giant pouched rat (450 grams versus 1,500 
grams [1 pound vs. 3 pounds]); although 
the weight of the African giant pouched rat 
is generally not enough to trigger a typical 
anti-personnel mine,6 the white rat, being 
lighter, would be even less likely to set off a 
mine. This is particularly important because 
the mines terrorists use in Colombia are of-
ten more sensitive than a typical landmine.
2. The white rat is found and can reproduce 
anywhere in the world (because it is a 
classical strain of laboratory rat).7 
With financial support from the Colombian 
Ministry of National Defense and the Colombian 
National Police, INVESTUD has successfully 
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completed the first phase of olfac-
tory detection and discrimination 
of seven explosive bases in con-
trolled conditions (see photo above). 
The average discrimination in-
dex achieved by the six subjects 
(four females and two males) was 
90 percent.8 The results were repli-
cated with a group of subjects that 
were the first group’s offspring that 
grew in the laboratory. These rats 
were exposed directly to other spe-
cies such as cats, dogs and humans,9 
which helps sensitize them to the 
smells they are likely to encounter in 
an actual minefield.
Hope for Progress in Mine Detection
Currently, the open-field phase of 
detection (see photo at left) is being 
developed near the Animal Behavior 
Laboratory of the Escuela de Estudios 
Superiores de Policía (Graduate School 
of Police) in Bogotá under the direc-
tion of Dr. Luisa Fernanda Méndez 
Pardo. While research is ongoing, ini-
tial results have already been reported 
in several national and international 
media.10,11
Colombia’s progress in the de-
tection and deactivation of explo-
sive remnants of war could make the 
country a vital part of the solution to 
the anti-personnel landmine prob-
lem. If this research project proves 
successful in real minefields, as with 
the African giant pouched rat, relief 
from mine contamination is well on 
its way for the war-torn country. 
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A rat learns to detect explosives in a laboratory experiment at the Graduate School 
of Police, Bogotá, Colombia. 
ALL PHOTOS COURTESY OF LUISA FERnAnDA MÉnDEz PARDO
Explosives-detection field training of 
a rat in an open field at the Graduate 
School of Police, Bogotá, Colombia.
Over the past few months, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitari-an Demining has helped coordinate a 
conference on cluster munitions and taken part 
in a workshop on explosive remnants of 
war for an international security fo-
rum. The GICHD also began pro-
moting the Bibliomines, an online 
resource for mine-action docu-
ments in French. This edition of the 
Geneva Diary discusses some of these 
recent activities in further detail.
Berlin Conference on the Destruction of 
Cluster Munitions
The Berlin Conference on the Destruction of 
Cluster Munitions was hosted by the German 
Federal Foreign Office in collaboration with the 
Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 23–
26 June 2009. The GICHD supported the GFFO 
in the substantial and organizational prepara-
tion of the conference, and the United Nations 
Development Programme, sponsored by Nor-
way, arranged the travel for about 40 officials 
from developing countries to attend the meet-
ing. The two-day conference gathered 84 of 
the 98 signatories to the Convention on Clus-
Geneva Diary: 
            Report from the GICHD
by Ian Mansfield [ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining ]
The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining provides operational 
assistance to mine-action programs and operators, creates and disseminates 
knowledge, works to improve quality management and standards, and provides 
support to instruments of international law.
ter Munitions, including nearly all those with 
cluster-munitions stockpiles. Representatives 
from nongovernmental organizations, interna-
tional organizations and companies work-
ing on cluster-munitions stockpile 
destruction also participated in the 
conference. Altogether the atten-
dance totaled 274 persons. 
The objective of the Berlin 
conference was to support the 
timely implementation of Ar-
ticle 3 (stockpile destruction) and 
related obligations of the CCM, and to 
maintain the momentum of its signing ceremo-
ny in December 2008. Experts from both states 
and civil society gave presentations organized 
in thematic sessions that led to fruitful discus-
sions. Further details can be found on the Web 
site at http://www.berlin-ccm-conference.org.
International Security Forum
The 8th International Security Forum was 
held in Geneva 18–20 May 2009. The GICHD 
arranged a workshop titled “Explosive Rem-
nants of War, Human Security and Develop-
ment” that included a range of speakers from 
mine-action programs and NGOs. The session 
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Colombia, located in the northern tip of South America, is the country in the Western Hemisphere most affected by 
improvised explosive devices. Its level of con-
tamination is comparable to countries like war-
torn Iraq and Afghanistan, where international 
forces deem IEDs a major threat to their plans 
and to the security of their personnel. 
Types of IEDs Found in Colombia
There are few conventional landmines 
found in Colombia. Instead, landmines are 
generally improvised explosive devices used 
as anti-personnel landmines (that is, victim-
activated). An IED1 is a bomb fabricated in an 
IEDs: A Major Threat for a 
                               Struggling Society
by Pablo Esteban Parra Gallego [ PAICMA ]
The use of improvised explosive devices by guerrillas, drug cartels and paramilitary 
groups has threatened Colombian society for the past 30 years. This article examines 
the types of IEDs found in Colombia, and the extent and history of its IED problem. Also 
outlined are the Colombian government’s efforts to counter IEDs, and possible solu-
tions to the challenges ahead, such as enhanced intelligence and community security.
improvised manner that incorporates destruc-
tive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic or incendiary 
chemicals. IEDs are designed to destroy or in-
capacitate personnel or vehicles. In Colombia, 
these devices were used recently to counter the 
advance of the Colombian Armed Forces during 
their struggle to eliminate illegal groups in the 
country. These groups also use IEDs to protect 
coca crops, and to frighten the population that 
may collaborate with the government forces.2
Most of the IEDs produced in Colombia fall 
into one of the following categories:
1. House-borne IEDs: Devices in any kind 
of building, rigged to detonate and cause 
collapse shortly after a military unit enters. 
These IEDs have become very popular to 
attack bomb/explosives clearance squads 
and specialized anti-terrorism teams.
2. Vehicle-borne IEDs: Devices that use a 
vehicle as the package or container of the 
IED. They come in all shapes, colors and 
sizes, depending on the type of vehicles 
available. Donkey-drawn carts, bicycles, 
motorcycles and ambulances have also 
been used in attacks on Colombian 
Armed Forces. Their destructive power 
relies on the quantity of explosives and 
the amount of shrapnel generated during 
the detonation.
3. Booby traps: IEDs contained in a variety 
of objects like cell phones, radios, balls, 
cooking pots and even corpses. They are 
Improvised landmine, pressure activated.
ALL PHOTOS COURTESY OF EJÉRCITO DE COLOMBIA—ESCUELA DE INGENIEROS 
MILITARES
was chaired by the new President 
of the GICHD Council of Founda-
tion (the Geneva Centre’s governing 
body), Dr. Barbara Haering. The dis-
cussion opened by emphasizing that 
landmines, ERW and small arms/
light weapons are all tools of armed 
violence that negatively affect lives 
and livelihoods after conflict.
Mine action can make a signifi-
cant contribution to programs fo-
cused on armed-violence reduction, 
peace building, security-sector re-
form, and the disarmament, de-
mobilization and reintegration of 
former combatants. The panelists 
discussed the experience of mine-
action organizations in dealing with 
the legacy of ERW as part of efforts 
to strengthen human security and 
promote reconstruction and develop-
ment. Further details on the work-
shop can be found on the Linking 
Mine Action and Development pages 
of the GICHD Web site.1
Bibliomines
The GICHD is collaborating 
with the national mine-action cen-
ters of Senegal (Centre National 
d’Action Antimines du Sénégal) and 
Mauritania (Programme National 
de Déminage Humanitaire pour le 
Développement) and the mine-action 
training center of Benin (Centre de 
Perfectionnement aux Actions post-
conflictuelles de Déminage et Dépol-
lution) to carry out the Bibliomines 
project. The Bibliomines online li-
brary was created for French-speak-
ing communities affected by mines 
and ERW, and for national actors 
within mine action. The library col-
lects and makes existing documen-
tation on mine and ERW action 
accessible in French.2 The materials 
on the Bibliomines Web site include 
the following:
·	 Documents from mine-affected 
countries 
·	 Documents from international 
institutions 
·	 Conventions and texts of inter-
national law 
·	 Documents developed for 
national implementation (leg-
islations, strategies, national 
standards, procedures, pro-
grams, etc.) studies, surveys, 
publications, etc.2 
In addition to facilitating access 
to mine-action-related documents 
in French, Bibliomines promotes the 
production and dissemination of 
new documents and creates oppor-
tunities for cross-sectoral exchanges 
of expertise.2 The Bibliomines Web 
site can be accessed via the GICHD 
Web site or at www.bibliomines.org. 
Recent Publications
Recent publications from the 
GICHD include an updated version 
of the Guide to Cluster Munitions,3 
the first edition was published in 
November 2007. This guide presents 
some content of the Convention on 
Cluster Munitions and information 
on stockpile destruction, while of-
fering new findings in procedures 
for survey and battle-area clear-
ance. Another recent GICHD pub-
lication is the Guide to Mechanical 
Demining Handbook.4 A full list 
of all GICHD publications can be 
found at http://www.gichd.org/
gichd-publications/overview. 
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Ian Mansfield is the Deputy Director 
and Head of Operations at the GICHD 
and is responsible for all of the center’s 
operational, technical and research ac-
tivities. He is also responsible for ana-
lyzing existing and potential areas of 
activity for the GICHD, as well as all 
evaluation, assessment and consultan-
cy activities. Mansfield holds a Master 
of Business Administration and a bach-
elor’s degree in civil engineering.
Ian Mansfield
Deputy Director/Head of Operations
Geneva International Centre for 
Humanitarian Demining
Avenue de la Paix 7bis
CH-1211 Geneva / Switzerland
Tel: +41 22 906 1674
Fax: +41 22 906 1690
E-mail: i.mansfield@gichd.org
Web site: www.gichd.org
25
JOURNAL: The Journal of ERW and Mine Action Issue 13.3
Published by JMU Scholarly Commons, 2009
50         special report | the journal of ERW and mine action | fall 2009 | 13.3 13.3 | fall 2009 | the journal of ERW and mine action | special report         51
IED builders usually rely on the container 
of the device for fragmentation purposes. A 
detonated car bomb will have a devastating ef-
fect resulting from the pieces of the car itself 
flying at high speed. Nevertheless, IEDs have 
been found with added shrapnel, like nails and 
bolts, to inflict worse damage. To avoid metal-
detector discovery of improvised landmines, 
illegal groups in Colombia avoid metallic ma-
terials, instead adding glass and plastic for 
fragmentation effect. At first, landmine vic-
tims suffer wounds from the explosion, and 
later develop infections from fragments that 
weren’t detected by X-rays.
Due to logistical constraints of illegal 
groups, their IEDs seldom contain military 
explosives. They are more often built with 
ammonium nitrate and fuel oil (ANFO) or 
other types of improvised explosives, which 
widely affect their destruction capability. 
Allegedly, several products, like coffee or 
paint, are added to those explosives to avoid 
canine detection. Most components of IEDs 
are relatively easy to find in rural markets. 
IEDs in Colombia commonly have a powerful 
main charge, causing significant damage 
and terrorizing the population. This scenario 
is particularly true with improvised land-
mines because these devices use contain-
ers, including bottles or boxes, that can hold 
more explosives than regular mine casings. 
AP landmines in Colombia usually hold 250 
grams (0.5 pound) to 4,000 grams (nearly 9 
pounds) of explosives, but some have been 
found to hold more than 20 kilograms (44 
pounds) of explosives.
The most common type of detonator found 
in Colombia is the electrical detonator, al-
though non-electrical and chemical detonators 
have also been found. The latter are commonly 
used in landmines to avoid detection by metal 
detectors and weathering of the batteries. Fur-
ther studies are needed, but evidence indicates 
that battery-initiated landmines decay after 
just months in the open. Similarly, the hygro-
scopic nature of ammonium nitrate and defects 
in the waterproofing of IEDs generally render 
ANFO ineffective after being abandoned for 
several months. 
Activation mechanisms vary widely, de-
pending on the type of IED. Car bombs and 
house bombs usually have a mixture of tim-
ers, remote controls and victim-activated fuz-
es. The nature of the objective, the amount of 
resources spent and the risk inherent to the ac-
tivity oblige the designers to use more sophis-
ticated and reliable activation systems. Booby 
traps generally have a victim-activated system, 
but some are also activated by a simple remote-
control device. IED landmines are all victim-
activated with pressure-release, tension, or 
tension-release systems. Depending on their 
strategic purpose, these landmines can have 
several initiation systems, including magnetic 
and photosensitive fuzes.
How did Colombia Become so Affected?
After Colombia won its independence from 
Spain in the beginning of the 19th century, ru-
ral violence became widespread throughout the 
country, the result of unfair land distribution, 
frail property rights and obscure political inter-
ests. From the second half of the 20th century un-
til today, leftist guerrillas—mainly the Fuerzas 
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolu-
tionary Armed Forces of Colombia or FARC) and 
the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (National Lib-
eration Army or ELN)3—have ravaged the country; 
and since the 1980s, drug cartels and paramilitary 
self-defense groups have only added to the level of 
violence in this already complicated setting.
Gas cylinder filled with explosives, used to booby- 
trap a building.
designed to detonate when an unsus-
pecting victim touches or disturbs the 
seemingly harmless object. They can 
also be activated by a remote control or 
a timing mechanism.
4. Anti-personnel mines: IEDs using plas-
tic, glass or metallic containers, with dif-
ferent amounts of explosives, different 
kinds of shrapnel-generating objects, and 
concurrent activation systems. Designed 
to detonate with contact by or proxim-
ity to its victim, they are concealed in 
the ground or in vegetation. The most 
sophisticated anti-personnel mines are 
undetectable by metal detectors and have 
chemical-activation systems that can 
last for many years. Since a single victim 
can activate most roadside IEDs, they 
are classified as AP mines and known as 
victim-activated IEDs—unless they have 
a remote-controlled activation system.
5. Improvised land-service ammunition: 
The pressure Colombian Armed Forces 
exerted on illegal armed groups closed 
most of these organizations’ access to 
weapons markets, forcing them to forge 
most of their land-service ammunition. 
Improvised projectiles, mortars, rockets, 
grenades and remote-controlled roadside 
charges were devised; many have serious 
reliability and aiming problems.
Materials Used and How IEDs Work
IEDs typically consist of a main charge, a 
booster, a detonator and an initiation system. 
Depending on their objective, IEDs in Colombia 
are built in different shapes and sizes, with var-
ied materials and activation devices. IEDs can 
act just by the power of the detonation (blast), 
but most of the time they contain multiple kinds 
of shrapnel, and evidence suggests that chemical 
or biological toxic elements are sometimes add-
ed to enhance the damage to victims. Depend-
ing on the IED’s purpose, sometimes the builder 
adds a shaped charge to defeat armor, but most of 
the time, IEDs in Colombia are designed as anti-
personnel landmines. IEDs that are meant to de-
stroy armored vehicles or buildings are shaped to 
focus the effect of the explosive’s energy, main-
ly to create more damage to a highly resistant 
object. When an IED is built in a shape-charge 
manner, it is most likely anti-vehicle and not AP. 
Each IED found in Colombia is unique because 
its producer uses only locally available materi-
als. Since they are tailored for a specific objective, 
IEDs are usually more difficult to prevent, detect 
and neutralize than regular ammunition.
IEDs built by inexperienced people or with 
defective materials can fail to accomplish their 
task. Illegal groups in Colombia, however, have 
developed advanced techniques, employing 
sophisticated elements of conventional ammu-
nition that make IEDs more reliable and lethal, 
including electronic components, cell phones, 
remote controls, and magnetic and optical fuz-
es. The complexity of IEDs is only limited by the 
training and creativity of the designer and by 
the availability of specific materials.
numerous explosive devices found by the 
Colombian Army.
IED found on a boat that was planned to be used 
in a river attack.
26
Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Vol. 13, Iss. 3 [2009], Art. 1
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol13/iss3/1
52         special report | the journal of ERW and mine action | fall 2009 | 13.3 13.3 | fall 2009 | the journal of ERW and mine action | special report         53
development efforts on new detection, neu-
tralization and destruction techniques. Special 
teams have been formed and trained in the 
techniques to counter IEDs, but the race be-
tween new production technologies and coun-
termeasures is never-ending. 
The National Army of Colombia alone 
has more than 1,200 rapid-response teams 
trained for breaching operations during com-
bat. This capacity is often used to counter 
IEDs and mitigate the risk for affected com-
munities. Seven other teams have received 
training in IED neutralization and deal with 
more complex threats in urban areas. The 
Colombian National Police and Colombia’s 
security agencies have also developed similar 
teams, providing the country with a substan-
tial counter-IED capacity.
Better security conditions in several parts 
of the country facilitate the return of inter-
nally displaced people who were forced to 
leave their homes by the illegal groups when 
the groups emplaced landmines. To support 
these communities calling for a definitive 
solution to their problem with IEDs, special 
humanitarian-demining teams from the Na-
tional Army have been trained and equipped. 
Using International Mine Action Standards, 
mine clearance is taking place, making many 
areas safe again. In coordination with the 
national mine-action authority, the govern-
ment is considering allowing experienced 
landmine-clearance organizations to imple-
ment clearance programs in Colombia.
As a result of these efforts in 2008, the fol-
lowing were detected and destroyed: 
•	 17,353 IEDs
•	 Six car bombs
•	 1,431 gas cylinders filled with explosives
•	 108,197 kilograms (238,534 pounds) of 
explosives
•	 97,174 detonators
•	 105,306 meters (65 miles) of detonating cord 
•	 22,736 meters (14 miles) of safety fuze.10 
During this same year, the humanitarian-
demining teams cleared 174,752 square meters 
(43 acres) and destroyed 447 landmines and 21 
pieces of unexploded ordnance.
More Work to be Done
More and better intelligence must supple-
ment the national capacity to counter IEDs. In-
formation is the key issue in the fight against 
terrorist attacks and minefields. It is as impor-
tant for the prevention of the use of new IEDs 
as it is for finding, neutralizing and destroying 
the ones already in the ground. The govern-
ment is already working on this issue, with the 
cooperation and technical assistance of several 
allied countries. 
An international advocacy campaign 
against the use of indiscriminate weapons by 
illegal armed groups in Colombia will soon be 
implemented. Regardless of its size, technol-
ogy and budget, no national counter-IED ca-
pacity is enough to stop the losses caused by 
these weapons. Iraq and Afghanistan are clear 
examples of this statement. Perhaps the Sec-
ond Review Conference of the Ottawa Con-
vention, to be held 30 November–4 December 
2009 in Cartagena, Colombia, will send a clear 
message to FARC and ELN to stop using land-
mines, and to reduce the use of IEDs against 
the people of Colombia. 
See Endnotes, Page 78 
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Most of the drug cartels, guerrillas and 
paramilitary groups began using IEDs in Co-
lombia during the 1980s and 1990s. During 
that time period, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (known 
as ETA or Basque Homeland and Freedom),4 
Irish Republican Army5 and other terrorist 
groups came to Colombia to train FARC and 
ELN members in the construction and use of 
IEDs. But over the years, FARC and ELN had 
already developed a state-of-the-art tech-
nique that allows them to build and utilize 
an ever-expanding number of IEDs to dis-
rupt Colombian State Forces and intimidate 
the population.
Over the past 30 years, illegal groups acting 
in Colombia have used all kinds of IEDs, from 
the car bombs commonly used in the past by the 
Medellín Cartel led by Pablo Escobar, to impro-
vised rockets, grenades, mortars, explosive-
filled gas cylinders, booby traps, roadside 
explosives and even donkey-bombs. Victim-
activated IEDs have killed or maimed over 
8,000 civilian and military Colombians, both 
(victims of other IEDs are still being count-
ed), and the national economy has suffered 
enormous losses in trade and infrastructure. 
The abundant use of IEDs and other indis-
criminate weapons by FARC and  ELN con-
tributed to the decision by the United States, 
the European Union and several other coun-
tries to classify the two organizations as ter-
rorists groups.6,7
Scope of the Problem
Between 2002 and 2007, 5,200 terror-
ist acts involving various IEDs took place in 
Colombia. Though the number of bombings 
saw an 81-percent reduction during that pe-
riod, the use of IEDs is still relevant. Despite 
the efforts of Colombian Armed Forces, ille-
gal groups successfully executed 347 terrorist 
acts involving IEDs in 2008, and 178 during 
the first six months of 2009.8 
Most of these IEDs were used against the 
Colombian Armed Forces by means of road-
side charges, car bombs and booby-trapped 
buildings. Some were used against key infra-
structure throughout the country, like pipe-
lines (734 bombings) and power lines (1,713 
bombings),8 affecting the national economy. 
Others were used against civilian targets, or 
affected the civilian population due to their 
indiscriminant nature, similar to the attack 
with gas cylinders on the church of Bojayá 
(2 May 2002), where 119 civilians lost their 
lives, or the bombing of the social club El 
Nogal (7 February 2003), where 36 died and 
more than 200 were wounded.
Additionally, FARC and ELN also use victim-
activated IEDs, effectively making them land-
mines. Between 1990 and 1 July 2009, there 
were 4,289 landmine accidents in Colombia, 
causing death or injury to 7,428 people, 34 per-
cent of which were civilians.9 
During this same period, 471 municipali-
ties of Colombia (43 percent) reported at least 
one landmine victim to the Programa Presi-
dencial para la Acción Integral contra Minas 
Antipersonal (Presidential Program for Mine 
Action or PAICMA).9 
Due to the intensive use of improvised 
anti-personnel mines by FARC and ELN in ru-
ral areas of the country, landmine accidents in-
creased almost 900 percent between 2000 and 
2006. Even though the number of landmine 
casualties started to diminish in 2007, the cur-
rent number of victims killed or injured by these 
devices in Colombia is still one of the highest in 
the world. The use of landmines in Colombia by 
FARC and ELN poses a huge threat to people, 
hinders social and economic development, im-
pedes the use of natural resources and causes 
displacement of communities.
 
National Measures Against IEDs
The social and economic losses due to 
the extended use of IEDs by illegal groups 
in Colombia are so large they are nearly 
incomprehensible. Colombia’s legislation 
contemplates strong penalties against IED 
producers, but the economic incentives 
from the drug business run by the illegal 
armed groups are too high, spurring their 
use against the Colombian Forces. 
Colombian Armed Forces have increased 
their training, along with research-and-
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are in fact a global problem and have been in 
use for a considerable period of time. Wher-
ever the militarily weak or poorly resourced 
confront superior forces with advanced tech-
nologies in armed conflict, IEDs provide an 
ideal weapon in much the same way landmines 
do. Throughout modern history, states, indi-
viduals, and criminal and terrorist groups have 
used them to murder, intimidate, extort and 
destabilize the infrastructure of government 
and undermine the rule of law.
In the mine-action community, IEDs, al-
though often recognized as significant threats 
where prevalent, are not generally understood 
or analyzed in any depth. As a result, the ad-
vice provided for mine-risk education and the 
formulation of procedures that humanitarian-
demining and battle-area-clearance person-
nel must adopt for IED removal and disposal 
are questionable. A number of possible reasons 
exist as to why mine action has failed to in-
corporate effective countermeasures to IEDs. 
Primarily, the International Mine Action Stan-
dards have never fully addressed the subject. 
As a result, the expertise required to properly 
analyze the impact of IEDs and thereby iden-
tify the requirement for action has not been 
resourced. No generic doctrine exists to form 
a basis for the development of IED standard 
operating procedures, IED-risk education, 
country assessment and threat analysis, for 
both the security of personnel and the conduct 
of mine clearance and related operations.
In Figure 1, the IED threat is shown by the 
number of IED incidents occurring in sample re-
gions and countries during 2008, and those re-
corded from 1 May through 30 June 2009. From 
the data provided, the number of incidents is 
Figure 1: IED incidents for selected regions and countries in 2008 and during May/June 2009.
GRAPHIC COURTESY OF HMS
I t is well-reported that improvised explo-sive devices create a lethal and prevail-ing threat that is responsible for hundreds 
of deaths across the globe each month. The 
question of how the escalating presence of 
IEDs will impact mine action should be ad-
dressed, alongside the issue of how we can 
improve our understanding of the threat and 
what actions need to be taken to reduce it.
IEDs have become synonymous with the 
ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. To 
an outsider (based on media reporting) IED 
use by terrorists and insurgents appears to be 
focused solely in these theaters; however, IEDs 
IEDs and Their Impact on Mine Action
by Adrian King [ Hazard Management Solutions, Ltd. ]
This article addresses the increasingly prevalent threat of improvised explosive de-
vices around the world. The author carefully defines this often unpredictable and un-
conventional “weapon of choice” and outlines the steps to eliminate the hazard it 
presents to global security. The article also discusses the role IEDs play within the 
scope of mine action, arguing their danger exceeds that of traditional mines and other 
unexploded ordnance. 
This illustration shows the construction of an IED used to destroy the U.n. building in Baghdad, Iraq, 19 August 2003.
GRAPHIC COURTESY OF HAzARD MAnAGEMEnT SOLUTIOnS
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What is an IED?
According to the Landmine Monitor Re-
port 2008, an improvised explosive device is 
“a device placed or produced in an improvised 
manner incorporating explosives or noxious 
chemicals. An IED may be victim-operated or 
command-detonated. Victim-operated IEDs 
are banned under the Mine Ban Treaty, but 
command-detonated IEDs are not.” 1 
IEDs are normally categorized by their 
method of initiation, such as timer-activated, 
command-fired or victim-operated. They are 
then further subcategorized by their explosive 
effect: blast, blast/fragmentation, incendiary or 
blast/incendiary. The method of delivery is a 
further type of classification, e.g., to the target— 
vehicle-borne IED, person-borne IED (suicide) 
or water-borne IED. Each method of initiation 
has its advantages and disadvantages, and the 
perpetrator will normally decide on the meth-
od of employment by the type of target to be 
attacked and its accessibility. For example, for 
exact targeting of a vehicle convoy, command-
fired IEDs with a large payload offer the great-
est opportunity for success for the perpetrator, 
who can choose the precise time of detonation 
to overcome a vehicle’s armor and attack the 
individuals inside. In other circumstances, a 
time-initiated IED may be better-suited, where 
escape of the bomb-layer is deemed essential 
and command firing cannot be considered due 
to the security infrastructure or the nature and 
situation of the target. Suicide IED attacks can 
be carried out at any location, providing secu-
rity can be negotiated, and suicide bombers 
have perpetrated some of the most devastat-
ing attacks. Victim-operated devices, although 
essentially random, can be targeted, such as in 
the form of an under-vehicle IED. Until recent-
ly, IED incidents generally occurred as a result 
of planned and targeted attacks on individuals 
or organizations. Currently, however, IEDs can 
be utilized almost anywhere, in any location 
or terrain, and in any area of the battlefield, 
where inevitably they will eventually impinge 
on mine-action operations and activities. In 
Afghanistan, for example, IEDs are used as 
a tactical weapon, targeting Internation-
al Security Assistance Force troops and af-
fecting force mobility, but IEDs also have the 
capability to considerably affect operational 
aims and even strategic planning. They are 
used in Afghanistan to deny ground, protect 
troop positions and serve as an early warning 
of attack in much the same way as a conven-
tional alarm mine. In Colombia and Nepal, 
IEDs are also employed as a protective mea-
sure in the same way as a defensive minefield, 
but they are sometimes placed with the facili-
ty to fire the devices on command as opposed 
to being victim-operated.
Current trends in IED manufacture indi-
cate a growing use of command-fired devices, 
especially those employing a radio signal as 
the method of arming and initiating. This 
progression is one seen globally, with perpe-
trators taking advantage of communications 
and radio technologies available worldwide. 
Insurgents used radio-controlled IEDs in Iraq 
in most attacks on Coalition Forces, where 
remote-controlled roadside bombs caused 
many casualties in the mid-stages of the re-
cent conf lict. Electronic countermeasures were 
then developed to jam the insurgents’ radio sig-
nals as forces travelled through the range of 
the device’s radio receiver. Insurgents respond-
ed by introducing infrared switches armed re-
motely by radio signal outside the range of the 
electronic-countermeasure equipment, where a 
passing vehicle or foot patrol could trigger the 
device. Afghanistan has shown similar trends, 
but instead of infrared switches, electronic-
countermeasure equipment is defeated by us-
ing long command wires from a distant vantage 
point with a good view of the device location. 
Recently, however, as command-wire detec-
tion procedures have become more successful, 
simple victim-activated devices have been used 
in significant numbers. These IEDs are manu-
factured using predominately nonmetallic and 
clearly very high, and although fatalities and inju-
ries are not given, they are likely to be significantly 
higher than those caused by landmines. Landmine 
casualties are rarely high for a single incident, 
whereas an IED contained in a truck and initiated 
in a busy marketplace can claim tens or even hun-
dreds of victims. In Iraq alone during 2007, 5,480 
civilian deaths were recorded as a result of multi-
fatality bombings,3 whereas 5,426 casualties were 
recorded globally for mine-related injuries, includ-
ing victim-operated IEDs for the same period.1 
These IED statistics have not been included as a 
comparison to mine-related injuries, but simply 
to show the prevalence of IED use. 
Dealing with a booby-trapped cache of IED components buried inside a refuse bin.
PHOTO COURTESY OF HMS
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the IMAS documentation, there is the ability to 
publish technical annexes for complex weapon 
systems or specialist EOD tasks. As an interim 
measure, IEDs and IED-disposal operations 
could be addressed in such a document, giving 
basic knowledge, generic standard operating 
procedures for search-and-disposal action, and 
the corresponding minimum equipment re-
quirements—including the personal protective 
equipment required for demining operations in 
locations where IEDs may be encountered. 
Clearing IEDs presents the deminer with 
a number of difficult decisions. Unlike a land-
mine or item of unexploded ordnance, IEDs are 
improvised to the extent of the imagination of 
the bomb-maker, so there is no guide or dia-
gram that can be followed to formulate a struc-
tured neutralization or disarming plan. There 
are, however, courses of action to take based on 
assessment of the threat conditions and by a pro-
cess of deduction, evaluation of the likely type of 
device, and the best method of clearance. How-
ever, due to the nature of the task and even with 
the benefit of knowledge and experience, IED 
defeat operations are often only calculated leaps 
into the unknown, where the level of specialist 
training and equipment sophistication can be 
critical in achieving a successful outcome.
MRE, although normally of a very high stan-
dard, rarely addresses IED threats in full, which 
vary between regions and countries in the same 
way as a landmine or UXO threat. Inclusion of 
an IED module in such education programs 
should be considered a priority where the threat 
exists and affects daily life, and the program 
must include an accurate threat analysis of the 
country or area in question. Generic briefings, 
although they have their place, may not correct-
ly address specific threats, leaving critical gaps 
in knowledge that could lead to the use of inad-
equate drills and regimes. IED briefings should 
also form part of any pre-deployment training 
for mine-action staff, whatever their level of in-
volvement. Personnel designated to operate in 
post-conflict areas where the ground situation 
has not been fully resolved should expect to be 
targeted by IEDs and must therefore receive ap-
propriate education before they are deployed.
Adrian King is a Counter-IED Expert employed by HMS Ltd. 
His diverse military career has included more than 30 years of 
working with explosive matters, including crisis response and 
demining operations in Iraq and Lebanon. King was involved in 
counter-IED training for NATO in Afghanistan last year and is 
involved in a number of tasks, including the development of ac-
credited Conventional Munitions Disposal and Demining train-
ing programs and a UXO-clearance task in the Middle East.
Adrian King
Consultant
Hazard Management Solutions Ltd.
85-88 Shrivenham
Hundred Business Park
Watchfield
Wiltshire SN6 8TY / UK
Tel: +44 1793 786350
Fax: +44 1793 786351
E-mail: Adrian.King@hazmansol.com
Web site: http://www.hms-online.org
Conclusion
IEDs pose an unconventional and relatively 
unpredictable threat. They cannot be countered 
by traditional means. Mine-action personnel, 
although used to following convention and 
doctrine within regulated organizations, will 
be at risk if they continue to serve without con-
sidering the growing global use of IEDs. These 
devices will continue to kill and maim a great-
er number of innocent victims than mines or 
UXO for the foreseeable future. They are the 
“weapon of choice” for non-state actors, and 
their use is widespread. It is inevitable that 
those actively involved in mine-action opera-
tions will encounter IEDs far more frequently 
than ever before. Intervention at the clearance 
level is occurring now, and we must ensure that 
personnel are equipped with a thorough assess-
ment of the risk, and that adequate provisions 
are made to mitigate threats. 
See Endnotes, Page 79 
nonmagnetic materials, making them difficult 
to locate with conventional detection equip-
ment. 
As technology development has advanced in 
countering the IED threat, the perpetrators have 
responded by changing their methods of attack 
and device construction. Therefore, defeating the 
device is now considered just one element of a 
much broader effort in which substantial multi-
faceted resources are now being applied to inter-
cept the IED attack cycle at all levels (such as at the 
stage of device manufacturing, or even sourcing 
device components). The ultimate objective is to 
stop the device from being laid in the first place.
Mine-action Implications
Within the International Mine Action Stan-
dards, IEDs do not feature prominently as be-
ing a target for specific clearance activity. They 
are referred to in the levels of qualification for 
demining/explosive-ordnance-disposal operations, 
but this reference is not in detail. The ability of 
a mine-clearing entity to competently deal with 
IEDs, should they be encountered, is left to spe-
cialist mine-clearance staff, who may be inad-
equately prepared. 
Organizations undertaking mine-clearance 
tasks rely heavily on the employment of per-
sonnel with military or similar backgrounds 
to undertake the more difficult EOD tasks, and 
IEDs certainly fall within this category. How-
ever, this reliance is a dangerous precedent, as 
nations’ training standards for IED disposal 
vary considerably, and the differing levels of 
expertise can present a risk to civilians and the 
individuals undertaking IED disposal tasks. 
This fact has been clearly illustrated by NATO 
operations in Afghanistan where inadequate-
ly trained and equipped personnel have been 
killed performing tasks beyond their capabil-
ity and where national EOD doctrine did not 
include IED-disposal operations.
Much more could be done to establish generic 
operating procedures for deminers and imple-
ment basic instructions for assessing and deal-
ing with IEDs. Under the current structure of 
PHOTO COURTESY OF DIMA GAVRRYSH / AP
A U.S. soldier guards a road in Afghanistan where the command wire for an IED was found, August 2009.
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training provided by its new part-
ner institution, the Peace and Con-
flict Studies School located in nearby 
Karen, Kenya. The HPSS and Peace 
and Conflict Studies School both fall 
under the umbrella of Kenya’s In-
ternational Peace Support Training 
Centre, established in 2001.10
Mike Liddicoat, Programmes 
and Plans Officer for the HPSS, 
explains, “The demand and in-
ternational funding for military 
demining has dried up in Africa. 
Civilian demining NGOs are now 
the preferred operators. That, com-
bined with a drive for wider African 
peacekeeping capabilities, has led 
us to widen our scope of activity.”11 
While this restructuring may stem 
partially from financial limitations, 
those involved see it as an opportu-
nity to create synergy between exist-
ing institutions, and more efficiently 
and effectively support peace opera-
tions in East Africa.10
Thinking Regionally
As part of the International Peace 
Support Training Centre, the HPSS 
aims to be a regional training and ed-
ucation institution. Aware that “the 
effects of conf lict either intra- or 
inter-state are felt across a region,” 
the leadership of the International 
Peace Support Training Centre feels 
“that there is a distinct advantage to 
having a center dedicated to the re-
gional level that exists outside the di-
rect influence of national interests, 
but at the same time responds to na-
tional peace-operations training 
requirements.”10 In addition, the In-
ternational Peace Support Training 
Centre is creating a research branch, 
the Peace and Security Research De-
partment, to support the HPSS and 
Peace and Conflict Studies School 
by attempting to better understand 
conflict prevention, conflict man-
agement and post-conflict recovery 
in the East African context through 
original research.12
Financial Support
Funding has always been the 
greatest challenge for the IMATC/
HPSS. The British government has 
funded most of the humanitarian- 
demining and peace-support op-
erations courses thus far, with 
Canada, Japan and Norway now 
providing funds to aid in the ex-
pansion of the HPSS.7 Much more 
support is needed, though. For ex-
ample, the creation of a new, state-
of-the-art peace-support-operations 
training village on the HPSS site, a 
four-phase project, has current-
ly only secured funding for phase 
one. In addition, the Demining 
and Disarmament Training Wing 
that would encompass the former 
mine-action training capabilities 
of the IMATC faces significant 
funding challenges.11 
 
Conclusion
From 8 June–12 July 
2009, the HPSS trained a 
team of 30 workers from 
the African Union Mis-
sion for Somalia. Prior to 
deployment, these civilian 
AMISOM staff members 
were introduced to inter-
national humanitarian law, 
HIV/AIDS issues, mine 
awareness, weapon recog-
nition and hostage-sur-
vival techniques, among 
other topics.13 This is just 
one recent example of 
HPSS’s immense poten-
tial for positive regional 
impact. With support from the in-
ternational community, the HPSS, 
part of an ambitiously restructured 
International Peace Support Train-
ing Centre, can expand upon a tra-
dition of excellence as an effective 
center for training peace enablers in 
East Africa.
See Endnotes, Page 79 
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In February 2005, the International Mine Action Training Centre was established near Nairobi as a joint venture between the 
U.K. and Kenyan militaries. The two countries 
had previously worked together to train Kenyans 
for a U.N. demining mission in nearby Eritrea, and 
the success of this endeavor led to the creation of a 
permanent center for primarily military3 mine-
action training. The U.K. government provided 
the £3.5 million (US$6.7 million4) required for 
construction of the IMATC facility, while the 
land, chosen for its neutral location, was provid-
ed by the government of Kenya.5
A Center of Excellence
The accomplishments of the initial IMATC 
were impressive. From 2005–2008, the cen-
ter trained 6,434 personnel in demining and 
explosive-ordnance disposal, mine aware-
ness, and other mine-action-related topics.6 
The courses, each of which lasted around four 
weeks, all adhered to established International 
Mine Action Standards.1 The IMATC provid-
ed demining equipment along with training, 
Kenya has been a State Party to the Ottawa Convention since 2001,1 
but the presence of the Humanitarian Peace Support School in 
Embakasi, on the outskirts of Nairobi, shows that the coun-
try’s commitment to promoting peace in East Africa goes 
beyond its obligations to this convention. Through a part-
nership with the United Kingdom, the ever-expanding 
HPSS (formerly the International Mine Action Training 
Centre), offers various courses in tactical peace-support 
operations, disaster management and response, and de-
mining and disarmament.2
by Katie Monroe [ Center for International Stabilization and Recovery ]
Organization Profile: 
Humanitarian Peace Support School
benefiting countries such as Rwanda and Ugan-
da.7 In 2006, the nongovernmental organiza-
tion Mines Awareness Trust teamed with the 
IMATC to establish the Dog Detection Train-
ing Centre—the first of its kind in East Africa—
within the IMATC.8 In 2007, the British military 
awarded the prestigious Firmin Sword of Peace 
to the IMATC, in recognition of the center’s re-
markable humanitarian contributions in its first 
two years of existence.9
Need for Restructuring
As successful as the IMATC has been, it is 
currently undergoing a reorganization to bet-
ter fit the current demands of East Africa. In-
stead of focusing solely on mine action, the 
newly renamed Humanitarian Peace Support 
School will now offer a variety of U.N./African 
Union pre-deployment courses for military ob-
servers, U.N./African Union police and civil-
ians, as well as adding a Disaster Management 
and Response Training Wing.7 In short, the 
HPSS offers a wider range of peace “enabler” 
training to complement the “decision maker” 
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Gradually, Athieu rose through 
the ranks, becoming the most tech-
nically qualified OSIL member.2 As 
a result, he progressed to leader of 
an OSIL demining group and man-
ager of other OSIL demining teams. 
“All of my promotions within OSIL 
were based on merit, skill and expe-
rience,” he says. Between 2002 and 
2003,2 however, OSIL’s funding was 
discontinued. Athieu and his col-
leagues found themselves without 
income. The loss of funding forced 
Athieu and the majority of his co-
workers to live off subsistence farm-
ing. To this day, Athieu remains 
unsure of the factors contributing to 
the salary terminations, but he was 
told they were related to the resur-
gence of the North-South conflict. 
Despite the lack of an income, 
Athieu decided to continue de-
mining. “The work isn’t about re-
ceiving a salary. I joined the SPLA 
because I was committed to [help-
ing] my people. … I want to ensure 
that the future of South Sudan [is] 
a safe one,” he says. When OSIL 
was unable to secure funding to 
continue its operations, MAG and 
OSIL signed a second MOU in 
2004. Consequently, MAG conduct-
ed a mine/UXO risk-evaluation sur-
vey in the contaminated town of 
Kapoeta, in which Athieu served as 
liaison between MAG staff and the 
locals.2 MAG established its opera-
tions a year later. The transfer of 
existing OSIL technical teams to 
MAG helped jumpstart Athieu’s 
mine-action career with MAG; he 
became the first National Techni-
cal Field Manager for MAG/OSIL 
in South Sudan. “I am very proud 
of this recognition and achieve-
ment. I hope this encourages other 
Sudanese to work hard to achieve 
their ambitions,” he says.
Hannah Bryce, Athieu’s MAG 
colleague, has known him since July 
2007. She believes he is a perfect ex-
ample for others in the mine-action 
field. To return to a country after 
years of internal conflict, “work for 
OSIL to contribute the skills you 
have, even at times without pay, and 
then to pursue a career within MAG 
shows strength of character and a true 
commitment to humanitarian mine 
action,” she says. Bryce met Athieu af-
ter he had just finished his EOD Level 
3 training in Nairobi.2 She said MAG 
steadily gave him more responsibil-
ity, and he proved himself more than 
competent at meeting the challenge 
of the Technical Field Manager po-
sition. The promotion meant Athieu 
could now manage demining teams 
without supervision and could also 
perform controlled demolitions up 
to 240 kilograms (529.11 lbs).2 “It 
has been a pleasure to see his ca-
reer progress, and I know everyone 
within MAG South Sudan is real-
ly proud of this achievement also,” 
Bryce says.
In May 2009, Athieu received 
formal U.N. Mine Action Office 
accreditation. “The UNMAO quality- 
assurance inspector checked my 
Athieu, hard at work, investigates hazards.
Akech Athieu was born in 1967 near the end of the First Sudanese Civil War between North and South Sudan 
(1955–1972) during a time when clearance of 
unexploded ordnance in the country was just 
beginning. “As a child, I never came across 
these dangerous items, but I did frequently 
hear of mine/UXO-related accidents that hap-
pened in, and close to, my community,” says 
Athieu. When fighting broke out again, Athieu 
temporarily relocated to Uganda to finish his 
post-secondary education.
Rising Through the Ranks
At the age of 26, Athieu became involved 
with the field of mine action when he joined 
the Sudan People’s Liberation Army. He se-
lected combat-engineering as his area of 
military interest. “I’ve always had a natural 
strength for technical jobs,” he explains. In 
1997, the SPLA took control of key towns in 
South Sudan. The SPLA’s political counter-
part, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, 
authorized and established a mine-action or-
ganization, Operation Save Innocent Lives, to 
remediate the threat of landmines and perform 
humanitarian mine action in regions under 
SPLA command.1 Because of Athieu’s combat-
engineering knowledge, the SPLA selected him 
to assist with road clearance to facilitate hu-
manitarian aid. “The Managing Director of 
Operation Save Innocent Lives, Aleu Ayeiny 
Aleu, really encouraged me when I started my 
Unsung Hero: 
by Amy Crockett [ Center for International Stabilization and Recovery ]
demining career, noting that it would be my 
role in Southern Sudan’s future,” says Athieu. 
Today, OSIL is South Sudan’s national mine-
action organization.
Following his military and combat-
engineering training, Athieu received additional 
explosive-ordnance-disposal education from 
Mines Advisory Group when it signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding with OSIL in 
1998. After completing his EOD Level 2 course 
in Yei, South Sudan, in 2001,2 MAG encouraged 
him to complete his Level 3 training, conducted 
by the International Mine Action Training 
Center (now the Humanitarian Peace Support 
School—profile on page 60). “I’ve also completed 
a supervisor’s course using funding from MAG 
and conducted by Mine Awareness Trust,” 
says Athieu.
Akech Athieu
Dedication to his job, competence, diligence and strength of character are just a 
few admirable qualities of Akech Athieu. His outstanding dedication to mine action 
in South Sudan has played a vital role in eliminating the region’s mines following 
decades of civil war.
Akech Athieu at his desk in Mines Advisory Group’s 
Yei, South Sudan, base.
ALL PHOTOS COURTESY OF MAG
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command and control of my demin-
ing team, and a site inspection was 
conducted to ensure that I properly 
laid out the site,” he explains. The in-
spection officer also verified that he 
implemented safety precautions and 
correct marking systems. Athieu 
is now internationally qualified to 
train and manage EOD and demin-
ing teams without supervision.
Hard Work Pays Off
Although he is aware of his suc-
cess against difficult odds, Athieu’s 
proudest accomplishment is wit-
nessing the progress made in the 
communities where he assisted with 
mine clearance. The heavily con-
taminated town of Kapoeta in the 
eastern part of South Sudan espe-
cially stands out in his mind. When 
he first joined MAG, he began work 
in the town, a community with fre-
quent mine accidents and restricted 
mobility for its residents. The con-
tamination offered little opportu-
nity for expansion. “With clearance 
activities beginning in Kapoeta over 
the last four years, I have been able 
to see the town grow from a small, 
tightly restricted community to a 
large town with schools, clinics and 
small businesses,” says Athieu.
Despite the determination and as-
sistance of Athieu and other dedicat-
ed deminers, contamination in South 
Sudan remains an extensive prob-
lem, with mines affecting a large area. 
Rather than using strictly manual 
clearance, Athieu believes clearance 
in South Sudan could be improved 
with more mechanical assets to speed 
up the process by discrediting sus-
pected hazardous areas. 
The dangers involved in land-
mine/UXO removal and destruction 
are always in the back of Athieu’s 
mind, but because he carries out 
his work with great care and strict-
ly follows safety procedures, he has 
no fear. His family does not worry 
either. “They know that I am a very 
cautious person, and they are confi-
dent in my abilities,” he says. Athieu 
offers advice to those considering 
mine-action involvement: “Remem-
ber that the objective of clearance is 
safety, both your own and others’, so 
it is critical that you implement your 
work with high standards.”
South Sudan is still recovering 
from decades of civil conflict, but 
thanks to Athieu’s hard work and 
dedication, it is a safer region today. 
He has become a role model in the 
world of mine action, demonstrating 
through his career achievements the 
ability to advance within the field and 
establish and maintain an effective 
national humanitarian mine-action 
capacity in South Sudan. 
See Endnotes, Page 79 
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In October 2007, the Croatian Mine Action Center–Center for Testing Development and Training Ltd. (HCR-CTRO), with assistance from the 
German Federal Institute for Materials Research and Testing (BAM), test-
ed two sensor systems: the Advanced Landmine Imaging System, devel-
oped by Tohoku University, Japan, and the Gryphon, developed by Tokyo 
Institute for Technology, Japan. Both systems employ commercial metal 
detectors (the ALIS with CEIA MIL-D1 and the Gryphon with Minelab 
F3) and ground-penetrating radar. The metal detector only indicates the 
presence of metal; it cannot determine if the metal is a mine. The GPR in-
dicates objects with a shape that could resemble a mine. The operator of 
the system decides whether to reject the metal clutter. Together, the sys-
by Kazunori Takahashi [ Leibniz Institute for Applied Geophysics ], Mate Gaal [ Federal Institute for Materials 
Research and Testing ] and Dieter Gülle [ Federal Office of Defense Technology and Procurement ]
Data Analysis and Performance 
Evaluation of Japanese Dual-sensor 
Systems Tested in Croatia
Two years ago, the Croatian Mine Action Center–Center for Testing Development and Training Ltd. tested two 
Japanese dual-sensor systems for humanitarian demining in Croatia. The test’s results show that these detection 
systems can potentially increase the accuracy of mine-detecting operations, but several improvements to the 
sensors may be required before the systems are fully effective. 
tems improve the productivity of demining operations.1,2,3 This article dis-
cusses the test’s results, the systems’ performances and the data analysis.
Test Conditions
The complete report, detailing the conditions, procedures and results 
of the two dual-sensor systems is available online.4 The test was carried 
out at the Benkovac test site in Croatia where previous metal-detector tri-
als have taken place, such as the Systematic Test and Evaluation of Metal 
Detector (STEMD) trial.5 Three soils are available at this site: red bauxite 
(Lane 1), neutral clay (Lane 3), and red bauxite with neutral stones (Lane 
5, local soil), as shown in the figures on the next page.6,7 
The Gryphon dual-sensor system evaluated in the test. The Gryphon team consists of two buggies: one with a metal detector (near 
side) and one with GPR (far side).
ALL PHOTOS AnD GRAPHICS COURTESY OF THE AUTHORS
Lane 1: red bauxite. Lane 3: neutral clay. Lane 5: red bauxite with neutral stones.
Table 1: Differences in categorization of sources of alarms for stand-alone met-
al detectors and dual sensors.
*1 The metal-detector scan in ALIS is performed in the conventional manner (i.e., manual scan with sound alert), while the metal detector on Gryphon 
is scanned by the robot arm and the detection is according to visual interpretations of the metal-detector image. 
*2 Scans of the GPR in ALIS are performed for each metal-detector alarm. Gryphon scans both sensors for an area approx. 1 x 2m at once and interpre-
tations are done for each scanned area, i.e., Gryphon scans all the area with both sensors.
Figure 1: Operation procedure of the dual-sensor systems.
Blind tests were conducted in these lanes with real, ren-
dered-safe mines (11 were PMA-2 and nine were PMA-3 
mines) and metal clutter. The target layout was the same 
as that in the International Test and Evaluation Program 
for Humanitarian Demining STEMD trial5 with addition-
al small pieces of various metals (nine per lane) placed on 
the ground surface. Thus, each lane comprised a total of 38 
buried targets.
Sources of true 
positives
Sources of false positives
Stand alone metal detector mines, metals soil
Metal detector as 
part of dual sensor mines metals, soil
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Three deminers from the Croatian Mine Action Center served as 
operators of the ALIS; the developer had trained them together 10 
workdays prior to the test. In the test, each deminer went through 
each of the three lanes once. The developer’s team of five to six per-
sons operated the Gryphon.
Both dual-sensor systems employ a metal detector as a primary sen-
sor and a GPR as a secondary sensor; the metal detector first detects all 
the metal objects, and then the GPR identifies objects suspected to be 
landmines. In the test, red markers indicated positions of objects detect-
ed by the metal detector and yellow markers indicated positions of ob-
jects confirmed as landmines by the GPR, so that those detections could 
be classified later. The operation procedure is schematically illustrated 
in Figure 1 on the previous page. 
After each run, all the markers’ positions were measured and com-
pared to the real positions of mines measured when they were planted. A 
circular area around a target, called a halo, is defined according to CWA 
14747-1:2003.8 A marker is considered a hit (true positive) if it falls into 
the area, and a marker is counted as a false alarm (false positive) if it is 
placed outside the area. A target with no markers in its halo is counted 
as a miss (false negative).
Data Analysis
Probability of detection has been commonly used to evaluate perfor-
mance of metal detectors. Since the dual sensors employ two kinds of de-
tection, two kinds of POD can be defined. The POD for a metal detector is 
defined as: 
where              and             denote the number of mines buried and the 
number of mines detected by the metal detector, respectively. The other 
POD for GPR is defined as:
where          is number of mines correctly confirmed after the use of 
the metal detector and the GPR. Metal-detector alarms not caused by 
mines and GPR alarms incorrectly confirmed as mines are considered 
false calls for a dual sensor. Therefore, the false-alarm rates for the metal 
detector and for the GPR, respectively, are defined as:
where                ,              ,               and               are alarm numbers caused 
by metal and soil, reported by the metal detector and the GPR, and A 
denotes an area searched. Note that the definition of the false alarm for 
metal detectors in this analysis is different from that of stand-alone met-
al detectors. Alarms from metal pieces are normally counted as true 
positives for stand-alone metal detectors, while they are considered false 
positives for dual sensors because of the detectors’ objective, which is to 
differentiate between landmines and other objects. The different catego-
rizations of alarms are summarized in Table 1. 
In order to observe how much efficiency is improved, FAR reduction, 
     , is introduced as follows:
If all the false alarms are rejected,              takes a value 1.
The GPR could fail to detect mines. It can be acceptable to miss false 
alarms; however, miss-discrimination for mines threatens the lives of 
end-users. In order to see the frequency of missed mines, probability of 
detection reduction,             , is defined as:
If the GPR does not reject any mines found by the metal detector, 
the value becomes 0. Related to the reduction, the discrimination ratio 
for mines is introduced to find how often mines are correctly confirmed.
The ratio is actually given by one minus POD reduction:  
Confidence limits of 95% of POD, FAR and their reductions are pro-
vided in Figures 2 and 3 (see page 68) to illustrate the accuracy of the es-
timations. They are calculated assuming the binomial and the Poisson 
distributions for POD and FAR, respectively.9,10,11
In the following section, the defined quantities above are incorporat-
ed into various figures that display the results of the dual-sensor system 
performance evaluations.
Results
Although performances of metal detectors and GPRs can be quite dif-
ferent in various types of soil, the results in the three lanes are analyzed to-
gether in this article to show the overview. An analysis of each soil can be 
found in the trial report.4 The ALIS operator whose results differed greatly 
from the others had his results excluded as an outlier.
Figure 2 (see page 68) shows the receiver-operating-characteristic dia-
gram in which probability of detections are plotted against false-alarm 
rates and the 95% confidence limits. Each device has two plots, one from 
using only the metal detector (primary sensor) and one from using both 
sensors (metal detector and GPR). It can be observed that the FARs by 
metal detectors (squares) are shifted toward the left by using GPRs (cir-
cles), meaning that FARs are reduced significantly. However, at the same 
time, reductions of PODs also occur for both devices, which should not 
happen for safety reasons.
The absolute levels of POD and FAR are basically given by the metal 
detectors, which are commercial ones in both systems. The reductions of 
FAR and POD can be seen as contributions of the GPR. The reductions 
are plotted in Figure 3. In this figure, FAR reductions are plotted with 
respect to POD reductions; therefore an ideal dual-sensor system that 
can perfectly discriminate targets gives a plot on the upper left portion 
of the graph. If a system uses random chance to determine whether a 
mine is present, the plot lies on the diagonal line. Both the ALIS and the 
Gryphon give plots above the diagonal line, therefore the GPRs in both 
systems are contributing to the decision-making. The Gryphon gives 
larger FAR reduction than the ALIS; however, the POD reduction is also 
larger than that by the ALIS. The difference in the POD reductions is not 
Figure 2: Receiver-operating-characteristic diagram with 
95% confidence limits for each device.
Figure 3: FAR reduction versus POD reduction for each device.
Figures 4a and 4b: POD given by the metal detector (solid lines) 
and by both sensors (dotted lines), and discrimination ratio for 
mines (dotted-broken lines) with respect to target burial depths, 
given by the ALIS (top) and the Gryphon (bottom).
The ALIS dual-sensor system evaluated in the test. 
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In 2007, the Director of the Canadian Centre for Mine Action Tech-nologies received a request to investigate a potentially promising 
heat-treatment process to extend the operational life of humanitarian-
deminer visors through removal of scratches from the field of view. The 
heat-treatment procedure was developed by undergraduate students 
as part of a product-design course and was published in The Journal 
of Mine Action.3 The authors of that article noted that further testing 
would be required to determine whether the visor properties were ad-
versely affected by the scratch-repair procedure. In order to allow for 
Blast Testing of Visors Used for 
Humanitarian Demining  
by Captain Charlene Fawcett [ DRDC Suffield ]
This article discusses experimental results from blast testing of Security Devices Ltd. polycarbonate visors used 
by humanitarian deminers. Visors used in the blast testing fell into one of three categories: new visors, manually 
scratched visors, and scratched and heat-gun-repaired visors. Results show that the visors in all three categories 
failed to meet the draft international standard for blast testing1 relevant at the time, that further research is 
required to establish pressure profiles for the standard charge size being tested, and that the proposed heat- 
treatment method does appear to degrade the blast resistance of the visor used in the test.2 
an independent assessment of the technique, the authors provided a 
detailed outline of the procedure in the article that readers could fol-
low independently. 
Trial Objectives and Methodology
The objective of this research was to assess the blast and ballistic per-
formance of deminer visors before and after heat treatment. To ensure 
compatibility with the original student project, the same type of visors 
were obtained from Security Devices Ltd.
Figure 1: Testing platform and positioning rig.
ALL GRAPHICS COURTESY OF DRDC SUFFIELD
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so significant considering the 95% confidence 
limit, but devices for demining must avoid the 
POD reduction as much as possible. The re-
sults suggest that the Gryphon can reduce FAR 
more than the ALIS can. However, the abso-
lute level of FARs is almost the same as shown 
in Figure 2 (see page 68) and the larger FAR re-
duction is due to a larger number of false alarms 
given by the metal detector implemented in the 
Gryphon. Therefore, performances of the whole 
system as dual sensor in terms of FAR can be 
characterized as almost the same.
Figure 4 (see page 69) shows probability of 
detections given by the metal detector and by 
both sensors, along with the discrimination 
ratio with respect to depth for each device. 
As the theory in the Das and McFee article12 
states and former trials verified, the PODs giv-
en by the metal detectors are decreasing with 
depth. Since the GPRs are always used after 
the metal detectors, the PODs used by the 
dual sensors cannot exceed those by the met-
al detectors. It can be observed that the PODs 
by both sensors positively correlate with the 
PODs by the metal detectors.
Furthermore, discrimination ratios tend 
to increase with depth in these results. This 
fact cannot be determined conclusively be-
cause the number of mines belonging to each 
depth class is small and the estimation would 
not be sufficiently accurate. This tendency sup-
ports a common theory that GPR has difficul-
ties in detecting shallowly buried targets since 
reflections from the ground surface mask 
those from targets.13 However, this observed 
tendency is not as strong as expected; both 
systems achieved about 0.7 of the discrimina-
tion ratio at the depth range from 0–3cm, so 
the theory cannot clearly be confirmed. This 
may be because both sensors measured data 
of GPR as images in terms of horizontal slice 
and this type of representation may be good at 
depicting small changes close to the surface, 
unlike only one-time signals or a vertical slice.
Conclusions and Discussion
The results of the test campaign for the 
dual-sensor systems tell us that those sys-
tems reduced false-alarm rates significantly by 
more than one-half. However, the systems also 
reduced probability of detections, which must 
be avoided in real clearance operations. Useful-
ness of the dual sensors may strongly depend 
on improvements with POD.
The full report4 stated that the three de-
miners who worked on the ALIS achieved 
different results in terms of POD, FAR and 
working hours. The variation may be caused 
by the way the deminers interpret the output 
of the sensor and make decisions when oper-
ating the ALIS. The visual interpretation of 
images and decision-making process are en-
tirely subject to the operators themselves. In 
order to avoid unstable and/or unexpected re-
sults, further developments/improvements, 
such as an automatic-recognition algorithm, 
are recommended.
Unfortunately, it was not possible to use 
stand-alone metal detectors at the same time 
as a benchmark, making a direct comparison 
of dual sensors to stand-alone metal detectors 
unavailable. However, one can roughly com-
pare the detectors to those from the STEMD 
trial,5 taking into account additional metals. 
The ALIS and the Gryphon needed approxi-
mately five and nine minutes, respectively, to 
survey an average of one square meter. It can 
be roughly estimated that the ALIS may be two 
to three times slower and the Gryphon may 
be four to five times slower than stand-alone 
metal detectors.14 Even if the search speed in 
this test is slower than for a stand-alone met-
al detector, it is possible that these dual sen-
sors would accelerate the clearance operation 
in total, because rejected alarms from metals 
would reduce the need for excavation or could 
be rapidly excavated. Increased search speed 
would also multiply these benefits. 
Another dual-sensor trial in Germany was 
carried out in September 2009 by the Interna-
tional Test and Evaluation Program for Hu-
manitarian Demining and led by the German 
Federal Office of Defense Technology and Pro-
curement.15 The results are being analyzed and 
we hope that a more detailed evaluation of dual-
sensor performance will be available soon. 
The authors acknowledge Mr. N. Pavković 
and Mr. T. V. B. Vondracek from HCR-CTRO 
for managing the test. We also thank the devel-
opers and deminers that participated.
See Endnotes, Page 79
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The visors were placed in three catego-
ries for blast and ballistic assessment: new, 
scratched, and scratched and heat-repaired. 
Following the procedures in the original 
project as closely as possible, a new visor was 
scratched by rubbing sand on the outer surface 
until the visor was opaque, which provided the 
“scratched” condition. To get the “scratched 
and heat-repaired” condition, a new visor was 
scratched as described and then washed and 
dried in an oven. After cooling, it was treated 
using a heat gun in the manner described in 
the students’ original project.3
The following documents were used as 
guidance to develop the test methodologies 
for blast and ballistic assessment: 
•	 “Test Methodologies for Personal 
Protective Equipment Against Anti-
Personnel Mine Blast”4 
•	 European Centre for Standardization-
Workshop Agreement 15756: “Humani-
tarian Mine Action (HMA) – Personal 
Protective Equipment (PPE) – Test and 
Evaluation”2
•	 “Ballistic Test Method for Personal Ar-
mour Materials and Combat Clothing”5
•	 “Protocols to Test Upper Body PPE 
Against AP Blast Mines”6
•	 “A Methodology for Evaluating De-
mining Personal Protective Equipment 
for Antipersonnel Landmines”7
Blast Assessment
Extensive research was conducted at 
DRDC Suffield by Ceh, et al., between March 
1999 and November 2000 (published in 20056)
to develop a protocol for testing and evalua-
tion of upper-body AP blast mine personal 
protective equipment. The detailed scientif-
ic and technical review resulted in a com-
prehensive understanding of the physics of a 
mine blast, factors affecting the performance 
of PPE, and the nature and severity of inju-
ries depending on the deminer’s position at 
the time of the blast. From those findings a 
protocol was developed to ensure the rep-
etition of data, good replication of human-
body positioning and motion, representative 
soil characteristics, standardized explosive 
charges and containers, reference pressure 
measurement, and relevant data acquisition 
and processing. 
With regard to the physics of an AP mine 
blast, factors that needed to be controlled in-
cluded the type of explosive used, the charge 
container, depth of charge burial, type of soil, 
distribution of larger soil particles, compac-
tion and moisture content. These parameters 
contributed to the strength and distribution of 
the energy of the blast through the soil matrix 
and expansion of detonation products and soil 
ejecta8 away from the center of the explosion.6 
With regard to the performance of the 
PPE, it was determined that the shape and 
surface area of the PPE affected how the blast 
wave and detonation products propagated 
Figure 2: Trial test site—heated inflatable tent.
around it, thereby affecting how the force was 
transmitted to the person wearing the PPE. 
Brittle materials were found to break into 
fragments that could be propelled at high ve-
locity and cause injury to the person.6 
Since the mid-1990s, anthropomorphic 
mannequins have been used at DRDC Suf-
field for testing of PPE survivability against 
AP mines. The mannequins are chosen to 
match the body size and weight of human 
PPE wearers and allow for instrumented 
gauges to be placed inside for measurement 
of body motion. 
In the 2005 Ceh study,6 the position of the 
deminer in relation to the blast was found to 
greatly influence injury outcome. Humanitar-
ian deminers often preferred a crouched or 
kneeling position to a prone position because 
it improved the field of view, made prodding 
easier and was less fatiguing. However, from 
an injury perspective, deminers in a kneel-
ing position experienced more severe injuries 
from blasts compared to those injured while 
working in a prone position. 
The desire to better control positioning of 
the mannequin during trials led DRDC Suffield 
to develop a testing platform and position-
ing rig. The platform allowed for exact place-
ment of the mannequin a specific distance 
away from the charge, which was buried to a 
measured depth in a known quantity of stan-
dardized soil. Figure 1 on page 71 shows the 
platform and rig placement. The measurement 
fixture and reference pressure transducer can 
be seen to the right of the mannequin.
The Hybrid III anthropomorphic man-
nequin, 5th-percentile female model was used 
for all of the testing as it approximates the size 
of typical Asian deminers more closely than 
the other Hybrid III mannequins at DRDC 
Suffield. The posture chosen for these tests 
Table 1: Visor blast test results.
Table 2: Visor blast testing post-trial photographs.
New Visors Scratched Visors
Scratched and 
Heat-treated Visors
New 6 1B Scratched 1A Scratched, Heat Treated
New 7 2B Scratched 2A Scratched, Heat Treated
3A Scratched, Heat Treated3B ScratchedNew 8
New 9 4B Scratched 4A Scratched, Heat Treated
Visor Description Charge Size Reference Pressure (psi) Visor Outcome
New 1
New 2
New 3 + apron
New 4 + apron
New 5 + apron
Baseline established
200g
100g
100g
150g
100g
at 75g
59.2
32.2
35.3
42.1
36.1
No apron
Broke
Broke
Did not break
Broke
Broke
New 6
New 7
New 8
New 9
75g
75g
75g
75g
34.6
12.9
27.2
30.2
Did not break
Did not break – misfire
Did not break
Did not break
1B scratched
2B scratched
3B scratched
4B scratched
75g
75g
75g
75g
34.9
32.1
28.1
32.7
Broke
Did not break
Did not break
Did not break
1A scratched, heat treated
2A scratched, heat treated
3A scratched, heat treated
4A scratched, heat treated
75g
75g
75g
75g
28.0
26.3
35.6
31.6
Broke
Broke
Broke
Broke
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was a kneeling position, with both knees on 
the ground. A wooden rig was used to posi-
tion the hips and knees into the kneeling po-
sition, and the positioning rig was then used 
to adjust the upper body of the mannequin. 
The joints and neck were adjusted to give a 
set stiffness, and were then readjusted be-
tween shots. 
The positioning rig supports the manne-
quin in the desired position before the blast. 
As soon as the blast pushes the mannequin 
backward, the chains go slack and the round 
crossbars fall from their supports, allowing 
free movement of the mannequin during the 
blast event. The measurement fixture is used to 
ensure repeatable placement of various parts 
of the mannequin body at specific X, Y and 
Z distances from ground zero. A reference 
pressure gauge was placed at 90 degrees to 
the charge at the same height and radial dis-
tance from the blast as the mannequin’s visor 
(60 cm). 
The soil type used for testing is medium- 
grain building sand, dried to less than 1% 
moisture, packed loosely in the testing plat-
form, and held in a container within the plat-
form that is large enough to prevent reflected 
shock wave interference from the walls of the 
container, yet small enough in volume to be 
easily removed and replaced between trials 
(60cm x 60cm x 60cm).
The charge containers that were used for this 
study were developed at DRDC Suffield in the 
late 1990s. They are AP mine surrogate contain-
ers made of Dupont Adiprene packed with C4 
plastic explosive, boosted with datasheet and 
center of axis initiated with an RP87 electric 
detonator. The charge size for the blast testing of 
visors in this trial was initially set at 200g C4 to 
match the European Centre for Standardization 
Workshop Agreement requirement of “an ex-
plosive equivalent to (240 ± 1)g cast tri-nitro 
toluene,”2 representing the charge size of the 
PMN mine, which is one of the most frequent-
ly encountered AP blast mines. Initial testing 
demonstrated that the new visors broke at the 
200g charge size. This result necessitated scaling 
back the charge size to 150g then 100g, before a 
threshold of 75g for visor breakage was found. 
In order to provide a suitable location for 
blast testing in temperatures that reach -40 C 
on the Suffield testing site in January, an inflat-
able tent was erected as shown in Figure 2 on 
page 72. A portable heating unit was used to 
provide a constant temperature of 15 C for test-
ing the visors.
The external temperatures in January in 
Suffield, Alberta, Canada, average between -31 
and -10 C and snowfall averages 22cm. In order 
to minimize temperature effects on the poly-
carbonate visors, they were stored in a heated 
building with the temperature maintained be-
tween 15 and 20 C. The visors were then trans-
ported in an insulated container to the heated 
tent and placed on the Hybrid III mannequin. 
The surface temperature was measured using 
an infrared digital temperature-measurement 
device and the trial commenced once the sur-
face temperature reached 15 C. 
Ballistic Assessment
The ballistic assessment was performed 
by an external laboratory, in accordance 
with Standard Agreement 29209 and Inter-
national Mine Action Standard 10.30.10 The 
objective of the V50 ballistic testing was to de-
termine the fragment protection capability of 
the PPE, with V50 representing the velocity at 
which half of the projectiles perforate the tar-
get material. It is noted in IMAS 10.30 that 
the STANAG 2920 test for ballistic protec-
tion may not provide a realistic assessment of 
the fragment threats from mine blasts, but it 
will continue to be used to estimate fragmen-
Description 10N-NEW V50 234m/s
Bullet FSP- 17 Vel. Spread 68m/s
Std Dev 29m/s
Shot Velocity Strike (m/s) Velocity Residual (m/s) Penetration (Y/N) Used in V50 (Y/N)
1 485 Y
2 437 Y
3 255 Y Y
4 261 Y
5 151 0 N Y
6 232 0 N Y
7 262 Y Y
8 206 0 N
9 323 216 Y
10 302 187 Y
11 254 Y Y
12 194 0 N
13 367 Y
14 301 171 Y
15 447 Y
16 249 71 Y Y
17 360 264 Y
18 338 233 Y
Table 3: V50 test results example.
tation protection until another international standard is developed. At 
the time these tests were being prepared, the CEN Workshop Agreement 
was only in a draft form and a formalized version was not available. 
Hence, the V50 testing used the defined 17-grain cold-rolled, annealed-
steel fragment-simulating projectile as a threat (type-1) test for each 
visor tested. As with the blast tests, the ballistic tests were performed 
on the original (new) visors, the scratched visors, and the scratched and 
heat-treated visors.
The V50 testing was conducted using a V50 headform with the visor 
headband aligned along the part line of the headform. A veil witness paper 
was taped to the face of the headform and the fixture was aligned such 
that the FSP struck with zero degrees of strike obliquity to the visor, as 
determined with laser alignment through the bore of the rifle. A laboratory-
grade .22 caliber long-rifle barrel firearm was used to fire the FSP. The 
range for the testing was set at 5.0m and the distance from the exit of the 
rifle muzzle to the strike face was 5.0m. A penetration was positive if it 
resulted in a hole in either the visor or the witness paper. 
Blast Test Results
The visor blast testing took place at DRDC Suffield from 15–22 January 
2008. In total, 18 visors were subjected to blast testing in the enclosed, inflat-
able tent facility illustrated in Figure 2 on page 72. External daytime temper-
atures ranged from a high of -5 C to a low of -23 C, and wind speed ranged 
from 11 to 65 km/h. Despite these extreme weather conditions, the tem-
perature inside the tent was maintained at approximately 15 C with the as-
sistance of two portable, diesel generators, and wind effects were negligible.
Testing began at the CEN Workshop Agreement’s recommended 
charge size of 200g C4 (240g TNT equivalent). After failure of the visor 
at 200g, the charge size was decreased to 100g. In an attempt to achieve 
visor survival at charge sizes closer to the recommended standard, a de-
miner apron was added to the mannequin. However, with breakage of 
the visor at 100g even with the apron, it was decided to proceed without 
an apron and to reduce the charge size to 75g.
Table 1 on page 73 summarizes the results of the visor blast trials. 
Note that visors “New 1” through “New 5” were consumed in attempts to 
Visor Condition V50  (m/s) Std Dev (m/s)
New 234 29
Scratched 226 40
Scratched & Heat Treated 247 18
Table 4: V50 test results summary.
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Figure 3: Strike velocity (Vs) versus residual velocity (Vr).
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get a charge size at which the new visors would 
survive. The test data in which the three cate-
gories of visor can be compared starts with vi-
sor “New 6.”
Photographs and high-speed video were 
taken of the visor blast trials. The photographs 
in Table 2 (see page 73) show the extent of 
damage to the visors that were broken in the 
trial, as well as the post-blast photos of the vi-
sors that did not break. During the trials, the 
pieces of broken visor were found dispersed 
throughout the tent area and the pieces were 
photographed where they landed. All visor 
pieces were then collected and reconstructed 
for the photographs as illustrated in Table 2 
(see page 73). 
Ballistic Test Results
The results of the ballistic tests were much 
more difficult to interpret. IMAS 10.30 states 
in paragraph 4.3: “PPE provided to reduce 
the risk from such a hazard should include, 
as a minimum … ballistic body armour with 
a STANAG 2920 V50 rating (dry) of 450m/s.” 
It continues, “Eye protection should be no 
less than that offered by 5mm of untreated 
polycarbonate.”10 It does not explicitly state 
that the visor should provide a V50 rating of 
450m/s, nor does it explicitly define what V50 
rating provides an acceptable level of pro-
tection. Indeed, it is possible to use the note 
about 5mm polycarbonate to allow any V50 
rating to be acceptable as long as the visor 
is made of polycarbonate 5mm or thicker. 
This ambiguity makes evaluation of the re-
sults somewhat problematic.
Table 3 (see page 74) shows the V50 test data 
for the new visor. The strike velocity is the ve-
locity at which the projectile struck the face of 
the visor. If the projectile traveled through the 
visor and kept moving, its exit velocity was 
shown as residual velocity. Residual velocity 
was not captured in all cases. To calculate V50 , 
three shots that did not penetrate and three 
shots that did penetrate were selected, while 
attempting to keep the strike velocities reason-
ably similar (the target was within 60m/s). 
This method prevents the far outlying data 
such as shot 1 from influencing the V50 value.
The V50 ballistic tests are summarized in 
Table 4 (see previous page). They show that 
within the error of one standard deviation, all 
three conditions of the visors have effective-
ly the same V50 rating. If anything, the heat 
treatment may have improved the V50 perfor-
mance slightly.
Figure 3 (see previous page) presents the 
results of the ballistic testing in a way that al-
lows comparison of the three conditions. The 
data points along the horizontal axis show the 
shots in which complete penetration did not 
occur (residual velocity is zero), while those 
above the horizontal axis show those that did 
penetrate completely. 
A variety of trend lines can be drawn 
through the three data sets, but they are very 
close to overlapping. With the wide spread 
of velocities and relatively few data points, 
there is really little or no significant differ-
ence among the three curves. In other words, 
these tests suggest that neither the scratching 
nor the heat treatment of the visors degraded 
the new visors from a V50 ballistics standpoint.
Discussion
The results of the blast testing illustrate 
that the threshold for visor breakage for 
scratched, heat-repaired, and even new vi-
sors was far below the recommended charge 
size, when 200g C4 was used. Comparison of 
the results of the blast testing of the scratched 
visors with the scratched and heat-treated vi-
sors, as noted in Table 2 (see page 73), reflects 
more extensive shattering of the heat-treat-
ed visors. The significance of this difference 
would require further testing, especially since 
all three groups of visors were found to break 
at less than half of the specified CEN Work-
shop Agreement charge size.
Observations from field experience sug-
gest that visors subjected to detonations of up 
to 240g TNT do not tend to shatter as they did 
in these tests. Assuming these observations to 
be accurate, it could indicate that there was a 
flaw in the experiment or that the CWA op-
tion to use a substitute for TNT needs to be re-
viewed; either the equivalency criteria need to 
be changed, or perhaps no substitute for TNT 
should be allowed. More experimentation will 
be needed to answer this question.
With regard to the V50 ballistic testing of 
the visors, it was seen that all three groups 
performed comparably. The estimated V50 falls 
between 225 and 250 m/s for all three groups, 
with no statistically significant difference 
among the new visors, scratched visors and 
heat-treated visors. STANAG 2920 is not clear 
with respect to what V50 rating is required for 
visors; it may be 450 m/s or it may simply be 
a 5-mm-thick, untreated polycarbonate visor 
with no requirement for a specific V50 rating. 
Further, if the CEN Workshop Agreement 
(CWA 15756) is taken as “an accepted alterna-
tive ... developed as an international standard” 
(IMAS 10.30, para 4.3.a10), then a less damag-
ing fragment may now be more appropriate for 
future tests of this type. 
Conclusions
Following the blast and ballistic testing of 
the visors, it was determined that: 
•	  Scratching the visors did not appear to 
have any detrimental effects on the blast 
resistance of the visors.
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•	  The proposed heat treatment of the 
scratched visors appears to degrade the 
blast resistance of the visors.
•	  All of the visors, including new ones, 
were broken during blast tests using 
charge sizes half the size recommended 
by the relevant standards.
•	  Neither the scratching nor the heat-
treating process appears to have any det-
rimental effects on the V50 performance 
of the visors under test. The V50 ratings 
for new, scratched and heat-treated vi-
sors fall within the 225–250m/s range.
•	  Contrary to popular opinion, there is 
actually no requirement to have visors 
achieve a V50 rating of 450m/s.
•	  There is a need to investigate whether 
the revised CWA should allow substitu-
tions for TNT, and if so, what equiva-
lency criteria should be applied. 
See Endnotes, Page 79 
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Meetings of States Parties 
(abbreviated 8MSP, 9MSP, etc)
The Meeting of State Parties is a formal meeting of the Member States that have accepted the 1997 Convention on 
the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction. 
For more information: http://www.apminebanconvention.org/meetings-of-the-states-parties.
Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs)
On 18 September 2000, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 55/2, the United Nations Mil-
lennium Declaration. At the United Nations Millennium Summit, world leaders agreed to a set of time-bound 
and measurable goals and targets for combating poverty, hunger, disease, illiteracy, environmental degradation, 
and discrimination against women. Placed at the heart of the global agenda, they are now called the Millennium 
Development Goals. The Summit’s Millennium Declaration also outlined a wide range of commitments in hu-
man rights, good governance and democracy. For more information: http://www.un.org/millennium.
Mine-free/Mine -safe or 
Impact-free
Some countries and mine-action organizations are urging the use of the term mine-free, while others 
are espousing the term mine-safe or impact-free. Mine-free connotes a condition in which all landmines 
have been cleared, whereas the terms mine-safe and impact-free refer to the condition in which land-
mines no longer pose a credible threat to a community or country.
Munitions List For more information on individual munitions, see the Mine Action Information Center’s “Munitions Ref-
erence.”  Available at: http://maic.jmu.edu/journal/supplemental/munitions/munitions.asp.
Nairobi Summit The Nairobi Summit on a Mine-Free World held 29 November–3 December 2004, is the name given to 
the First Review Conference of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production 
and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction. The summit, a gathering of various high-
ranking political representatives throughout the international community, focused on the examination of 
the problems caused by anti-personnel mines and the appropriate actions needed to address the landmine 
situation across the globe. For more information: http://www.reviewconference.org/fileadmin/pdf/review_
conference/press_room/Nairobi_Summit_Highlights.pdf.
Non-technical Survey According to the most recent IMAS (8.20 Draft Edition, 10 June 2009), Non-technical Survey involves 
collecting and analyzing new and/or existing information about a hazardous area. Its purpose is to con-
firm evidence of a hazard or not, to identify the type and extent of hazards within any hazardous area and 
to define, as far as possible, the perimeter of the actual hazardous areas without physical intervention. A 
Non-technical Survey does not normally involve the use of clearance or verification assets. See also Inter-
national Mine Action Standards (IMAS), Technical Survey, Land Release.
Oslo Process The Oslo Conference on Cluster Munitions, also known as the Oslo Process, was the first step in a process toward 
creating an international ban on cluster munitions. See also Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM). For more 
information: http://www.noruega.ao/policy/Oslo+Conference+on+Cluster+Munitions.htm.
Ottawa Convention The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines 
and on Their Destruction, was opened for signature in Ottawa, Canada, 3 December 1997, and is commonly 
known as the Ottawa Convention. For more information: http://www.icbl.org/treaty/text/english.
Ottawa Convention, Article 4 Article 4 of the Ottawa Convention requires each signatory to destroy or ensure the destruction of all 
stockpiled mines it owns or possesses, or that are under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible 
but not later than four years after the Convention is in force for that State Party. For more information: 
http://www.icbl.org/treaty/text/english#4. 
Ottawa Convention, Article 5 Article 5 of the Ottawa Convention requires that signatories identify all mined or mine-suspected areas; ensure 
these areas are marked, monitored and protected to effectively exclude civilians; and destroy or ensure destruction 
of all mines in these areas as soon as possible and no later than 10 years after the Convention’s entry into force for 
that State Party. For more information: http://www.icbl.org/treaty/text/english#5. 
Small Arms/Light Weapons
(SA/LW)
Among conventional weapons, SA/LW are particularly problematic as they are relatively simple to use and 
are easily accessible. The term “small arms” refers to a category of weapons designed for individual use, 
including pistols, machine and submachine guns, assault rifles, and hand grenades, among others. “Light 
weapons” typically include conventional weapons designed for operation by a group of two or more indi-
viduals (although they may be operated by individual combatants as well). These weapons include heavy 
machine guns, grenade launchers, anti-tank missiles and rocket systems, and man-portable air-defense sys-
tems (MANPADS). Moreover, they are often the weapons of choice of non-state actors, including terrorist 
organizations and paramilitary insurgents.
Technical Survey According to the most recent IMAS (8.20 Draft Edition, 10 June 2009), Technical Survey is a detailed intervention 
with clearance or verification assets into a Confirmed Hazardous Area, or part of a CHA. It should confirm the pres-
ence of mines/ERW, leading to the definition of one or more defined hazardous areas, and may indicate the absence 
of mines/ERW, which could allow land to be released when combined with other evidence. See also International 
Mine Action Standards (IMAS), Non-technical Survey, Land Release.
Common Terms and Definitions
Anti-personnel Mine Ban See Ottawa Convention.
CCW, Amended Protocol II Protocol II of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, amended 3 May 1996, to strengthen its 
provisions, addresses the effects of mines and booby traps on civilians after conflicts end.
CCW, Protocol V Protocol V of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons addresses the effects of explosive rem-
nants of war, including unexploded cluster munitions, on civilians after conflicts end. 
Convention on Certain 
Conventional Weapons (CCW 
or CCCW)
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be 
Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects was opened for signature in Geneva, 
Switzerland, on 10 October 1980. For more information: http://disarmament.un.org/ccw/. 
Convention on Cluster 
Munitions (CCM)
A complete ban on cluster munitions with victim-assistance and decontamination information standards, 
the CCM was adopted in Dublin by 107 states on 30 May 2008. See also Oslo Process. For more infor-
mation: http://www.clusterconvention.org.
Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities
Adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on 13 December 2006, the Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities was opened for signature on 30 March 2007, and entered into force with the 20th ratifi-
cation on 3 May 2008. For more information: http://www.un.org/disabilities/.
Deed of Commitment The Deed of Commitment for Adherence to a Total Ban on Anti-personnel Mines and for Cooperation in Mine 
Action is the anti-personnel mine ban for nongovernmental entities, provided by the organization Geneva 
Call. Geneva Call encourages non-state actors to respect humanitarian norms by signing and adhering to this 
Deed of Commitment. For more information: http://www.genevacall.org/home.htm. 
Department Departments are subdivided portions of a country, much like a state or province.
Disarmament, Demobilization 
and Reintegration (DDR)
Considered a successful strategy for peacekeeping operations, disarmament refers to the physical removal of 
weapons from ex-combatants; demobilization refers to the breaking up of armed groups; and reintegration en-
tails the reintroduction of former combatants to society without the threat of future armed conflict.
Explosive Remnants of War 
(ERW)/Landmines
Some organizations consider mines and explosive remnants of war to be two separate entities, since they 
are regulated by different legal documents (the former by the Ottawa Convention and Amended Protocol 
II of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the latter by CCW Protocol V). However, since 
mines are explosive devices that have similar effects to other ERW, and it is often impossible to separate 
the two during clearance operations, some in the community have adopted a “working definition” (as 
opposed to a legal one) of ERW. This working definition is a blanket term that includes mines, UXO, 
abandoned explosive ordnance and other explosive devices.
Geneva Conventions The Geneva Conventions are international treaties on the laws of the conduct of war. For more 
information: http://www.genevaconventions.org/.
Human Development Report This report is an annual milestone publication by the United Nations Development Programme. For 
more information: http://hdr.undp.org.
International Mine Action 
Standards (IMAS)
The IMAS provide the framework of international standards and guidelines for mine clearance and were 
developed to improve effectiveness, efficiency and safety in mine action.  For more information: http://
www.mineactionstandards.org.
Irregular Warfare (IW) According to the U.S. Department of Defense, irregular warfare is “A violent struggle among state and non-state 
actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, 
though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influ-
ence, and will.” For more information: http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/iw-joc.pdf
Land Release According to the most recent IMAS (8.20 Draft Edition, 10 June 2009), the term Land Release describes the 
process of applying all reasonable effort to identify or better define Confirmed Hazardous Areas and remove 
all suspicion of mines/ERW through Non-technical Survey, Technical Survey and/or clearance. The criteria 
for “all reasonable efforts” is defined by the national mine-action authority. See also International Mine Ac-
tion Standards (IMAS), Non-technical Survey, Technical Survey.
Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) A LIS is a community-based national survey that measures the extent of the impact of the landmine problem in a 
country, based on the number of recent victims, socioeconomic blockages and type of munitions.
Landmine Monitor Landmine Monitor is an initiative providing research for the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and 
the Cluster Munitions Coalition. Landmine Monitor provides systematic monitoring and assessment of the in-
ternational community’s response to the problem caused by landmines, cluster munitions and other explosive 
remnants of war. Landmine Monitor publishes annual reports in October that detail the landmine and ERW 
developments during the past year. For more information: http://lm.icbl.org.
13.3 | fall 2009 | the journal of ERW and mine action | terms and defenitions         81
41
JOURNAL: The Journal of ERW and Mine Action Issue 13.3
Published by JMU Scholarly Commons, 2009
Deadline: February 1, 2010
Publish Date: Summer 2010
Call For Papers 
14.2
READ THIS:
The Journal Editorial Staff reserves the right to re-
ject submissions that include text copied from other 
sources in part or as a whole. Works that have been 
published previously and for which the author re-
tains publishing rights may be submitted, but The 
Journal requires the author provide notification of 
this when submitting the article and give contact in-
formation for the original publisher so that reprint 
permission may be verified. Reprint submissions for 
which this information is not provided up front may 
be rejected. Please note that The Journal reserves all 
rights to content published and requires notifica-
tion and written approval before content is used 
again by another source or publication.
FEATURE
Non-state Actors 
The Feature section will concentrate on non-state actors (NSAs) and their role in and 
impact on mine action. How do NSAs affect issues such as mine clearance, weapons 
proliferation and conflict remediation? How do they hinder mine-clearance activities, 
and what steps (if any) can be taken to include armed groups in clearance objectives 
and other mine-action activities, such as risk education and victim assistance? What 
models exist for engaging NSAs effectively? 
SPECIAL REPORT
Physical Stockpile Security and Management
The Special Report section will highlight the topic of physical security and stock-
pile management. PSSM is one of the most urgent threat-reduction issues, as aging 
stockpiles are unstable and pose a threat to civilians in countries where stockpiles 
exist. How can governments maintain security for state-controlled stockpiles to 
ensure they do not become targets for terrorist and criminal groups? What is the 
best way to ensure that these munitions do not deteriorate, become more volatile 
or detonate randomly due to other stimuli? 
RESEARCH, TECHNOLOGY AND DEVELOPMENT
The Journal of ERW and Mine Action is soliciting articles for its peer-reviewed Research, 
Technology and Development section. All articles on current trends and advancements 
in R&D will be considered for this section? 
SUBMISSION GUIDELINES:
Article length: 800–1,500 words, submitted in digital format (i.e., Microsoft 
Word). R&D articles may be up to 3,000 words in length.
Images/photos: Photos must be scanned at 300 dpi or better. Line art, graphics and 
charts should be scanned at 600 dpi or better. Submit all graphics by e-mail or CD.
Important: Please do not include images in your documents. The quality is too poor 
for printing.
Contact information/bio: Articles must contain each author’s name and full contact 
information at the end of the article (i.e., phone, e-mail and mailing address). Please 
include a headshot photo and biography (up to 60 words) of each author for inclusion 
at the end of the article. Consider including credentials, books authored and other 
biographical information.
For complete submission guidelines, please visit:
http://maic.jmu.edu/journal/index/guidelines.htm.
Submit all materials to:
Editor-in-Chief, The Journal of ERW and Mine Action
Center for International Stabilization and Recovery/MAIC
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E-mail: editormaic@gmail.com
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FOCUS
Mine Action Success Stories
Issue 14.2 of The Journal of ERW and Mine Action will focus on 
success stories in mine action. In recent years, much progress 
has been made toward reducing and eliminating the effects 
of contamination from landmines and other explosive rem-
nants of war. How do different programs define success in 
mine action? What important milestones are there along the 
way to reaching a final clearance goal? Stories should focus 
on specific programs and initiatives that have made signifi-
cant gains, countries that have seen progress in remediat-
ing landmine and ERW contamination, and countries and 
organizations that have cooperated to increase efficiencies 
and effectiveness.
ON THE FRONT LINES
Mine Action Information Center
James Madison University 
Harrisonburg, VA / USA 
1.540.568.2756
maic@jmu.edu 
http://cisr.jmu.edu 
http://maic.jmu.edu 
The Center for International 
Stabilization and Recovery develops 
projects concerning mine-action 
and stabilization efforts around the 
world. For over a decade, the CISR 
has been serving organizations 
and individuals on the front lines 
of humanitarian crises and post-
conflict environments.
Contact CISR today.
 The Center for International        
 Stabilization and Recovery:
•	 Creates, edits and publishes  
cutting-edge publications
•	 Plans and supports interactive 
international conferences and 
workgroups
•	 Conducts practical research projects
•	 Develops course curricula and 
training materials
•	 Develops and delivers training and 
certificate programs
•	 Develops Web sites, portals and 
databases 
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FOCUS
Looking Beyond Mine Action 
In issue 14.3, The Journal of ERW and Mine Action will look 
at the interrelation of mine action with issues presented by 
small arms/light weapons, ammunition stockpiles, cluster 
munitions, and the broader challenges posed by disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration efforts. How are mine- and 
ERW-remediation activities intrinsically linked with these 
larger issues? How have practitioners grappled with these chal-
lenges? What strategies have been successful? What lessons 
learned and best practices can be shared? How are practitio-
ners addressing the overlap of these fields that have often been 
treated separately in the past? Have new skill sets been inte-
grated or developed in mine-action activities to address broad-
er issues related to SA/LW, CMs, ammo dumps and DDR?
READ THIS:
The Journal Editorial Staff reserves the right to reject 
submissions that include text copied from other sources 
in part or as a whole. Works that have been published 
previously and for which the author retains publishing 
rights may be submitted, but The Journal requires the 
author provide notification of this when submitting the 
article and give contact information for the original pub-
lisher so that reprint permission may be verified. Reprint 
submissions for which this information is not provided 
up front may be rejected. Please note that The Journal 
reserves all rights to content published and requires no-
tification and written approval before content is used 
again by another source or publication.
FEATURE
Development and Funding
As international funding for mine-action activities dwindles, organizations and programs 
have increasingly hybridized their efforts to encompass broader development activities. Proj-
ects that include or highlight assistance to internally displaced persons, infrastructure im-
provement, and other development tasks are receiving more attention and emphasis. What 
impact is this having on more traditional mine-action efforts? Are there development activi-
ties with which mine action can be easily integrated? Have past MA efforts included devel-
opment elements without explicitly saying so, and should these linkages be more widely 
touted? What are the ramifications of integrating mine action and development? 
SPECIAL REPORT
Update on National Programs
This section will explore the evolving nature of national mine-action programs; articles about 
national program goals, objectives and results are encouraged. Some of the questions to an-
swer: What determines a national program’s endstate? Which mine-action national programs 
have reached their endstates? What milestones have been met? What is yet to be done, and 
what needs to happen to assure completion? What risks may still remain? What level of risk 
is acceptable and how is this determined? How have national programs adapted to meet new 
needs and goals? Of particular interest are capacity-building efforts and those programs that 
have recently been established nationally, where either no program previously existed at the 
national level or the national mine-action structure was managed primarily through regional 
or international entities.
RESEARCH, TECHNOLOGY AND DEVELOPMENT 
IN MINE ACTION
The Journal of ERW and Mine Action is soliciting articles for its peer-reviewed Research, 
Technology and Development section, which appears in most issues of The Journal. All ar-
ticles on current trends and developments in R&D will be considered for this section. 
SUBMISSION GUIDELINES:
Article length: 1,000–2,000 words, submitted in digital format (i.e., Microsoft Word). 
R&D articles can be up to 3,000 words.
Images/photos: Photos must be scanned at 300 dpi or better. Line art, graphics and charts 
should be scanned at 600 dpi or better. Submit all graphics by e-mail or CD.
Important: Please do not include images in your documents. The quality is too poor 
for printing.
Contact information/bio: Articles must contain each author’s name and full contact in-
formation at the end of the article (i.e., phone, e-mail and mailing address). Please include a 
headshot photo and biography (up to 60 words) of each author for inclusion at the end of the 
article. Consider including credentials, books authored and other biographical information.
For complete submission guidelines, please visit:
http://maic.jmu.edu/journal/index/guidelines.htm.
Submit all materials to:
Editor-in-Chief, The Journal of ERW and Mine Action
Center for International Stabilization and Recovery/MAIC
James Madison University, MSC 4902
800 S. Main Street
Harrisonburg, VA 22807 / USA
Phone: +1 540 568 2503 / Fax: +1 540 568 8176
E-mail: editormaic@gmail.com
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